The Quint Border Region: The World’s Most Under-Reported Terror Hot Spot

By: Kerry Patton

10/09/2012 (11:54am)

 

 Anyone who researches terrorism has likely come across a place in South America known as the Tri-border region, a remote area where Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina border one another that is often mentioned as a safe haven for Islamic radicals. But as more and more intelligence officers begin to understand this very old South American safe haven, they also need to start paying attention to another hotspot: The Quint-border region in Africa.

South America's Tri-border region is certainly unique. Very few travel inside the region. And for good reason; it is a remote, semi-lawless and often times extremely dangerous place. But imagine that there’s a new place in the world that's very similar to the Tri-border territory -- that includes an additional two nation states. That’s the Quint-border expanse, and it’s just as remote and lawless, but also far more dangerous.

The Quint-border region is thousands of miles from South America situated in the west-southwest region of Africa. It’s called the “Quint” region because it consists of five different borders -- Nigeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. It’s the location counterterrorists need to begin paying close attention to in order to stay on top of our enemy’s initiatives.

The Tri-border region in South America may never have become what it is today if it weren’t for the treacherous terrain in the region. It is comprised of heavy jungle with thick canopies making it difficult even for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) air platforms to monitor.

But with all things considered, a lot of hard evidence is missing from much of the continuing claims about this region being South America’s terror “hot spot.” While there’s little question that the Tri-border region is filled with illegal activity that ranges from black markets to organized crime, the extent of Islamist terrorist groups operating in the region remains questionable.

Terror groups such as Hezbollah, Al-Jihad (Islamic Jihad), Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group), Hamas and Al-Qaeda probably had a presence in the Tri-border region - evidence points to this - but most of this evidence is historical; there’s little proof that these groups have a significant presence in the region today. Multiple nation states’ have worked to weed out some of the bad guys from the region.

Today, there is absolutely no definitive evidence of any largescale terrorist operations in the region. Yes, some active terror supporters have been captured in the region as of late, but that does not mean the region should still be considered a terror hot bed.

When it comes to definitive evidence about terror hot spots, though, there is substantiation that one such area location exists, and it’s the Quint-border region. Africa is unique. Over the years, it has shifted multiple times from a heavily influenced Islamic region to a Christian zone. Today, it is shifting back to a very influential Islamic continent. Geospatial mapping shows a rapid movement of Islamic infiltration throughout Africa, starting in the north and moving southward. Unfortunately, this Islamic shift is filled with extreme radicalization.

We rarely hear about such terror safe havens because they aren’t all that sexy. Most safe havens lack physical violence. Terrorists are smart and they don’t necessarily enjoy “defecating where they eat.” But violence has imploded inside Africa’s Quint-border region.

Northern Nigeria has been ravaged by Islamist violence in recent years. Boko Haram, an Al Qaeda-linked Islamic terror group, has consistently been on the offensive, committing mass genocide against Christian communities living in the northern half of the country.

Hezbollah also has a relatively heavy presence in the Niger Delta. The official website of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria quoted an African security expert explaining why Hezbollah has a relatively large presence in the region: “One reason is the large population of Lebanese Shi’ites who left their country during the civil war in the 1970s. They deal in trade, communications, minerals and other fields. Ironically, so do many of the Israelis in the region, which means people from both groups may meet up in the business world … the warning must be taken seriously by business people in the area, at least for the time being.”

That "warning" comes from multiple threats related to kidnappings -- a terror tactic frequently used by terrorist groups in the region.

Mali recently experienced a coup that was heavily influenced and led by Islamists closely aligned with Al Qaeda. As mentioned in my May, 2012 Homeland Security Today commentary, West Africa: Al Qaeda’s New Home, “Today, the nation of Mali has been seized by Al Qaeda elements. This once democratic nation has been toppled by a military coup, and those who arguably now control the nation in the aftermath of its instability have allied themselves with Al Qaeda. And there have been talks between the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) Tuareg rebels and Al Qaeda.”

I further noted that the “Tuareg rebellion of 2012 is an independence war against the Malian government in the Sahara desert region of the Azawad led by the MNLA, which is composed of former insurgents and a significant number of returning and heavily armed Tuareg fighters who fought for either the National Transitional Council or the Libyan army during the Libyan civil war.”

