Tuesday, August 28, 2012

US sees Israel, tight Mideast ally, as spy threat

Read US sees Israel, tight Mideast ally, as spy threat in Spotlight

Egypt: IMF, FMF and the MFO

 

 

 

by J. Millard Burr

  |  

23-Aug-12


EGYPT: IMF, FMF AND THE MFO


"President Barack Obama himself, among other personnel from the US administration, promised Egypt $2 billion in the form of debt swaps and credit guarantees in 2011, shortly after Mubarak was unseated. These promises, however, have yet to materialise."  ("US ambassador discuss[es] assistance to Egypt," Ahram Online, Cairo, 17 August 2012.)

IMF TO THE RESCUE

     On 15 August the Egyptian Finance Minister Momtaz El Said met with U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Anne Patterson to discuss previously promised U.S. foreign aid funding.  Also discussed were Egypt government efforts to restore Egypt’s national economy and prospects for an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan.

     Regarding the IMF loan, Patterson agreed that given the political stability it was a "good time" for Egypt to resume negotiations with the IMF. In fact, new negotiations were pending and on 22 August IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde was to visit Cairo to re-open discussions that were initiated shortly after protests erupted across Egypt in January 2011.

     In May 2011 the Egyptian economy was in free-fall.  To halt the decline Egyptian officials had entered talks with the World Bank and it appeared that Egypt was about to receive a major infusion of financial aid.  Ostensibly, Cairo was to recieve some $4.5bn in assistance over the next two years, and World Bank President Robert Zoellick himself stated that it was indeed the Bank's desire to support the "Arab Spring."  According to Zoellick, Bank funds would be made conditional on Egypt's willingness to modernize its economy." (BBC, 24 May 2011 "Egypt and Tunisia to get $6 billion from World Bank.")

     Egypt-IMF talks then stalled in June—at a time when the IMF seemed poised to approve a $3 billion loan.  During a time of great political uncertainty in Egypt an arrangement seemingly had been reached that would achieve an orderly devaluation of the Egyptian pound and attack the problem of a growing budget deficit. But Egypt backed off and no final agreement was reached. In December 2011, talks were resumed but once again stalled.  And as the months passed analysts felt that to have the required effect on the Egyptian economy the IMF would have to fund much more than the $3 billion originally considered.  

     The army's Military Council, which was really in charge of the talks, admitted that it was responsible for postponing an agreement. The military leadership did not want to be condemned for what they thought would be a very unpopular move. Yet, as it lingered, in December 2011 Moody's downgraded Egypt's credit rating. The move occurred shortly after Egypt's leadership (or what passed for it) rejected the IMF's $3 billion credit arrangement first broached in June 2011. As General Mokhtar al-Mullah told reporters in December 2011,"The easiest thing would have been for the military council to accept the loans from abroad, give it to Egyptians to live a better life, and then hand over power and the Egyptian people would have been responsible to repay these debts."

     By 2012 the cost of domestic borrowing had increased, and foreign reserves were reduced by half.  Egyptian exports fell, and the crucial tourist industry continued its downward slide.  When the budget deficit reached 11% of gross domestic product, devaluation of the Egyptian pound had to be considered whether the military liked it or not. Today, Most economists are aware that the Egyptian economy is a mess, and to be effective an IMF package would now need to be somewhere in the range of $10-15 billion.

     In advance of the Patterson-El Said meeting it had been announced by Abdallah Shehata, economic advisor to President Mohammed Morsi, that his government was preparing an entirely new program for the forthcoming IMF negotiations.  It would emphasize "social justice," something that undoubtedly would appeal to Washington, to Secretary of State Clinton and Ambassador Patterson.  El-Said explained that with regard to the "low-income sector" the government intended to "minimise the socio-economic gap between citizens.”  An organization dominated by urbanites and professionals, it is hard to see what the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimun) can do to better the lives of millions of farm families—the poorest of the poor. A land reform law of 1953 limited individual holdings to no more than 200 acres. Second and third agrarian reform laws further limited the area of landholdings.  With no land to play with, it is likely that the Ikhwan will introduce more subsidies, placing more pressure on an already overburdened budget.
 
FOREIGN AID

     At his meeting with Patterson El Said admitted that the issue of greatest immediate importance was the missing funds that had been promised by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and Kuwait.  El Said noted that his government was daily expecting the arrival of a half billion dollars (of two billion that had been promised) from Qatar. In addition, a major tranche of funds promised by Saudi Arabia was said to be in the pipeline. As for the others, who could guess?

     With regard to United States economic assistance, following the meeting Ambassador Patterson informed the press that a U.S. State Department delegation would arrive in Cairo by the end of August.  Discussions would be held on the latest political and economic developments, "and the means of providing Egypt with funds, especially after the appointment of Egypt's new government." (Ahram Online, 17 August 2012)

     Prior to the fall of the Mubarak government, Egypt annually received more United States foreign aid (civilian and military) than any country except for Israel. It has averaged slightly more than $2 billion per annum since the signing of the Camp David Peace Accords.  The amount of American Foreign Military Financing (FMF) has varied very little from year to year, and funds devoted to economic assistance, and generally channeled through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), has slowly declined since 1998.

     FMF that averaged more than $1.3 billion per annum allowed Egypt to receive U.S. military hardware.  Inter alia, it has included jet aircraft, Apache helicopters, aerial surveillance aircraft, and armored personnel carriers.  The Egyptian military could also purchase equipment directly from U.S. defense contractors in excess of the annual FMF payment.  Both the Pentagon and Foggy Bottom have argued that FMF provides the cornerstone to a very cordial relationship, and Egyptian leaders called the FMF "untouchable compensation" for the continuation of peace with Israel.  Just how the Morsi government with its recent change of military leadership stands on the issue of U.S. military aid is presently unclear.

      From news reports following their meeting one could assume that Ambassador Patterson gave assurances that Washington had already reached a decision, and aid to Egypt would continue without conditions.  And given the tenor of Egyptian news reports that followed, one might easily assume that U.S. economic assistance might even be enhanced.
 
MILITARIZING THE SINAI

     As a result of the disorder during Egypt's "Arab Spring", on 28 January 2011 an Egyptian military communiqué ordered the national police to relinquish their posts while the army restored order throughout the nation.  In short order, many police departed the Sinai and that region devolved into chaos. Conditions were so hectic that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, fearing the increase of arms smuggling into Gaza, "agreed to let Egypt deploy 800 additional troops to the Sinai" to fill a power vacuum in the area.  This occurred even though, "the two countries' peace accords stipulate the peninsula should be demilitarized." (Bradley and Mitnick, "Bedouin Arms Smugglers See Opening in Sinai, The Wall Street Journal, 5 February 2011.)

