Showing posts with label arab revolutions. Show all posts
Showing posts with label arab revolutions. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 26, 2013

Mubarak, Morsi, and then?

 
 
 
 
 
 
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Muriel Mirak-Weissbach

Muriel Mirak-Weissbach is a political journalist specialising in economic, political and cultural development in the Arab and Islamic world for thirty years. She is the author of two books published by Ithaca Press Through the Wall of Fire, Armenia – Iraq – Palestine: From Wrath to Reconciliation, and Madmen at the Helm: Pathology and Politics in the Arab Spring.
In his famous novel Animal Farm, George Orwell satirized the outcome of the Bolshevik revolution and Stalinism. His allegorical tale showed how a gang of animals had risen up against the exploitative farmer and seized power, only to reproduce the political structures they had sought to eliminate.



Something similar may be unfolding in Egypt. After the 2011 revolution, in which mass forces mobilized nationally over 18 days and forced President Hosni Mubarak to resign, an interim military government came in, followed by the Muslim Brotherhood, led by Mohammad Morsi, declared winner of the May–June 2012 presidential elections. Now, less than a year after assuming power, Morsi, who pledged to be the president of all Egyptians, is being denounced as ‘no better than Mubarak’, even the ‘new pharaoh of Egypt’. Masses of Egyptians, including many formations that constituted the revolutionary movement that ousted Mubarak, are again taking to the streets this time demanding Morsi’s downfall, carrying posters which explicitly identify him as the reincarnation of the ousted dictator. Some are calling on the military to intervene, at least temporarily, to oversee a transition to democratic rule.

In my book on the psychological aspects of the Arab upheavals,[*] I posed the following question: are dictators, most often characterized by narcissism and other personality disorders, born or are they made? Are they doomed by traumatic childhood experiences and other social conditions to become tyrannical leaders, or are they well-meaning individuals who, once assuming political power, turn into such? Is it the case that ‘power corrupts’?

Egypt, as I witnessed during a recent visit to Cairo, provides a good case study. When he was inaugurated last June, Morsi, a leading figure of the Islamists so long persecuted by Mubarak, enjoyed public support. This was the case despite the fact that the electoral process had not been free from controversy, regarding the procedures leading to the vetting of candidates and the actual voting and tallying.

It did not take long for Morsi to fall from grace, and it was all of his own doing. His first big mistake was to overrule the Supreme Constitutional Court by calling the dissolved parliament back into session. This was the beginning of a continuing challenge to state institutions, the judiciary and military. On 22 November he issued a declaration in which he decreed (à la Mubarak) special powers to the president, i.e. to himself. Thus, all his decisions, decrees, laws etc., were protected from changes or cancellation. He also arrogated the right to take any measures he deemed necessary to protect the revolution. Although public pressure forced him to retract some of these measures, he did not fully receive the message. Instead, he rammed through a constitutional draft put together by an Islamist-dominated rump constituent assembly, announced a referendum and then new elections. Morsi proceeded to fill all possible political as well as civilian positions with people from his party, the Muslim Brotherhood, or, Ikhwan in Arabic. Egyptians call this the Ikhwanization of political and public life and compare it most unfavorably with the nepotism and favoritism characteristic of the Mubarak era. Not only has the Muslim Brotherhood put its people in ministries, but also in leadership positions of businessmen’s associations, religious and civil society organizations, etc. As Mustafa El-Labbad from the Al Sharq Center for Strategic Studies told me in an interview, through this Ikhwanization process, businessmen associated with the Brotherhood are reaping benefits as they did earlier; they are the same ‘compradors, only this time bearded.’

When I asked my Egyptian friends why Morsi was making such egregious errors, jeopardizing the power he and his movement had so long aspired to, the answer I got was: ‘it’s ideological.’ In fact, if these reports are reliable, Morsi’s Brotherhood government would like to introduce a number of demands that can only be understood as issuing from ideological concerns. Among them are the calls for eliminating a traditional Egyptian spring festival, changing the national anthem, removing music from school curricula and the like.
Egyptians of all political tendencies are demanding responsible leadership to lead the country into a new era. This means restoring public order and economic security, and finally introducing institutions of truly representative government. The number of people killed during demonstrations has been rising and the economy is on the verge of collapse. Unless the Morsi regime wakes up to political reality, it will be as readily dispensed with as was the Mubarak regime. Elections called by Morsi for Parliament cannot take place if the opposition, which, though not unified programmatically, represents a secure majority of the population, successfully leads a boycott. And if the economically and politically important governorate of Port Said, which has become a center of protest, refuses to take part, then the elections will be meaningless. Even if the polls were to be held, if only the Brotherhood and other Islamist parties were to take part, and if they were to ‘win’, that would be a Pyrrhic victory, which international bodies would have great difficulty in acknowledging.