Niger, the landlocked country bordering Mali, Nigeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Libya and Chad, is located in the heart of Africa’s hell. Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) saturates its north, Boko Haram is to the south, and Mali unrest is to its west. It also sets in the middle of a major illegal goods trafficking route. Since the French left Niger in 1960, the country witnessed approximately two dozen coups making it incredibly unstable … and prone to radicalization and a safe haven for terrorist activities.

Not every nation within the Quint-border region is filled with violence. Burkina Faso is relatively peaceful with a relatively strong government that so far has been willing to fight crime and corruption even though crime remains high. However, Burkina Faso is an African nation involved in a multi-million dollar a year cigarette smuggling adventure that contributes to multiple financial advancements for terror groups. What other illegal activities exist in Burkina Faso that contribute to an ongoing global terror dilemma?

The small African country of Burkina Faso is also a known drug and weapon smuggling hot zone. According to the US Department of State, “The organized crime that exists in Burkina Faso mostly revolves around the smuggling of weapons, commercial goods, illegal drugs and, to a lesser extent, human trafficking. Burkina Faso is known as a transit country for these activities although a small portion of these weapons, goods, drugs, and trafficked humans do remain in the country.”

According to a 2005 US Department of Labor Bureau of International Labor Affairs report, “Benin is a source, destination and transit country for the trafficking of children. Children from Benin are trafficked into Cameroon, Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, the Gulf States and Lebanon; children from Burkina Faso, Niger and Togo are sold into servitude in Benin.”

Make no mistake; those involved in human trafficking around the world often have ties to terror networks. They are identified as transnational criminal organizations, or TCOs. These TCO’s are major players in the Quint-border region responsible for financing terror.

There are serious locations in the world that are prone to mass terror activities. The identified Quint-border region could easily be construed as the world’s most dangerous hot spot with significant terror connections. A book could be written about the region’s activities, but we’ll leave that endeavor to intelligence officials.

There is enough data to support the foundation of a good working intelligence report. And this material comes at a critical time -- the war on terror continues, Africa has imploded with violence, and the US continues to run amok searching high and low for the snake’s head of terrorism to be cut off. Unfortunately, that head does not come in the form of a person; look at Al Qaeda’s capabilities even after the killing of Osama Bin Laden.

To effectively target terrorists, you must go to the location where they receive the most active and passive support, because without this support, they have nothing. There is no question that when it comes to Islamic terrorists, a great amount of their support comes from a key region, and that’s the Quint-border region.

Kerry Patton is a combat service disabled veteran who has worked in South America, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Europe focusing on intelligence and security, and has interviewed current and former terrorists, including members of the Taliban. Author of, Sociocultural Intelligence: The New Discipline of Intelligence Studies, you can follow Kerry on Facebook or at www.kerry-patton.com. 

http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/correspondents-watch/single-article/the-quint-border-region-the-worlds-most-under-reported-terror-hot-spot/d3a2696632954d92c74ec688a04d3bde.html 

Spotlight: EGIS / EGID

In the aftermath of Rafah border massacre, I thought I would give it a deeper look on our Intelligence Service. I mainly wanted to know if they had done their job or not... But then the question I had to answer at the first place: Whats their job??

So I started reading the 90 articles 1971's Law 100 which defines and explains its role, status and functions.

Yet, what even seemed more interesting was their image and how they have tried to forge it recently.
Although known for being extremely secretive, they took an unprecedented PR step recentely (a month ago) by releasing a 40 minutes documentary about its history and giving a glimpse on its operations.

The well done interesting documentary certainly leaves a positive impression on any normal Egyptian citizen. Yet, the last incidents has affected the image they have been trying to build as one of the very few last standing effective bodies of the Egyptian State. The declarations of General Murad Mwafi, the ex spy chief who retired (sacked in a chic way), about having informed the president  previously about the attack isnt enough to discharge the agency from the responsibility.


One book can help giving a look on its history

A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the Mukhabarat, 1910-2009 by Owen L. Sirrs (London: Routledge, 2010), 271 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

Books on Arab intelligence services are in short supply. Yaacov Caroz, a former Mossad officer, published the most recent one, The Arab Secret Services, in 1978.7 Owen Sirrs, a former senior intelligence officer and Arab specialist at DIA and now with the University of Montana has produced a fine, well-documented volume on the Egyptian intelligence service—al-mukhabarat in Arabic—that adds significantly to public knowledge. While the focus of his book is on the Egyptian service—“the oldest, largest and most effective in the Arab world”—Sirrs discusses those in other Middle Eastern countries as well.