     Six months later, Israeli forces reportedly checkmated what it called a "spectacular" border attack conceived by an Al Qaida affiliate.  Hatched within the Gaza Strip, the plot was to be the fourth in a series of attacks on Sinai gas pipeline that supplies Israel with 35% of its need (and Gaza with all its gas).  On 14 August three Egyptian army brigades of 1,700 men, an equal number of police, and 3,400 security personnel, backed by tanks and personnel carriers, drove across the Sinai and into the Mediterranean towns of El Arish and Sheikh Zuweyid. Once those towns were occupied the convoy continued on to Rafah, an Egyptian town bordering with  Gaza.  An Egyptian military communiqué reported that the occupation force had gained control of a region that had been lost to lawless and terrorist elements.  Unfortunately, despite the occupation the attacks on the gas pipeline continued.  

     Ironically, it was then little noted in the media that the movement of Egyptian forces into the eastern Sinai was yet again a contravention of the Camp David Accords and Article 2, Annex I, which defines the limits of responsibility (the "Security Arrangements") in the various geographic zones.  Whether Israel (and the United States) agreed to what was a violation of the terms of the 33-year-old peace treaty has never been clarified.  Still, It has been reported in the Israeli press that the military appendix to the Accords was modified after the situation in Sinai began to deteriorate; it apparently allowed for the addition of seven additional Egypt military battalions in the Sinai. If true, it is assumed that the United States, which is a guarantor of the agreement, agreed to the increase.  

     In effect, by 2012 the Egyptian army has remilitarized the eastern Sinai—a sector it had been excluded from for more than three decades. The military continued to claim that its move was in response to the presence of 2,000 well-organized and heavily armed Islamist gunmen and a passel of smugglers that threatened the peace. Left unsaid was the reality that the Egyptian military felt that the number of rebels was obviously more than the existing Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) present in the Sinai could handle.

 QUO VADIS MFO

    As an addendum to the 1978 Camp David Accords, in August 1981 the United States, Egypt and Israel signed a Protocol to the Camp David Treaty of Peace establishing the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). The MFO mission was required to implement the security provisions of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace and prevent any violation of its terms. The agreement placed strict limitations on the presence of Egyptian military and police in the Sinai Peninsula.

     The MFO role was initiated in April 1982, the same day that Israel returned sovereignty of the Sinai to Egypt. Under Article 2, Annex I, of the Peace Treaty the Sinai Peacekeeping Zones were delimited.  The Peninsula was divided into three geographically defined zones" In Zone A, located just to the east of the Suez Canal, Egypt was allowed to quarter a mechanized infantry division with a total of 22,000 troops; Zone B, to the east of A and an area comprising the second third of the Sinai, allowed Egypt to emplace four border security battalions and civilian police.  Zone C, which was the most problematic of the three, was located between Line B and the Egypt-Israel border. In Zone C, only the MFO and the Egyptian civilian police were permitted.  In that zone three battalions of MFO were quartered at two bases: MFO headquarters with two infantry battalions (Colombia, Fiji, etc.,) at North Camp was located south of the Mediterranean town of El Arish; an American battalion was quartered at South Camp north of Sharm el Sheikh, now a well known tourist destination.
 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

   In Israel it was reported on 19 August that the government of Israel had asked Egypt to withdraw armored vehicles—including tanks and armored personnel carriers—that had "entered the Sinai in force ten days earlier in contravention of the peace treaty between the two nations." Apparently, their deployment had only been admitted "retroactively." (Gil Ronen, Arutz Sheva)  The Egyptian response to the demand was seen in Israel as an indication of how relations with the Morsi government would proceed.

     Two days later Al Ahram, Egypt's state-run media megaphone, "dismissed the matter as a fabrication of the Israeli news media and said that the move had been fully coordinated with the Israeli military." (Isabel Kershner, AP, 21 August 2012)  Israeli news reports that followed claimed that the Israeli cabinet had authorized the use of Egyptian helicopter gunships, but the movement of a mass of tanks into the Sinai was neither approved nor coordinated with Israel. There next followed an even more disturbing report: Egyptian Anti-Aircraft Missiles were sighted in Sinai. (Gil Ronen, Arutz 7, 20 August 2012)  If true, it was a dangerous provocation because their deployment could only be intended for use against Israeli aircraft.  Meanwhile, in Washington, which is a tripartite member of the Camp David Accords and should be concerned with the deteriorating conditions in the Sinai, nothing of substance has been revealed either in Foggy Bottom or the Pentagon.

CONCLUSION

     From its beginning the MFO has been assiduous in protecting its image as a neutral entity devoted to keeping the peace in the Sinai.  It is not, however, a fighting force.  And under present conditions it is incapable of continuing its peacekeeping role envisioned for it by the 1982 agreement. In the slipstream of the military intrusions that began in early 2011, the MFO raison d'etre has been shattered.  The pier on which Egypt-Israel peace was moored has now been washed away.  To keep the peace today a multinational force would require heavy weapons and armored vehicles.  

     It is presently unclear what the United States, Egypt, or Israel expect of the MFO.  It is likely, however, that Egypt's Morsi will expel it soon unless something like U.S. foreign assistance would change Ikhwan thinking.  For the Muslim Brotherhood a foreign presence on Egyptian soil is no more welcome than the American military presence in Saudi Arabia was welcomed by its Islamist populace.   

     It would only seem logical that before the United States begins to consider any new foreign aid package—and the renewal of the annual billion-dollar stipend that is paid to the Egyptian military—there should be a new tripartite agreement that responds to what has now become the creeping remilitarization of the Egyptian Sinai.  For more than a quarter-century U.S. assistance to Egypt has been predicated on the willingness of Cairo to keep the peace with Israel. Now, however, with a sea-change in the both the government of Egypt and in its armed forces leadership, it is time to discern what Egypt's intentions for the Sinai are.  Certainly, a decision must be reached regarding the MFO.  A decision should be made as soon as possible regarding the role that institution should play in the Sinai, or whether its presence in its current form is necessary. 


http://econwarfare.org/viewarticle.cfm?id=4528&goback=.gmp_944357.gde_944357_member_152152321 

Tuesday, August 21, 2012

Meles Zenawi: From a Freedom fighter to a Dictator






Just another story of a man who started his life as a freedom fighter and gradually turned into a dictator.
His reign can be summarized in two key numbers: 21 years in office & 99% success rate in elections. He ruled his country with an iron fist, and claimed achieving a sustainable economic development pace for Ethiopia. Not only did he introduce the ethnic federalism model, but he also maintained a relatively stablized country. However, rebel movements never disappeared from the different regions of the country.  