What awaits Egypt is something that George Orwell did not contemplate in his fictional scenario: a new revolution. Although it is politically heterogeneous, the opposition can find its unity in a commitment to representative government. Civil disobedience has spread across the country, intellectuals and artists are issuing statements demanding Morsi’s resignation. And the opposition is also wielding that invincible weapon of humor. The most popular weekly television show is ‘The Program’, featuring Bassem Youssef, the Egyptian answer to American political satirist Jon Stewart. Youssef devotes most of his show to biting ridicule of Morsi and the Brotherhood. The 6 April Movement, which was at the forefront of the revolution, launched an initiative to send Morsi to the moon and collected over 20,000 signatures, placing his name on an online competition sponsored by the Axe Apollo Space Academy. Novelist Ibrahim Abdel-Meguid was quoted in Al-Ahram weekly in late February, saying: ‘If he is not getting the message from the demonstrations, and if he is not getting it from the jokes wanting to send him to the moon, then he might get it from the statements addressed to him directly.’ He added: ‘Morsi had his chance, but he failed to make anything of it. His performance shows that he is totally disconnected from what is going on in the country. He must really come from the moon, and he might as well go back there.’

http://www.ithacapress.co.uk/creator/muriel-mirak-weissbach 

Sunday, March 10, 2013

Libya's guns, gangs and the liberation of a masculine sickness

In Benghazi or a US suburb, the gun is a devil whispering to masculine hearts. This picture is less about freedom than power

 
guardian.co.uk,
Framing the debate benghazi
Libyans celebrate the second anniversary of the overthrow of Gaddafi. 'At a moment when guns are proliferating dangerously from Sandy Hook to South Africa, here is a photograph of what men see in them.' Photograph: Mohammad Hannon/AP

Are the guns in this photograph weapons or toys? The young men flaunting them look like they could have been playing with plastic guns not so many years ago, but the armoury they display here on the streets of Benghazi in Libya is very real. At a moment when guns are proliferating dangerously from Sandy Hook to South Africa, here is a photograph of what men see in them.

These youths, dressed half militarily, half casually – note the baseball cap, the low jeans – are driving round streets that apart from them, look empty. Well you wouldn't want to risk a stray bullet as these heroes celebrate the second anniversary of the uprising that overthrew Muammar Gaddafi. While the khaki- and camouflage-clad pair in the foreground look more or less like some kind of trained soldier with an official role, the car behind them is manned by equally well-armed kids whose dress and behaviour – the hooded youth raises a pistol wildly – is more gangsterish than military.

Why are guns the symbol of freedom at Benghazi's revolutionary celebration? This identification of guns with political liberty is not of course unique to north Africa. Defenders of the gun in the US associate it with citizens' liberties guaranteed by the second amendment to the constitution. They ignore the fact that any such liberties are matched in that venerable document by duties. But whatever you say about it, whatever you claim it means, a gun is fundamentally a piece of power. An armed man is always superior to an unarmed man, said Machiavelli. That is the point of view of the youths in this picture. They may be penniless, hungry, unemployed – who knows – but they possess the most basic form of power: a firearm.

In civil wars and sudden acts of violence, in Syria or an American suburb, the gun itself is an actor, because carrying it is such a temptation. It is a devil whispering to masculine hearts. This picture is about masculinity as much as guns: like a gang, these guys share their knowledge of the gun (if, that is, they do know how to shoot the death sticks they hold). They are bonded by an aura of toughness and strength. The gun freed Libya and it also liberates these kings of the street. It saves them from fear and ensures them respect.