The book is divided into four parts and begins in 1910. The first part deals with the British-sponsored service (under the Egyptian monarchy) designed to counter threats from nationalist and Islamic parties and, later, the Axis powers in WW II. It concludes with the failure of the service to prevent the coup in July 1952 that brought Nasser to power. The second part is concerned with the Nasser period (1952-70), when the domestic security service, or GID (General Investigations Directorate), the EGIS (Egyptian General Intelligence Service)—modeled after the CIA (44)—and the MID (Military Intelligence Department) were established. The major threats during this formative period came from the Muslim Brotherhood, dissident military officers, and communists. Sirrs also examines how the services performed during the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Yemen Wars in 1962-67, and the 1970 War of Attrition. Part three deals with the services under Anwar Sadat (during 1970-1981), their operations associated with the 1973 war with Israel, and the services’ failure to prevent Sadat’s assassination. Part four brings the story to the rule of the now deposed President Hosni Mubarak. The principal operations discussed here include threats from the local Islamic community and how they have been sternly and effectively muted. Sirrs also explores the controversial role of the mukhabarat—he uses this term synonymously with intelligence service—and the CIA’s rendition program.

In each part of his book, Sirrs analyzes the mukhabarat performance in several areas: collection, evaluation, counterintelligence, covert action, and liaison with foreign services. Background data on principal figures, human rights issues, organizations, and power struggles are also included. Several short case summaries illustrate operations. For example, he reviews the controversial case of Ashraf Marwan, whom both Egypt and Israel claim as their best agent. As Sirrs notes, Marwan died under suspicious circumstances and the ambiguity remains.

“One in four Arabs is Egyptian,” write Sirrs. (197) This fact and Egypt’s close links to the United States make this book an important source for the general reader, for students of international relations, and certainly for anyone desiring to become a professional intelligence officer.

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-55-no.-1/the-intelligence-officers-bookshelf.html



The death of Omar Suleiman has taken many by surprise. The poor health of Egypt's intelligence chief had been a closely guarded secret, causing the news.......................Read more about the EGIS image and Public Relations Campaign in SPOTLIGHT

Wikileaks- Cairo Cables: DASD Kahl Meeting with Egyptian Military Al Assar

DASD Kahl Meeting with Egyptian Military Officials

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0433
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
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RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 000257

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28
TAGS:
SUBJECT: DASD Kahl Meeting with Egyptian Military Officials

CLASSIFIED BY: Donald A. Blome, Minister Counselor, DOS, ECPO;
REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

1. (C) Key Points:



-- On January 31, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the
Middle East Dr. Colin Kahl met with Major General Mohammad
al-Assar, Assistant to the Minister of Defense, Major General Ahmad
Moataz, Chief of the American Relations Branch, and Major General
Fouad Arafa, Consultant to the Military Intelligence Department.



-- During the meeting, Kahl discussed the need to incorporate a
military strategy that included symmetrical and asymmetrical
capabilities, pursuing a capabilities-based approach to security
assistance, FMF issues, balance of power in the region, nuclear
weapons in the Middle East, current U.S. policy towards Iran,
Egyptian efforts to counter-smuggling and interdict illicit weapons
destined for Gaza, and the release of advanced weapons systems.



-- The Egyptian defense officials continued to stress that the
threats facing the United States were different from Egypt's, and
Egypt needs to maintain a strong conventional military to counter
other armies in the region.



--------------------------------------------- ----------------------
--------------

Egypt's Current Security Concerns and National Defense Policy

--------------------------------------------- ----------------------
---------------



2. (C) During the 31 January 2010 meeting, al-Assar
constantly referred to the numerous unstable security situations in
the Middle East that influenced Egyptian military doctrine to
include: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon/Hezbollah,
Palestine/HAMAS, Yemen, Sudan/Darfur, Somalia, Eritrea, Piracy
issues, Algeria, and al-Qaida. Al-Assar emphasized that ethnic
conflict throughout the region and border issues could have a
negative impact on Egyptian sovereignty at any time. al-Assar
commented that he did not expect any of these security situations
to resolve in the near future; instead, he believed the list would
grow even larger.