A strong friend of the United States, A frequent stubborn foe of Egypt, he played an influential role in the Horn of Africa Region.
 

Here is a selection of articles that highlight different aspects of both his life & death. 

 A short biography

Meles Zenawi leaves behind richer, less tolerant Ethiopia

 http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_meles-zenawi-leaves-behind-richer-less-tolerant-ethiopia_1730717 
Ethiopian strongman Meles Zenawi led one of Africa's most populous nations for more than two decades, steering it along the path of economic growth while clamping down on dissent.

A towering figure in Africa's political landscape, Prime Minister Meles died late on Monday aged 57 at an overseas hospital where he had been recovering from an undisclosed illness for two months, state-run television said on Tuesday. He was born Legesse Zenawi in 1955 in Adwa, the site of Ethiopia's most celebrated victory against colonial invaders Italy in 1896.

He took the nom-de-guerre Meles as a tribute to Meles Tekle, a young activist killed by the government. But the time Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, the head of the Communist junta that ruled the country from 1974 to 1987, launched his Red Terror purge in 1977, Meles had ditched his medical studies and was fighting in the bush.

He was a rising figure in the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) that he helped found as a 20-year-old, which then aligned with other groups to form the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition. The EPRDF entered Addis Ababa in 1991, much to the amazement of the locals.
Meles led the country first as transitional president and later, after poorly contested elections in 1995, as prime minister of the renamed Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, winning renewed mandates in 2005 and 2010 in polls that rights groups said were rife with violations.

The West welcomed Africa's youngest leader enthusiastically, grateful for his overthrow of a communist regime and impressed with his urbane manner. It also came to value him for the central role his country - home to one of Africa's biggest armies - played in regional and continental security.
Former US President Bill Clinton said Meles was part of a "new generation" of African leaders and he was invited to join then British Prime Minister Tony Blair's crusading Commission for Africa. At home, the EPRDF set about trying to pull Ethiopia out of poverty, pledging to drive growth and improve the lives of peasant farmers.

It introduced a system of ethnic federalism, opening regional parliaments and giving Ethiopia's main ethnic groups the chance to govern the areas in which they dominate. Under Meles' leadership, the Horn of Africa country also embarked on a mass of energy and infrastructure projects, while hospitals and schools throughout the country have surged ten-fold. Officials expect economic growth of 11% for the 2011/2012 fiscal year that ended in June, thanks to rising agricultural output, the seventh consecutive fiscal year of growth. However, inflation remains stubbornly high, hitting 20 percent in July.
Meles forged close business ties with India and Turkey as well as Asian powerhouse China, which footed the $200 million bill for the sprawling, new headquarters of the African Union. The former rebel has made key contributions to regional security, twice sending troops into Somalia to battle Islamist rebels, while Ethiopian peacekeepers have been deployed in several African hotspots such as Sudan's Darfur and Abyei regions.

But Meles' record of solid economic growth, poverty reduction and closer ties to the West has been coloured by a firm crackdown on dissent. Following the disputed polls of 2005, Ethiopia rounded up almost the entire leadership of an opposition group that won an unprecedented number of seats in parliament and jailed them for life for treason. In 2009 followed an anti-terror law, under which more than one hundred opposition figures have been arrested.

The government insists it is tackling rebel groups that have links with al Qaeda and arch-foe Eritrea. More than 10 journalists have also been charged under the law, according to the Committee to Protest Journalists.
The group says Ethiopia is close to replacing Eritrea as the African country with the highest number of journalists behind bars. Two Swedish journalists were jailed for 11 years on charges of entering the country illegally and aiding a rebel group. Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights, has slammed the verdicts, saying journalists, human rights defenders and critics were facing a "climate of intimidation".
Meles responded with trademark defiance, labelling the duo as "messengers boys of terror groups". During the Group of Eight summit in Chicago last May, Meles was interrupted soon after he started to speak: "You are a dictator! You have committed crimes against humanity!" a member of the audience said. The bald, bespectacled strongman, visibly shocked at first, tried to continue talking before staring down, stony-faced.



 Future Impact:

Ethiopian PM Meles Zenawi dies after illness

 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19328356

Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has died aged 57 in a hospital abroad, the government says.
It did not give details but an EU spokesman later told journalists Mr Meles had died in Brussels, Belgium.
Mr Meles had not been seen in public for weeks and speculation about his health mounted when he missed a summit in Addis Ababa last month.
His deputy, Hailemariam Desalegn, becomes prime minister until elections due in 2015, state media reported.
Mr Meles took power as the leader of rebels that ousted communist leader Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991.
He is credited with spearheading economic development in Ethiopia - but, critics charge, at the price of respect for human rights.
He was austere and hardworking, with a discipline forged from years spent in the guerrilla movement - and almost never smiled, says Elizabeth Blunt, the BBC's former correspondent in Addis Ababa.
Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf said Mr Meles was an "intellectual leader for the continent", and UK Prime Minister David Cameron called him "an inspirational spokesman for Africa" who had lifted millions out of poverty.
But a spokesman for al-Shabab Islamist militants in Somalia - where Mr Meles twice sent troops to fight - told Reuters news agency they were "very glad" of his death, saying Ethiopia was "sure to collapse".
Ethiopia's Council of Ministers announced "with great sadness the untimely death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi" in a statement, state TV reported.
The statement said Mr Meles had been receiving medical treatment abroad for the past two months and that his health was improving. But he developed a "sudden infection" on Sunday and despite emergency treatment, died at 23:40 on Monday.
European Commission spokesman Olivier Bailly later told a regular news briefing that Mr Meles "passed away during the night here in Brussels".
Over some eight weeks that Mr Meles had been absent from the public eye, concerns about his health had grown, and in July he was said to have been admitted to hospital.
Reports suggested he was in hospital in the Belgian capital suffering a stomach complaint but these were never confirmed by the Ethiopian authorities.
Three weeks ago, government spokesman Bereket Simon dismissed reports Mr Meles was critically ill, and declined to give any details about Mr Meles's whereabouts.
A period of mourning had been declared until the funeral, for which no date has been announced.
State television said his body would be flown to Addis Ababa later on Tuesday.