Yet they seem almost strained in their joy. The most professional looking "soldier", on the left, poses with a smile as he rests a machine gun on his shoulder. He seems the most controlled. Yet his companion shakes a rifle in the air and makes a victory sign while yelling, in a way that seems restless, dissatisfied. Is waving a gun aloft enough? Is that all there is? Meanwhile the gangster-style youth behind them seems to be manically aware of his handgun's capacity to cause mayhem. For guns are just props, unless you use them. Their thrill demands ever greater demonstrations of the power they confer. There lies the temptation. This picture shows how societies get sick, when the gun becomes a male accessory.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/feb/19/libya-guns-gangs-masculine-sickness?CMP=twt_gu&goback=.gde_2692730_member_216955786


Saturday, August 4, 2012

The Specter of Syrian Chemical Weapons





By Scott Stewart

The unraveling of the al Assad regime in Syria will produce many geopolitical consequences. One potential consequence has garnered a great deal of media attention in recent days: the possibility of the regime losing control of its chemical weapons stockpile. In an interview aired July 30 on CNN, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said it would be a "disaster to have those chemical weapons fall into the wrong hands -- hands of Hezbollah or other extremists in that area." When he mentioned other extremists, Panetta was referring to local and transnational jihadists, such as members of the group Jabhat al-Nusra, which has been fighting with other opposition forces against the Syrian regime. He was also referring to the many Palestinian militant groups such as Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, which have long had a presence in Syria and until recently have been supported by the al Assad regime.
The fear is that the jihadists will obtain chemical weapons to use in terrorist attacks against the West. Israel is also concerned that Palestinian groups could use them in terrorist attacks inside Israel or that Hezbollah could use such weapons against the Israelis in a conventional military battle. However, while the security of these weapons is a legitimate concern, it is important to recognize that there are a number of technical and practical considerations that will limit the impact of these weapons even if a militant group were able to obtain them.


Militant Use of Chemical Weapons

 

Militant groups have long had a fascination with chemical weapons. One of the largest non-state chemical and biological weapons programs in history belonged to the Aum Shinrikyo organization in Japan. The group had large production facilities located in an industrial park that it used to produce thousands of gallons of ineffective biological agents. After the failure of its biological program, it shifted its focus to chemical weapons production and conducted a number of attacks using chemical agents such as hydrogen cyanide gas, phosgene and VX and sarin nerve agents.
Jihadists have also demonstrated an interest in chemical weapons. The investigation of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing found that bombmaker Abdul Basit (aka Ramzi Yousef) had added sodium cyanide to the large vehicle-borne improvised explosive device detonated in the Trade Center's basement parking garage. The cyanide was either consumed or so widely scattered by the huge blast that its effects were not noticed at the time of the attack. The presence of the cyanide was only uncovered after investigators found a list of the chemicals ordered by conspirator Nidal Ayyad and debriefed Basit after his arrest.
In his testimony at his 2001 trial for the Millennium Bomb plot, Ahmed Ressam described training he had received at al Qaeda's Deronta facility in Afghanistan for building a hydrogen cyanide device. Ressam said members of the group had practiced their skills, using the gas to kill a dog that was confined in a small box.
Videos found by U.S. troops after the invasion of Afghanistan supported Ressam's testimony -- as did confiscated al Qaeda training manuals that contained recipes for biological toxins and chemical agents, including hydrogen cyanide gas. The documents recovered in Afghanistan prompted the CIA to publish a report on al Qaeda's chemical and biological weapons program that created a lot of chatter in late 2004.
There have been other examples as well. In February 2002, Italian authorities arrested several Moroccan men who were found with about 4 kilograms (9 pounds) of potassium ferrocyanide and allegedly were planning to attack the U.S. Embassy in Rome.
In June 2006, Time magazine broke the story of an alleged al Qaeda plot to attack subways in the United States using improvised devices designed to generate hydrogen cyanide gas. The plot was reportedly aborted because the al Qaeda leadership feared it would be ineffective.
In 2007, jihadist militants deployed a series of large vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices augmented with chlorine gas against targets in Iraq. However, the explosives in these attacks inflicted far more casualties than the gas. This caused the militants to deem the addition of chlorine to the devices as not worth the effort, and the Iraqi jihadists abandoned their chemical warfare experiment in favor of employing vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices without a chemical kicker.
There have also been several credible reports in Iraq of militants using chemical artillery rounds in improvised explosive device attacks against coalition forces, but those attacks also appear to have been largely ineffective.