3. (C) al-Assar outlined Egypt's National Defense Policy
which he stated was based on a defensive, capabilities-based
strategy instead of threat-based. The number one priority is the
defense of Egyptian land and the Suez Canal. Other goals include:
preparedness for unexpected threats such as terrorism; the
achievement of regional stability; interoperability with Egypt's
military partners; and a leading role for Egypt in the region.
Al-Assar provided the Egyptian military's list of regional
threats/concerns such as Nile Basin water rights and the conflicts
in Darfur and southern Sudan. He commented that one never knows
what Libya might do and that it was essential that Egypt maintain
the balance of power on its eastern border. He reiterated the fact
that Israel possesses unconventional weapons and sophisticated
conventional weapons, which creates a regional imbalance and
contributes to instability. He noted that stability in the region
cannot be attained without balance of power. He stated that the
Egyptian military doctrine did not intend to gain an edge on any
other country in the region or cause offense to anyone.



4. (C) Al-Assar complained that the Egyptian military
sometimes felt pressured by the United States to reform its
doctrine and capabilities to counter asymmetric threats. He
emphasized that the threats faced by the United States were
different from Egypt's. He commented that tanks and aircraft were
necessary to fight asymmetrical threats as well. He referred to
General Patreaus' Sadr City battle plan against extremists and
noted that this plan depended on the use of tanks and aircraft in
Iraq. He called on Dr. Kahl to educate Congress about Egypt's
military needs and not put limits on the numbers of aircraft and
tanks. He noted that the Egyptian military preferred to purchase

its weapons and armaments from the United States, but that Egypt's
national security was a red line and they could go elsewhere if
they had to.



--------------------------------------------- ----

Security Assistance and Modernization

--------------------------------------------- ----



5. (C) Dr. Kahl commented that the U.S. military had learned
some hard lessons about the promises and limits of technology
during the first years of the war in Iraq. Kahl stated that there
are no longer any purely conventional military conflicts in the
world and the last large conventional war was the First Gulf War.
The current challenge for modern armies is to find the right
balance between conventional and irregular forces and doctrines to
fight what Secretary Gates refers to as "hybrid wars." Kahl
commented that the U.S. lost more tanks in Iraq to roadside bombs
than in battles with Iraqi tanks. He also noted that information
technology in the modern war was just as valuable as military
equipment in order to have the ability to rapidly communicate and
assess the environment.



6. (C) Dr. Kahl reiterated that a modern military should rely
on quality equipment rather than a large quantity of outdated
armaments, and should place a greater emphasis on the scope of its
aggregate capabilities vice number of high-end weapons platforms.



7. (C) Major General Fouad Arafa interjected during the
discussion to note that the spirit of the Camp David accord was
that there would be a 2:3 balance between Egypt and Israel's
security assistance. Egypt's role was to keep a certain balance of
power in the region that would not allow other parties to go to
war. Egypt had fulfilled this role faithfully for the last 30
years. al-Assar added that the current ratio of 2:5 was a
violation of the Camp David ratio.



--------------------------------------------- --------

Yemen, Iran, and the Weapons Free Zone

--------------------------------------------- ---------





8. (C) al-Assar noted that Iran effectively interfered in
the internal affairs of Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq. He commented
that Iran's nuclear ambitions would significantly change the
balance of power in the region and was contributing to further
regional instability and intensifying the conflicts. Al-Assar
stated that Egypt views Iran as a threat to the region and its
conventional and unconventional weapons would only increase the
instability in the region. Al-Assar commented that if Iran was
successful in obtaining nuclear weapons, it would only encourage
other countries in the Middle East to pursue the same path.



9. (C) Al-Assar brought up President Obama's pledge to
pursue a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. He
called on the United States to not ignore the Israeli nuclear
program. He stated that Israel's nuclear program only gave Iran
justification for creating its own nuclear weapons. If Iran
obtained nuclear weapons, it would only embolden Iran to use
Hezbollah and HAMAS with impunity.



10. (C) Dr. Kahl stated that ultimate goal for the United States
was the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East. However, it was not
possible to draw strict parallels between Iran's acquisition of
nuclear weapons and other Middle Eastern countries. Iran is the

only country in the world that was currently threatening to wipe an
entire country off the map, and Tehran reinforced this message
through destabilizing activities pursued by its proxies in the
region. The goal of a NWFZ in the Middle East could take 10-20
years to achieve; however, the international community could not
wait 20 years to address Iran's nuclear program and needed to
figure out ways to slow down the clock on the Iran's nuclear
ambitions.