Instability concerns
Mr Hailemariam, who is also Ethiopia's foreign minister, will become acting prime minister, government spokesman Bereket Simon told reporters.
He said an election was not necessary as the "constructional procedure" allowed for Mr Hailemariam to "kick off as a full-fledged prime minister".
In an earlier news conference, Mr Bereket said Mr Meles had struggled with illness for a year, but he had continued to work regardless.
Concerns have been expressed - including by Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga - that Mr Meles's death could lead to a power vacuum and dangerous instability in Ethiopia.
But Mr Bereket insisted the country was stable and that "everything will continue as charted" by the late prime minister.
This theme was echoed by state television, which stated that "even if Ethiopia has been badly affected for missing its great leader, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi initiated fundamental policies and strategies which will be further strengthened".
Ethiopia's economy has grown rapidly in recent years, despite the secession of Eritrea and the subsequent war between the two countries.

Under Mr Meles, Ethiopia became a staunch US ally, receiving hundreds of millions of dollars in aid over the years, and hosting the US military drones that patrol East Africa.
He won accolades from the West for sending troops to battle Islamist militants in Somalia, says the BBC's James Copnall.
But concern had been growing about the lack of democracy and human rights in Ethiopia, our correspondent in the region says.
At least 200 people died in the violence that followed the 2005 elections, and many journalists and politicians have been locked up.
One rights critic, Commander Assefa Seifu, called Mr Meles "a devil incarnate".
"He was always talking about democracy, civil rights, adherence to [the] constitution and the like. But it was only a lip service," he told the BBC.

 Analysis


Meles Zenawi's death will have repercussions far beyond his country. He was undeniably central to everything in Ethiopia - the good and the bad, the economic growth and development, as well as the repressive climate denounced by opposition politicians and journalists. But he also played a key role in the region.
Since Mr Meles took power in 1991, Ethiopia has seen Eritrea secede, then fought a war with the new country. It also twice sent troops into Somalia to fight militants linked to al-Qaeda.
Ethiopia also has peacekeepers in Abyei, the border region claimed by both Sudan and South Sudan.
Political leaders in all these countries will be carrying out rapid calculations about what Mr Meles' death means for them.
The West has also lost a key ally in the Horn of Africa. Now the attention will switch to whether Mr Meles built a strong enough system to outlast him. He was austere and hardworking, with a discipline forged from years spent in the guerrilla movement - and almost never smiled, says Elizabeth Blunt, the BBC's former correspondent in Addis Ababa. Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf said Mr Meles was an "intellectual leader for the continent", and UK Prime Minister David Cameron called him "an inspirational spokesman for Africa" who had lifted millions out of poverty.
But a spokesman for al-Shabab Islamist militants in Somalia - where Mr Meles twice sent troops to fight - told Reuters news agency they were "very glad" of his death, saying Ethiopia was "sure to collapse".
Ethiopia's Council of Ministers announced "with great sadness the untimely death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi" in a statement, state TV reported.
The statement said Mr Meles had been receiving medical treatment abroad for the past two months and that his health was improving. But he developed a "sudden infection" on Sunday and despite emergency treatment, died at 23:40 on Monday.
European Commission spokesman Olivier Bailly later told a regular news briefing that Mr Meles "passed away during the night here in Brussels".



How Egyptians see him:

Here is an interesting look on how Egyptian press saw his life. The title of the following article is :

Meles Zenawi....US's cop in the African Horn and the enemy of Egypt's historic share in the Nile

ميليس زيناوى.. الشرطي الأمريكي في القرن الإفريقي وحامل لواء العداوة لحصة مصر من مياه النيل

بعد فترة من التعتيم والسرية الشديدة فرضتها السلطات الإثيوبية دامت أكثر من شهرين بشأن حقيقة مرض رئيس الوزراء ميليس زيناوي، أعلن اليوم الثلاثاء رسميًا عن وفاته في بلجيكا عن عمر ناهز 57 عامًا.

ارتبط اسم زيناوي مع الشارع المصري للمرة الأولى عام 1994 بعد محاولة الاغتيال الفاشلة التى تعرض لها الرئيس السابق حسني مبارك على الأراضى الإثيوبية، وزاد هذا الارتباط في السنوات الأخيرة بسبب إصراره على منازعة مصر في حصتها التاريخية بمياه النيل، وعدم اعترافه باتفاقية نهر النيل الموقعة عام 1959 التى تحدد حصص كل دولة من دول حوض النيل في مياه النهر.

اتخذ زيناوى موقفًا معاديًا لمصر خلال السنوات الثلاث الأخيرة، واتهمها بمحاولة زعزعة أمن واستقرار بلاده عبر بتمويل جماعات متمردة مسلحة تسعى للاستيلاء على السلطة، في موقف فُسِرَ وقتها بأنه محاولة للخروج من أزماته الداخلية ومحاصرة المعارضة له ومطالبته باصلاحات سياسية واقتصادية في البلاد.

استطاع زيناوي أن يؤثر على دول حوض النيل، وقام بإقناع بوروندي وأوغندا وكينيا تنزانيا ورواندا، بتوقيع الاتفاقية الإطارية الجديدة لتقاسم مياه النيل عام 2011، الأمر الذي يهدد أمن مصر المائي بشكل كبير.

وفي سعيه لأن يثبت دعائم حكمه في إثيوبيا؛ انفتح زيناوى على القوى الكبرى وخاصة الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، بهدف تحويل بلاده إلى قوى إقليمية في المنطقة مستغلًا في ذلك الحرب على الإرهاب والجماعات الجهادية المسلحة، وسوقَ نفسه باعتباره الشرطي الأمريكي في منطقة القرن الأفريقي، مستغلًا حالة السيولة الشديدة التي تشهدها جارته الصومال، والانفلات الأمني الذي تعيشه بعد أن تحولت إلى قبلة لتنظيم القاعدة، والتنظيمات الجهادية.

قام زيناوي بتحريك جيشه داخل الأراضي الصومالية للمرة الأولى عام 2006 بهدف القضاء على حركة الشباب المتشددة، فيما اعتبر وقتها أكبر خطوة وثقت علاقات إثيوبيا بالغرب منذ الإطاحة بمنجستو هيلا ميريم.

وفي عام 2011 قامت القوات الإثيوبية بدخول الصومال للمرة الثانية بدعم أمريكي أوروبي، وأكد زيناوي أن بلاده تعتزم الإبقاء على قواتها في الصومال إلى حين التصديق على دستور جديد للبلاد، و يصبح جيشها قادرًا على مواجهة خطر المتشددين.

دخل زيناوى في علاقات وثيقة مع إسرائيل، وفتح الباب على مصراعيه للأجهزة الأمنية الإسرائيلية خاصة الموساد، وتحولت أديس أبابا إلى واحدة من أقوى قواعد الموساد في إفريقيا ومعبر تل أبيب القوى للتغلل في غرب ووسط القارة الإفريقية، تحت ستار تصدير تكنولوجيا الري والزراعة التى تتفوق فيها الدولة العبرية إلى القارة السمراء.


