Mubarak, Morsi, and then?

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Muriel Mirak-Weissbach

Muriel Mirak-Weissbach is a political journalist specialising in economic, political and cultural development in the Arab and Islamic world for thirty years. She is the author of two books published by Ithaca Press Through the Wall of Fire, Armenia – Iraq – Palestine: From Wrath to Reconciliation, and Madmen at the Helm: Pathology and Politics in the Arab Spring.

In his famous novel Animal Farm, George Orwell satirized the outcome of the Bolshevik revolution and Stalinism. His allegorical tale showed how a gang of animals had risen up against the exploitative farmer and seized power, only to reproduce the political structures they had sought to eliminate.

Something similar may be unfolding in Egypt. After the 2011 revolution, in which mass forces mobilized nationally over 18 days and forced President Hosni Mubarak to resign, an interim military government came in, followed by the Muslim Brotherhood, led by Mohammad Morsi, declared winner of the May–June 2012 presidential elections. Now, less than a year after assuming power, Morsi, who pledged to be the president of all Egyptians, is being denounced as ‘no better than Mubarak’, even the ‘new pharaoh of Egypt’. Masses of Egyptians, including many formations that constituted the revolutionary movement that ousted Mubarak, are again taking to the streets this time demanding Morsi’s downfall, carrying posters which explicitly identify him as the reincarnation of the ousted dictator. Some are calling on the military to intervene, at least temporarily, to oversee a transition to democratic rule.

In my book on the psychological aspects of the Arab upheavals,[*] I posed the following question: are dictators, most often characterized by narcissism and other personality disorders, born or are they made? Are they doomed by traumatic childhood experiences and other social conditions to become tyrannical leaders, or are they well-meaning individuals who, once assuming political power, turn into such? Is it the case that ‘power corrupts’?

Egypt, as I witnessed during a recent visit to Cairo, provides a good case study. When he was inaugurated last June, Morsi, a leading figure of the Islamists so long persecuted by Mubarak, enjoyed public support. This was the case despite the fact that the electoral process had not been free from controversy, regarding the procedures leading to the vetting of candidates and the actual voting and tallying.

It did not take long for Morsi to fall from grace, and it was all of his own doing. His first big mistake was to overrule the Supreme Constitutional Court by calling the dissolved parliament back into session. This was the beginning of a continuing challenge to state institutions, the judiciary and military. On 22 November he issued a declaration in which he decreed (à la Mubarak) special powers to the president, i.e. to himself. Thus, all his decisions, decrees, laws etc., were protected from changes or cancellation. He also arrogated the right to take any measures he deemed necessary to protect the revolution. Although public pressure forced him to retract some of these measures, he did not fully receive the message. Instead, he rammed through a constitutional draft put together by an Islamist-dominated rump constituent assembly, announced a referendum and then new elections. Morsi proceeded to fill all possible political as well as civilian positions with people from his party, the Muslim Brotherhood, or, Ikhwan in Arabic. Egyptians call this the Ikhwanization of political and public life and compare it most unfavorably with the nepotism and favoritism characteristic of the Mubarak era. Not only has the Muslim Brotherhood put its people in ministries, but also in leadership positions of businessmen’s associations, religious and civil society organizations, etc. As Mustafa El-Labbad from the Al Sharq Center for Strategic Studies told me in an interview, through this Ikhwanization process, businessmen associated with the Brotherhood are reaping benefits as they did earlier; they are the same ‘compradors, only this time bearded.’