Difficult to Employ

 

Using chemical munitions on the battlefield presents a number of challenges. The first of these is sufficiently concentrating the chemical agent to affect the targeted troops. In order to achieve heavy concentrations of the agent, chemical weapon attacks were usually delivered by a massive artillery bombardment using chemical weapons shells. Soviet military chemical weapons doctrine relied heavily on weapons systems such as batteries of BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, which can be used to deliver a massive amount of ordnance to a targeted area. Additionally, it is very difficult to control the gas cloud created by the massive barrage. There were instances in World War I and in the Iran-Iraq War in which troops were affected by chemical weapon clouds that had been created by their own artillery but had blown back upon them.

Delivering a lethal dose is also a problem in employing chemical weapons in terrorist attacks, as seen by the attacks outlined above. For example, in the March 20, 1995, attack on the Tokyo subway system, Aum Shinrikyo members punctured 11 plastic bags filled with sarin on five different subway trains. Despite the typically very heavy crowds on the trains and in the Tokyo subway stations that morning, the attacks resulted in only 12 deaths -- although thousands of other commuters were sickened by the attack, some severely.
The Syrian regime is thought to have mustard gas as well as tabun, sarin and VX nerve agents in its chemical weapons inventory. Mustard gas, a blistering agent, is the least dangerous of these compounds. In World War I, less than 5 percent of the troops who were exposed to mustard gas died. Tabun and sarin tend to be deployed in a volatile liquid form that evaporates to form a gas. Once in gas form, these agents tend to dissipate somewhat quickly. VX, on the other hand, a viscous nerve agent, was developed to persist in an area after it is delivered in order to prevent an enemy force from massing in or passing through that area. While VX is more persistent, it is more difficult to cause a mass casualty attack with it since droplets of the liquid agent must come into contact with the victim, unlike other agents that evaporate to form a large cloud.
But there are other difficulties besides delivering a lethal dose. Because of improvements in security measures and intelligence programs since 9/11, it has proved very difficult for jihadists to conduct attacks in the West, even when their attack plans have included using locally manufactured explosives. There have been numerous cases in which plots have either failed, like the May 2010 Times Square attack involving Faisal Shahzad, or been detected and thwarted, like the September 2009 plot to attack the New York subway system involving Najibullah Zazi.
Because of the improved security, it would be very difficult for jihadists to smuggle chemical agents into the United States or Europe, even if they were able to obtain them. Indeed, as mentioned above, the chemical artillery rounds used in improvised explosive devices in Iraq were employed in that country, not smuggled out of the region.

This means that jihadists not only face the tactical problem of effectively employing the agent in an attack but also the logistical problem of transporting it to the West. This difficulty of transport will increase further as awareness of the threat increases. One way around the logistical problem would be to use the agent against a soft target in the region. Such targets could include hotels, tourist sites, airport arrival lounges or even Western airliners departing from airports with less than optimal security.
Another option for jihadists or Palestinian militants could be to attempt to smuggle the chemical agent into Israel for use in an attack. However, in recent years, increased security measures following past suicide bombing attacks in Israel have caused problems for militant groups smuggling weapons into Israel. The same problems would apply to chemical agents -- especially since border security has already been stepped up again due to the increased flow of weapons from Libya to Gaza.

Militants could attempt to solve this logistical challenge by launching a warhead or a barrage of warheads into Israel using rockets, but such militant rocket fire tends to be very inaccurate and, like conventional rocket warheads, these chemical warheads would be unlikely to hit any target of value. Even if a rocket landed in a populated area, it would be unlikely to produce many casualties due to the problem of creating a lethal concentration of the agent -- although it would certainly cause a mass panic.
The use of chemical weapons would also undoubtedly spur Israel to retaliate heavily in order to deter additional attacks. This threat of massive retaliation has kept Syria from using chemical weapons against Israel or allowing its militant proxies to use them.