وبالرغم من الانتقادات الشديدة التى وجهت إلى زيناوي، يُحسب له القفزة الكبيرة التى شهدها الاقتصاد الإثيوبي خلال سنوات حكمه، وتحقيقه معدلات نمو تخطت الستة فى المائة خلال السنوات الخمس الأخيرة، وكان أكثر المجالات نموًا في البلاد هو الزراعة، التى أولاها اهتماما شديدًا نظرًا للامكانيات الإثيوبية الكبيرة غير المستغله فى الأراضى والمياه.

جدير بالذكر أن زيناوي ولد عام 1954 في إقليم تكراي بشمال إثيوپيا، ودرس الطب في جامعة أديس أبابا وكانت تعرف وقتها باسم جامعة هيلا سلاسي لمدة سنتين، ثم ترك دراسة الطب عام 1975، وانضم إلى جبهة تحرير شعب تكراي، وعندما كان عضوا في الجبهة، أسس الاتحاد الماركسي-اللنيني لتكراي.

تولى زيناوى حكم إثيوبيا عام 1991م، بعد أن أطاح المجلس العسكري الذي كان عضوًا بارزًا فيه بالديكتاتور السابق منجستو هيلا مريم، واستمر في منصبه حتى عام 1995 ، ثم تولى رئاسة الوزراء منذ ذلك الحين بعد أن أجرى اصلاحات سياسية وتعديلات غيرت نظام الحكم في البلاد من رئاسي إلى برلماني، بهدف عدم صناعة ديكتاتور جديد، بيد أن هذا الهدف لم يتحقق بعد أن أحكم زيناوي قبضته على إثيوبيا، واستمر على رأس النظام السياسي أكثر من 20 عامًا، كنتيجه لإصراره على وضع مادة في الدستور تنص على تحصين منصب رئيس الوزراء من الإقالة.

حصل زيناوي على ماجستير في إدارة الأعمال من الجامعة المفتوحة في المملكة المتحدة عام 1995، ثم ماجستير العلوم في الاقتصاد من جامعة إراسموس في هولندا عام 2004.

في عام 1998 تعرض زيناوى إلى أقوى اختبار في حياته السياسية عندما قامت إريتريا بغزو بلاده، مما أدى لاندلاع حرب أسفرت عن مقتل عشرات الآلاف من الشعبين.

أظهر زيناوي خلال الحرب مع إثيوبيا قدرة سياسية وعسكرية بارعة استطاع خلالها أن يوحد الشعب الإثيوبي خلف قواته، وتمكن من دحر القوات الإريترية بل وسيطر على على حوالي ثلثي الأراضي الإرترية، وبالرغم من ذلك قام بتوقيع معاهدة سلام مثيرة للجدل مع إريتريا تضمن لها امتيازات عديدة.

أثار هذا القرار غضب الكثير من الإثيوپيين وأدى إلى حالة انقسام داخل الحزب الحاكم، بسبب قناعة كثيرين أن زيناوي يرغب في الحفاظ على الرئيس الإريتري أسياسي أفورقي.

وفي عام 2011 تغير موقف زيناوي من أفورقي وأعلنت إثيوبيا صراحة دعمها لجماعات إريترية متمردة تسعى للإطاحة بالرئيس أفورقي. وفي مارس الماضي أقرت إثيوبيا للمرة الأولى أن قواتها قامت بهجمات على المتمردين داخل إريتريا، وكانت هذه أول مرة تعترف فيها أديس أبابا بوقوع مثل تلك الهجمات منذ انتهاء الحرب الحدودية بين البلدين

http://gate.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/13/71/242647/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85/%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B7%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%A7.aspx .

Ya Nhar Alwan

See Ya Nhar Alwan and other 7amousha digital art in My Art page


Monday, August 20, 2012

Targeting Tribal Leaders: A New Militant Tactic in Sinai



By Ashley Lindsey

Militants killed Egyptian tribal leader Khalaf al-Menahy and his son Aug. 13 as the two were returning from a conference in east Sinai organized and attended by tribal leaders to denounce militancy, according to Sinai security forces. The senior al-Menahy was a prominent proponent of bolstering the Sinai Peninsula's representation in Egypt's parliament and of improving security in the region. He also was a prominent sheikh in the Sawarka tribe, said to be the largest in Sinai. Following his burial Aug. 13, the tribe vowed to seek vengeance.
This is the first reported case of militants attacking tribal leaders in Sinai. It comes soon after an attack on Egyptian security forces Aug. 5 and an attack on military checkpoints in northern Sinai on Aug. 8.
Although the militant tactic of targeting tribal leaders is new to Sinai, the tactic has been common in conflict zones in the Middle East and South Asia, such as in Yemen, Iraq and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. Though it can offer many benefits to these militants -- including weakening the targeted tribe and possibly leading to its co-option -- these kinds of attacks tend to only succeed in zones with little government control and against tribes that cannot effectively retaliate. Examining similar instances of this tactic thus provides a helpful tool for assessing the consequences of attacks against tribal elements in the Sinai Peninsula.

A Widespread Militant Tactic

Yemen

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has operated openly in Yemen's tribal-dominated southern and eastern provinces for years. It has sought to expand its presence and operations by winning over local tribes using tactics such as strategic marriages.
Lately, it appears to have begun a shift from wooing tribal leaders to intimidating them. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula recently failed in an attempt to assassinate tribal leader Majed al-Dhahab in the city of Radda in Bayda province. An important tribal leader, al-Dhahab participated in the offensive to drive al Qaeda -- and his own cousin, a local al Qaeda leader -- from the region after the militant group seized control of Radda in January. Al-Dhahab's son received a package that unbeknownst to him contained a bomb, which he was instructed to give to his father. However, the package exploded in his arms Aug. 4 before he could deliver it. Immediately after his son's death, al-Dhahab received a call warning him that the group would kill anyone who opposed it.
The group followed up with another attack on tribal elements Aug. 5. A suicide bomber detonated an explosive device at a wake in Jaar, killing 45 people. The dead included several tribal fighters who had participated in the June Yemeni government offensive against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and the wounded included a tribal leader.
The region's tribes have not publicly vowed to retaliate against the militant group. If they are capable of doing so, they probably will respond to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's attacks. But the tribes could be too weak to mount an effective response, especially in the wake of attacks on their leadership structure. This could cause some tribesmen to abandon the fight, allowing militants to try to resume activity in the region's towns should they wish.