11. (C) Major General Fouad Arafa joined the conversation stating
that Iran was using the various Middle East conflicts for its own
ambitions and was gaining power because of its interference in the
internal affairs of the Middle Eastern countries. It was essential
to cut Iran's connections and influence in the regional conflicts
in Lebanon, Israel, and Palestine in order to decrease the level of
influence Iran enjoyed in the region. Iran was effectively using
Arab public opinion to advance its goals. Dr. Kahl agreed and
reinforced the need for continued Arab engagement on this issue to
ensure a "unified front" on the part of the international
community.



12. (C) Kahl stated that the United States had reached out to
Iran in 2009 through unconditional talks and that this was meant as
a test of Iran's willingness to prove that its nuclear program was
for peaceful civilian use. Iran, however, had not seized this
opportunity to resolve international concerns. Kahl speculated
that European countries and even Russia, which would not have
supported the sanctions in the past, were now ready to increase
pressure on Iran.



-------------------------

Counter-smuggling

-------------------------



13. (C) Dr. Kahl extended his appreciation for Egypt's enhanced
counter-smuggling efforts in the past year, but expressed concern
over recent increases in smuggling activity into the Gaza strip and
HAMAS' efforts to rearm. Dr. Kahl emphasized that the United
States understands that this is an especially sensitive political
issue internally in Egypt, as well as in the region. Dr. Kahl
noted that the United States was looking forward to the positive
completion of the BTADs project and thanked the Egyptian Military
for its agreement-in-principle to sign a follow -on statement for
future BTADs support as this provided an opportunity for further
cooperation on counter-smuggling and border security. He also
underscored the importance of targeting smuggling networks and
their financiers in Sudan and the Sinai-not just their activities.



14. (C) Dr. Kahl renewed Secretary of Defense Gate's offer to
assist the Egyptian military in expanding its counter-smuggling
efforts on the Sudanese border and the Red Sea region.



15. (C) Al-Assar stated that the smuggling tunnels threatened the
national security of Egypt (highlighting HAMAS specifically) and
that "terror" could come to Egypt via these tunnels. Egypt has
spent approximately $40 million to purchase the steel for the
underground wall on the Gaza border, and Egypt was paying the cost
of this wall in terms of public opinion both within Egypt and the
region. He noted that once the wall was in place, the time would
come to pressure Israel to take responsibility for the humanitarian
situation in Gaza. Dr. Kahl reaffirmed that in all of engagements
with Israel, the U.S. officials strongly encourage Israel to open
crossings into Gaza to allow humanitarian goods to cross, and that
Egypt's focus must be affixed on thwarting the movement of illicit
weapons into the strip.



-------------

Homework

-------------



16. (C) Dr. Kahl encouraged Egypt to sign a Communications
Electronics Security Agreement (CESA aka CISMOA) with the Unites
States, which would pave the way for the transfer of advanced
technology to Egypt and greatly increase interoperability.
Al-Assar stated that Egypt had "its reasons to delay a decision on
a CISMOA." He noted that thousands of Egyptian military officers
have participated in training and education programs in the United
States and learned about U.S. technology and strategy. He
commented that the younger officers are frustrated with the delay
in obtaining political release for more advanced U.S. technology.
Specifically, al-Assar referred to TOW2B and JAVELIN, which he
commented had already been released to other countries. Al-Assar
noted that a CISMOA was not a condition for obtaining these
systems, but instead they were held up due to a "third party".



17. (C) Al-Assar commented that Egypt was in negotiations with
Iraq to supply the Iraqi military with approximately 140 tanks,
which are manufactured at the FMF tank facility. He noted that the
Egyptian Ministry of Defense was awaiting the United States
positive response to its request for approval of the transfer. Dr.
Kahl noted that the U.S. was considering this request and would
provide a response soon.



18. (C) Al-Assar encouraged Dr. Kahl to convince the U.S.
Congress that Egypt was worth more than $1.3 billion a year. Dr.
Kahl mentioned that Egypt receives the second largest amount of
assistance in the world, and that during these difficult financial
times in the United States, it was unlikely that annual flow of FMF
would increase. He did however reassure the Egyptian officials
that the USG would continue to advocate for current levels of FMF
and push back on any attempts to condition those funds.
SCOBEY
http://dazzlepod.com/cable/10CAIRO257/