Hezbollah may be the militant organization in the region that could most effectively utilize Syrian chemical munitions. The group possesses a large inventory of artillery rockets, which could be used to deliver the type of barrage attack required for a successful chemical weapon attack. Rumors have been swirling around the region for many months that Libyan rebels sold some chemical munitions to Hezbollah and Hamas. While we have seen confirmed reports that man-portable air-defense systems and other Libyan weapons are being smuggled into Sinai en route to Gaza, there has been no confirmation that chemical rounds are being smuggled out of Libya.

Still, even if Hezbollah were to receive a stockpile of chemical munitions from Syria or Libya, it has a great deal to lose by employing such munitions. First, it would have to face the aforementioned massive retaliation from Israel. While Israel was somewhat constrained in its attacks on Hezbollah's leadership and infrastructure in the August 2006 war, it is unlikely to be nearly as constrained in responding to a chemical weapon attack on its armed forces or a population center. Because of the way chemical weapons are viewed, the Israelis would be seen internationally as having just cause for massive retaliation. Second, Hezbollah would face severe international repercussions over any such attack. As an organization, Hezbollah has been working for many years to establish itself as a legitimate political party in Lebanon and avoid being labeled as a terrorist organization in Europe and elsewhere. A chemical weapon attack would bring heavy international condemnation and would not be in the group's best interest at this time.
So, while securing Syrian chemical munitions is an imperative, there are tactical and practical constraints that will prevent militants from creating the type of nightmare scenario discussed in the media, even if some chemical weapons fell into the wrong hands.
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/specter-syrian-chemical-weapons?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120802&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=title&elq=80ec3526b0504804ac000748308afacb

Tuesday, February 7, 2012

Stratfor intelligence : The Arab Spring Revisited

Thought it would be beneficial and interesting to show how some western opinion and information makes view the Arab Spring , a year later.

Sunday, October 2, 2011

Freedom's Unsteady March: America's Role in Building Arab Democracy..............(by Tamara Cofman Wittes)

On May 1st 2008, FOREIGN POLICY & SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY organized an event at the Brookings Institution to discuss the new book, then, of TAMARA COFMAN WITTES. Brookings Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes argues in her new book Freedom’s Unsteady March: America’s Role in Building Arab Democracy (Brookings Institution Press, 2008) that democracy promotion in the Arab world remains an essential component of any strategy to achieve long-term American goals in that critical region. In November 2009, Tamara Cofman Wittes became deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs at the U.S. Department of State. She was at Brookings from 2003 to 2009. 

                 

TAMARA WITTES:   When I began writing Freedom’s Unsteady March four years ago, as Martin said, I set it up as a two-part argument. First, why the United States should promote democracy in the Arab world, and then how. Now, at the time, I thought the why part of the argument would be pretty uncontroversial, but the how might be very useful. After all,......READ THE FULL TRANSCRIPT

Selected Reviews

"[Freedom's Unsteady March] is an intelligent and thorough analysis that may help guide the next administration through the extreme challenge of furthering US interests in the Middle East. " Dierdre Sinnott, Foreword Magazine

"Freedom's Unsteady March is billed as a "realist's guidebook for democracy promotion." Wittes does not shrink from acknowledging the failures of the Bush administration in this area. But she attributes these failures to a halfhearted effort rather than the inherent unachievability or inadvisability of the objective." Eva Bellin, Foreign Affairs

"We ultimately need allies who share our values—not just our interests. In FREEDOM'S UNSTEADY MARCH, Tamara Cofman Wittes forcefully and articulately reevaluates how we can encourage liberalization in the Middle East. It is a welcome contribution to the ongoing foreign policy debate." Lee Hamilton, president, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

"FREEDOM'S UNSTEADY MARCH is a definitive assessment of one of the central foreign policy challenges of our era. Not trapped in the Beltway straightjacket of either cheering for or sneering at President Bush, Wittes provides compelling arguments for why the United States should foster democratic change in the Middle East, and then offers creative yet sober ideas for how to promote democracy more successfully. Wittes knows intimately both Washington and the Arab world, knowledge which grounds her arguments in solid research and prudent judgments. It should be required reading for anyone seeking to help make U.S. foreign policy in the next administration." Michael McFaul, professor of political science, Stanford University