Iraq and the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border

Although new to Yemen, militants frequently used the tactic of attacking tribal leaders during the U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The tactic is still frequently used, especially in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. In one significant instance, in 2007 al Qaeda in Iraq assassinated high-profile Sunni tribal Sheikh Abdul-Sattar Abu Risha, who led the Anbar Awakening Council. A U.S. ally, Abu Risha had formed the council, uniting dozens of Sunni tribes in the province against al Qaeda in Iraq. His killing backfired on the militant group, generating a massive outpouring of sympathy for Abu Risha and prompting the tribes in the province to join in vowing to fight al Qaeda in Iraq to the death.
In southern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban are deeply embedded into the tribal system. They have effectively used the tactic of assassinating tribal leaders to eliminate obstacles to their operations and evolution. To this end, they regularly employ suicide operations, armed assaults and roadside bombs against anti-Taliban militias known as lashkars and against tribal leaders in northwestern Pakistan.
One area particularly affected by such attacks is Bajaur, a Pakistani agency that borders Afghanistan's Kunar province. After numerous attacks on tribal leaders and members of peace committees in Bajaur, the Mamond tribe announced July 25 that the tribal leaders had formed a lashkar to prevent cross-border attacks. Hundreds of elders, leaders and religious figures of various subtribes and peace committees pledged their support for this militia. As with the killing of Abu Risha, the Afghan Taliban attacks on tribesmen and leadership in the region spurred a fiercely united response across numerous tribes, with the new militia even expressing a willingness to enter Afghanistan to attack Taliban leaders.

 

Upsides and Downsides of a Militant Tactic

Militant groups attack tribal leaders to increase their influence and area of operations. From the militants' perspective, removing a tribal leader ideally will weaken the targeted tribe. This could end the tribes' resistance and even lead to the its being co-opted by the militant group due to a leadership vacuum following the militant attack. The weakening of the tribe could leave the group no choice but to allow the militant group to operate unchallenged in its territory. Even though assassinated tribal leaders are replaced and the leadership structure remains intact, tribal leaders in the area could be persuaded to adopt a more accommodating stance on the presence of militants.
Success for a militant group in the long term happens under two conditions. First, the militants must be acting in an area with a tribal patronage network and limited government oversight. Without such a network, attacks on tribal leaders in efforts to co-opt and intimidate that tribe would not provide any significant gain. In Yemen, for example, the patronage and tribal network are very strong and in most cases enjoy greater legitimacy and power than the government. Attacks against tribal chiefs there are accordingly tantamount to attacks on the local government. On the one hand, that means tribal networks can band together and shun foreign militant elements as one community. On the other hand, if al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is able to coerce a tribe into aligning with it, the militant group will then enjoy access to that tribes' resources, will gain the ability to plan and launch attacks in that area, and could even gain better relations with neighboring tribes.
Second, the group must be militarily capable of overwhelming the targeted tribe and its allies or at least of gaining the upper hand. As can be seen from the Iraq example, killing Abu Risha backfired because his tribe was large, committed and militarily strong, and it had the support of several allied Sunni tribes that belonged to his Anbar Awakening Council.
The tactic of targeting a tribal leader thus comes with certain risks. When the aforementioned two conditions are not met, a militant group exposes itself to great danger when it targets tribal leaders.

 

Consequences of the Sinai Assassination

The Sinai Peninsula meets the requirement of limited government control and strong tribal networks. The question then becomes whether the Sinai tribes can muster a strong defense against the militants. In the coming weeks, it will be important to look for signs of the retaliation pledged by al-Menahy's Sawarka tribe and others allied with it. This retaliation could come in the form of attacks against the militants passing through Sawarka and its allied tribes' territory.
Tribal retaliation could also come in the less aggressive, yet still effective, form of supplying increased logistical support and intelligence to the Egyptian government. Increased weapons seizures and the arrest of key leaders suggest that tribal sources on the ground are providing intelligence to Cairo. A targeted campaign against the militants already has begun, with Egyptian planes bombing the mountains of El Arish on Aug. 15. The intelligence for these attacks likely came from local tribes.
The success of tribal and Egyptian security efforts against the militants will determine whether the militants miscalculated their position in Sinai when they attacked a key tribal leader. The resilience of militants in Sinai also will help determine whether they can continue to stage attacks against Egypt and Israel.
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/targeting-tribal-leaders-new-militant-tactic-sinai?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120816&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=536cf9b22736498fb84bb3f864738f1a

Thursday, August 9, 2012

Sinai: Closed Until Further Notice سيناء: مُغلقة حتى اشعارا آخر


Military operations, guns, insurgents, special forces, helicopters, attacks on check points,.... Northern and Mid Sinai is becoming a mini war zone. And its all because of the last tragic killings.
I studied various conflicts in the world and as I came across different examples in Africa and Latin America, an image of Egypt was forged in my head: this big crazy nation that luckily succeeded to keep itself safe from high rates of criminality, civil wars, insurgency, separatist movements,...etc.
But as time passes, this image seems to fall and the country seems to join another category. Criminality is not as high as in Brazil but we are on the road. Drug trafficking isn't as flagrant as in Mexico, but hey in less than one month we caught over 240 million narcotic pills in different ports,........ imagine how many have already passed. We have no rebel movements like in Colombia or Uganda, but dam it an attack by insurgents killed 16 army soldiers,.... not to mention the number of police officers killed during the last year and a half. Violence is no longer a phenomenon but a norm, the society is getting more brutalized and massacres are becoming less and less shocking.   
 
No one remembers hearing of such a massacre for long time, probably since the early 90's known as the terror war era, when again radicals regularly attacked and killed soldiers with cold blood in South Egypt.

However, this time is still different. When? Why? &  How? They attacked soldiers during iftar, a thing that we don't even remember Israelis have done during the war.  They stole two armored vehicles and crossed the borders for a reason they only know. And How? that is a big question......how the fuck could they manage to plan, gather, attack a military checkpoint without any dam clue by the mighty EGIS or all the other national security bodies (even if they did inform the president as they claim)? 

Anyway, I am too depressed to narrate the story, to analyze the facts (in case there were any), to speak of  the whole incident. Its just too sad to know that fellow soldiers, whom I or my brother could have been in their place, were killed that way, and by so called egyptians. Its even sadder to know that there exist Egyptians ( whatever was all the conspiracy plots raised about who planned it) who are ready to execute such an operation against their army, which protect their borders, in that way, knowing that this army is constituted of faithful soldiers and recruits who are just spending a military service.

But I am also very annoyed hearing all the arguments given by the MB partisans and Morsi supporters, to defend and justify his decisions of releasing ex-terrorists and to maintain fully non controlled open borders & tunnels with Gaza. With no concern what so ever for Egyptian national security, they cant stop defending this pan-Islamist ideology on the expense of the nation's interests. There will be no Islamic, Arabic, African ...... what ever Umma, before having a powerful strong well-conserved Egypt, who knows well its ancient history, who believes in & protects its mixed identity and who seeks to be a leader not a periphery follower.  May our beloved president and his hungry obedient gang gets it well.   

Spotlight: EGIS / EGID




In the aftermath of Rafah border massacre, I thought I would give it a deeper look on our Intelligence Service. I mainly wanted to know if they had done their job or not... But then the question I had to answer at the first place: Whats their job??

So I started reading the 90 articles 1971's Law 100 which defines and explains its role, status and functions.

Yet, what even seemed more interesting was their image and how they have tried to forge it recently.
Although known for being extremely secretive, they took an unprecedented PR step recentely (a month ago) by releasing a 40 minutes documentary about its history and giving a glimpse on its operations.





The well done interesting documentary certainly leaves a positive impression on any normal Egyptian citizen. Yet, the last incidents has affected the image they have been trying to build as one of the very few last standing effective bodies of the Egyptian State. The declarations of General Murad Mwafi, the ex spy chief who retired (sacked in a chic way), about having informed the president  previously about the attack isnt enough to discharge the agency from the responsibility.


One book can help giving a look on its history

A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the Mukhabarat, 1910-2009 by Owen L. Sirrs (London: Routledge, 2010), 271 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

Books on Arab intelligence services are in short supply. Yaacov Caroz, a former Mossad officer, published the most recent one, The Arab Secret Services, in 1978.7 Owen Sirrs, a former senior intelligence officer and Arab specialist at DIA and now with the University of Montana has produced a fine, well-documented volume on the Egyptian intelligence service—al-mukhabarat in Arabic—that adds significantly to public knowledge. While the focus of his book is on the Egyptian service—“the oldest, largest and most effective in the Arab world”—Sirrs discusses those in other Middle Eastern countries as well.

The book is divided into four parts and begins in 1910. The first part deals with the British-sponsored service (under the Egyptian monarchy) designed to counter threats from nationalist and Islamic parties and, later, the Axis powers in WW II. It concludes with the failure of the service to prevent the coup in July 1952 that brought Nasser to power. The second part is concerned with the Nasser period (1952-70), when the domestic security service, or GID (General Investigations Directorate), the EGIS (Egyptian General Intelligence Service)—modeled after the CIA (44)—and the MID (Military Intelligence Department) were established. The major threats during this formative period came from the Muslim Brotherhood, dissident military officers, and communists. Sirrs also examines how the services performed during the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Yemen Wars in 1962-67, and the 1970 War of Attrition. Part three deals with the services under Anwar Sadat (during 1970-1981), their operations associated with the 1973 war with Israel, and the services’ failure to prevent Sadat’s assassination. Part four brings the story to the rule of the now deposed President Hosni Mubarak. The principal operations discussed here include threats from the local Islamic community and how they have been sternly and effectively muted. Sirrs also explores the controversial role of the mukhabarat—he uses this term synonymously with intelligence service—and the CIA’s rendition program.

In each part of his book, Sirrs analyzes the mukhabarat performance in several areas: collection, evaluation, counterintelligence, covert action, and liaison with foreign services. Background data on principal figures, human rights issues, organizations, and power struggles are also included. Several short case summaries illustrate operations. For example, he reviews the controversial case of Ashraf Marwan, whom both Egypt and Israel claim as their best agent. As Sirrs notes, Marwan died under suspicious circumstances and the ambiguity remains.

“One in four Arabs is Egyptian,” write Sirrs. (197) This fact and Egypt’s close links to the United States make this book an important source for the general reader, for students of international relations, and certainly for anyone desiring to become a professional intelligence officer.

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-55-no.-1/the-intelligence-officers-bookshelf.html



The death of Omar Suleiman has taken many by surprise. The poor health of Egypt's intelligence chief had been a closely guarded secret, causing the news.......................Read more about the EGIS image and Public Relations Campaign in SPOTLIGHT

Saturday, August 4, 2012

The Specter of Syrian Chemical Weapons





By Scott Stewart

The unraveling of the al Assad regime in Syria will produce many geopolitical consequences. One potential consequence has garnered a great deal of media attention in recent days: the possibility of the regime losing control of its chemical weapons stockpile. In an interview aired July 30 on CNN, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said it would be a "disaster to have those chemical weapons fall into the wrong hands -- hands of Hezbollah or other extremists in that area." When he mentioned other extremists, Panetta was referring to local and transnational jihadists, such as members of the group Jabhat al-Nusra, which has been fighting with other opposition forces against the Syrian regime. He was also referring to the many Palestinian militant groups such as Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, which have long had a presence in Syria and until recently have been supported by the al Assad regime.
The fear is that the jihadists will obtain chemical weapons to use in terrorist attacks against the West. Israel is also concerned that Palestinian groups could use them in terrorist attacks inside Israel or that Hezbollah could use such weapons against the Israelis in a conventional military battle. However, while the security of these weapons is a legitimate concern, it is important to recognize that there are a number of technical and practical considerations that will limit the impact of these weapons even if a militant group were able to obtain them.


Militant Use of Chemical Weapons

 

Militant groups have long had a fascination with chemical weapons. One of the largest non-state chemical and biological weapons programs in history belonged to the Aum Shinrikyo organization in Japan. The group had large production facilities located in an industrial park that it used to produce thousands of gallons of ineffective biological agents. After the failure of its biological program, it shifted its focus to chemical weapons production and conducted a number of attacks using chemical agents such as hydrogen cyanide gas, phosgene and VX and sarin nerve agents.
Jihadists have also demonstrated an interest in chemical weapons. The investigation of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing found that bombmaker Abdul Basit (aka Ramzi Yousef) had added sodium cyanide to the large vehicle-borne improvised explosive device detonated in the Trade Center's basement parking garage. The cyanide was either consumed or so widely scattered by the huge blast that its effects were not noticed at the time of the attack. The presence of the cyanide was only uncovered after investigators found a list of the chemicals ordered by conspirator Nidal Ayyad and debriefed Basit after his arrest.
In his testimony at his 2001 trial for the Millennium Bomb plot, Ahmed Ressam described training he had received at al Qaeda's Deronta facility in Afghanistan for building a hydrogen cyanide device. Ressam said members of the group had practiced their skills, using the gas to kill a dog that was confined in a small box.
Videos found by U.S. troops after the invasion of Afghanistan supported Ressam's testimony -- as did confiscated al Qaeda training manuals that contained recipes for biological toxins and chemical agents, including hydrogen cyanide gas. The documents recovered in Afghanistan prompted the CIA to publish a report on al Qaeda's chemical and biological weapons program that created a lot of chatter in late 2004.
There have been other examples as well. In February 2002, Italian authorities arrested several Moroccan men who were found with about 4 kilograms (9 pounds) of potassium ferrocyanide and allegedly were planning to attack the U.S. Embassy in Rome.
In June 2006, Time magazine broke the story of an alleged al Qaeda plot to attack subways in the United States using improvised devices designed to generate hydrogen cyanide gas. The plot was reportedly aborted because the al Qaeda leadership feared it would be ineffective.
In 2007, jihadist militants deployed a series of large vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices augmented with chlorine gas against targets in Iraq. However, the explosives in these attacks inflicted far more casualties than the gas. This caused the militants to deem the addition of chlorine to the devices as not worth the effort, and the Iraqi jihadists abandoned their chemical warfare experiment in favor of employing vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices without a chemical kicker.
There have also been several credible reports in Iraq of militants using chemical artillery rounds in improvised explosive device attacks against coalition forces, but those attacks also appear to have been largely ineffective.