"The author contends that democratic reform in the Arab world is neither a luxury nor a pipe dream, but a necessity. In this compact, lucid book about the recent democracy project in the Arab Middle East, Tamara Cofman Wittes provides an incisive, critical account of the Bush administration’s democracy promotion policy. Despite its commendable objective, it was underfunded, bureaucratically contested, and ideologically entangled. Wittes concludes with a passionate plea to hold firmly to that policy objective but to serve it better." Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Egyptian democracy activist and chairman of the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies

Wednesday, September 28, 2011

US presses wary ally Egypt on Israel, democracy



AP)  WASHINGTON — In this chaotic post-revolution period, the United States on Wednesday sought to press its wary allies in Egypt's army leadership to bolster ties with Israel and stick to scheduled elections later this year, even though a new set of leaders much less friendly to the U.S. and the Jewish state may be the winners.

Ahead of a meeting between Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Egyptian Foreign Minister Muhammed Amr, the State Department said it was encouraged by the way Egypt's military council has defused tensions with its neighbor after protesters recently stormed the Israeli embassy in Cairo. But State officials expressed continued concerns over the interim government's commitment to ending the emergency laws that were a mainstay of abuse during Hosni Mubarak's three-decade rule.

"It is obviously a very important time in Egypt," spokeswoman Victoria Nuland told reporters. "We have a broad and deep relationship working to support the democratic transition in Egypt that is under way."

The American demands on Egypt represent in some ways the twin set of hopes and fears for all the movements for greater democracy in the Arab world. The Obama administration has championed them but hopes to corral their energy so that political transitions from Tunisia to Yemen don't slide back into renewed military domination or unleash a powerful new wave of intolerant populism — as occurred after Iran's Islamic revolution 32 years ago.

With Egypt, the United States is facing a precarious balancing act. It is trying to lay the foundation for renewed relations with a future government that will be more democratic if less amenable to U.S. interests. And it is attempting to convince Egypt's leaders to salvage ties with Israel and maintain counterterrorism and diplomatic efforts that may be deemed vital for American national security, but not necessarily supported by the Egyptian people.

The fraying of relations with Israel has especially concerned the United States, which has been lobbying much of the world in recent weeks against a Palestinian bid for recognition as a state and U.N. membership. Egypt, which under Mubarak often played a key mediation role between the two sides, has come out determinedly for the Palestinian bid over fierce Israeli opposition.

And with elections around the corner, Washington's challenge is only likely to get more difficult. At stake is American influence in a crucial geopolitical space linking North Africa to the Arabian Peninsula. Also in question is how the U.S. projects power in a part of the world where al-Qaida and other Islamist extremists still pose a threat to the United States, and where the six-decade Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to hamper American relations with Arab countries

Among American officials, the early hopes of a triumph for democracy and rule of law after Mubarak's February ouster, alongside a continuum of U.S.-Egyptian cooperation, have slipped somewhat amid increasingly worrying signs: the apparent chaos in the Israeli embassy storming, the arrests of demonstrators and bloggers, the extension of the Mubarak-era emergency law empowering authorities to detain people without charge and stamp out strikes and demonstrations.

The vote for Egypt's legislative People's Assembly starts Nov. 28 and the less powerful Shura Council on Jan. 29, with both parliamentary houses to begin their session in March. And well-organized Islamist parties could make significant gains, with the hardline Muslim Brotherhood likely to parlay any new power into a far tougher line on cooperation with the United States and Israel.

While any new government would likely honor the 1979 accords with Israel, the result may be one closer to cold peace than regional partnership. Neither the remnants of the old regime nor youth-driven secular groups are keen to assume the banner of Mubarak's unpopular legacy or ignore the voices on the streets which mobilized so forcefully against Mubarak.

Similarly, the U.S. can't push too hard right now against the fragile military council guiding the transition. For all its failings, the administration sees it as the best hope for a stable transition. A collapse in the reform process or a retrenchment away from free and fair elections, and toward a military junta, would provide a devastating example for a Middle East that is still largely in revolt.

With Syrian demonstrators desperately pressing for the end of Bashar Assad's regime, Yemen on the brink of an all-out civil war and Libya's opposition authorities seeking to destroy Moammar Gadhafi's remaining resistance, the U.S. is keen to hold up a successful democratic transition that provides an example to the region and safeguards American interests. Having both won't be easy.
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/09/28/ap/cabstatepent/main20112857.shtml