Difficult to Employ

 

Using chemical munitions on the battlefield presents a number of challenges. The first of these is sufficiently concentrating the chemical agent to affect the targeted troops. In order to achieve heavy concentrations of the agent, chemical weapon attacks were usually delivered by a massive artillery bombardment using chemical weapons shells. Soviet military chemical weapons doctrine relied heavily on weapons systems such as batteries of BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, which can be used to deliver a massive amount of ordnance to a targeted area. Additionally, it is very difficult to control the gas cloud created by the massive barrage. There were instances in World War I and in the Iran-Iraq War in which troops were affected by chemical weapon clouds that had been created by their own artillery but had blown back upon them.

Delivering a lethal dose is also a problem in employing chemical weapons in terrorist attacks, as seen by the attacks outlined above. For example, in the March 20, 1995, attack on the Tokyo subway system, Aum Shinrikyo members punctured 11 plastic bags filled with sarin on five different subway trains. Despite the typically very heavy crowds on the trains and in the Tokyo subway stations that morning, the attacks resulted in only 12 deaths -- although thousands of other commuters were sickened by the attack, some severely.
The Syrian regime is thought to have mustard gas as well as tabun, sarin and VX nerve agents in its chemical weapons inventory. Mustard gas, a blistering agent, is the least dangerous of these compounds. In World War I, less than 5 percent of the troops who were exposed to mustard gas died. Tabun and sarin tend to be deployed in a volatile liquid form that evaporates to form a gas. Once in gas form, these agents tend to dissipate somewhat quickly. VX, on the other hand, a viscous nerve agent, was developed to persist in an area after it is delivered in order to prevent an enemy force from massing in or passing through that area. While VX is more persistent, it is more difficult to cause a mass casualty attack with it since droplets of the liquid agent must come into contact with the victim, unlike other agents that evaporate to form a large cloud.
But there are other difficulties besides delivering a lethal dose. Because of improvements in security measures and intelligence programs since 9/11, it has proved very difficult for jihadists to conduct attacks in the West, even when their attack plans have included using locally manufactured explosives. There have been numerous cases in which plots have either failed, like the May 2010 Times Square attack involving Faisal Shahzad, or been detected and thwarted, like the September 2009 plot to attack the New York subway system involving Najibullah Zazi.
Because of the improved security, it would be very difficult for jihadists to smuggle chemical agents into the United States or Europe, even if they were able to obtain them. Indeed, as mentioned above, the chemical artillery rounds used in improvised explosive devices in Iraq were employed in that country, not smuggled out of the region.

This means that jihadists not only face the tactical problem of effectively employing the agent in an attack but also the logistical problem of transporting it to the West. This difficulty of transport will increase further as awareness of the threat increases. One way around the logistical problem would be to use the agent against a soft target in the region. Such targets could include hotels, tourist sites, airport arrival lounges or even Western airliners departing from airports with less than optimal security.
Another option for jihadists or Palestinian militants could be to attempt to smuggle the chemical agent into Israel for use in an attack. However, in recent years, increased security measures following past suicide bombing attacks in Israel have caused problems for militant groups smuggling weapons into Israel. The same problems would apply to chemical agents -- especially since border security has already been stepped up again due to the increased flow of weapons from Libya to Gaza.

Militants could attempt to solve this logistical challenge by launching a warhead or a barrage of warheads into Israel using rockets, but such militant rocket fire tends to be very inaccurate and, like conventional rocket warheads, these chemical warheads would be unlikely to hit any target of value. Even if a rocket landed in a populated area, it would be unlikely to produce many casualties due to the problem of creating a lethal concentration of the agent -- although it would certainly cause a mass panic.
The use of chemical weapons would also undoubtedly spur Israel to retaliate heavily in order to deter additional attacks. This threat of massive retaliation has kept Syria from using chemical weapons against Israel or allowing its militant proxies to use them.

Hezbollah may be the militant organization in the region that could most effectively utilize Syrian chemical munitions. The group possesses a large inventory of artillery rockets, which could be used to deliver the type of barrage attack required for a successful chemical weapon attack. Rumors have been swirling around the region for many months that Libyan rebels sold some chemical munitions to Hezbollah and Hamas. While we have seen confirmed reports that man-portable air-defense systems and other Libyan weapons are being smuggled into Sinai en route to Gaza, there has been no confirmation that chemical rounds are being smuggled out of Libya.

Still, even if Hezbollah were to receive a stockpile of chemical munitions from Syria or Libya, it has a great deal to lose by employing such munitions. First, it would have to face the aforementioned massive retaliation from Israel. While Israel was somewhat constrained in its attacks on Hezbollah's leadership and infrastructure in the August 2006 war, it is unlikely to be nearly as constrained in responding to a chemical weapon attack on its armed forces or a population center. Because of the way chemical weapons are viewed, the Israelis would be seen internationally as having just cause for massive retaliation. Second, Hezbollah would face severe international repercussions over any such attack. As an organization, Hezbollah has been working for many years to establish itself as a legitimate political party in Lebanon and avoid being labeled as a terrorist organization in Europe and elsewhere. A chemical weapon attack would bring heavy international condemnation and would not be in the group's best interest at this time.
So, while securing Syrian chemical munitions is an imperative, there are tactical and practical constraints that will prevent militants from creating the type of nightmare scenario discussed in the media, even if some chemical weapons fell into the wrong hands.
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/specter-syrian-chemical-weapons?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120802&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=title&elq=80ec3526b0504804ac000748308afacb