When I asked my Egyptian friends why Morsi was making such egregious errors, jeopardizing the power he and his movement had so long aspired to, the answer I got was: ‘it’s ideological.’ In fact, if these reports are reliable, Morsi’s Brotherhood government would like to introduce a number of demands that can only be understood as issuing from ideological concerns. Among them are the calls for eliminating a traditional Egyptian spring festival, changing the national anthem, removing music from school curricula and the like.
Egyptians of all political tendencies are demanding responsible leadership to lead the country into a new era. This means restoring public order and economic security, and finally introducing institutions of truly representative government. The number of people killed during demonstrations has been rising and the economy is on the verge of collapse. Unless the Morsi regime wakes up to political reality, it will be as readily dispensed with as was the Mubarak regime. Elections called by Morsi for Parliament cannot take place if the opposition, which, though not unified programmatically, represents a secure majority of the population, successfully leads a boycott. And if the economically and politically important governorate of Port Said, which has become a center of protest, refuses to take part, then the elections will be meaningless. Even if the polls were to be held, if only the Brotherhood and other Islamist parties were to take part, and if they were to ‘win’, that would be a Pyrrhic victory, which international bodies would have great difficulty in acknowledging.

What awaits Egypt is something that George Orwell did not contemplate in his fictional scenario: a new revolution. Although it is politically heterogeneous, the opposition can find its unity in a commitment to representative government. Civil disobedience has spread across the country, intellectuals and artists are issuing statements demanding Morsi’s resignation. And the opposition is also wielding that invincible weapon of humor. The most popular weekly television show is ‘The Program’, featuring Bassem Youssef, the Egyptian answer to American political satirist Jon Stewart. Youssef devotes most of his show to biting ridicule of Morsi and the Brotherhood. The 6 April Movement, which was at the forefront of the revolution, launched an initiative to send Morsi to the moon and collected over 20,000 signatures, placing his name on an online competition sponsored by the Axe Apollo Space Academy. Novelist Ibrahim Abdel-Meguid was quoted in Al-Ahram weekly in late February, saying: ‘If he is not getting the message from the demonstrations, and if he is not getting it from the jokes wanting to send him to the moon, then he might get it from the statements addressed to him directly.’ He added: ‘Morsi had his chance, but he failed to make anything of it. His performance shows that he is totally disconnected from what is going on in the country. He must really come from the moon, and he might as well go back there.’

http://www.ithacapress.co.uk/creator/muriel-mirak-weissbach 

My latest article to Think Africa Press

Egypt: A Police Under Fire and in Need of Reform

Suffering from both external and internal pressures, Egypt's much maligned police force urgently needs reforming.

Article | 20 February 2013 - 5:19pm | By Ahmed Abou Taleb

  

Giza, Egypt:

Last week, for the first time in decades, thousands of Egyptian police officers went on strike in several governorates. Their demands included the resignation of the interior minister, who they claim is too close to the Muslim Brotherhood, and the abolition of the recently approved Demonstrations Act which criminalises protests and thus, according to the striking police, puts officers in constant confrontation with protestors. The demonstrating officers also demanded better salaries and better resources to defend themselves against increasing attacks on police stations.

While many police are angry at the government, much of the public are angry at the police. Many politicians, activists, and NGOs and have been accusing the police of being as brutal and corrupt as it was before the 2011 overthrow of Hosni Mubarak. This unhealthy relationship between the people and their supposed guardians raises lots of questions about the relationship between building a modern democracy and security sector reform in Egypt.

Egypt’s police remain, to a great extent, one of the country’s most hated institutions. The police’s brutal attitude and its bloody legacy during Mubarak’s last years made it hard to reconcile with a people revolting against injustices and human right violations. During the Egyptian uprising, which started on 25 January or National Police Day, clashes between the police and protestors left about 840 protestors dead and 6,000 injured. As well as being distrusted for their brutal sins of commission in the past, however, Egypt’s police are also criticised for their sins of omission – namely their incompetence and alleged deliberate negligence, for example during the Port Said football riots in February 2012.
The police force has thus found itself under fire whilst needing to undergo crucial reforms.

 

Under pressure

For decades, the Ministry of the Interior has been extremely influential and present in Egyptians’ daily lives. Around 2010, the ministry employed an estimated 1.3 million to 1.7 million people, including 850,000 police officers and 400,000 officials.

There are no clear figures about how many exactly worked in the powerful and feared State Security Investigations Service (SSI); however, there is some data about the layoffs that took place after the revolution. In response to the accusations against it, the interior ministry did not convict any of its members but attempted to cleanse the SSI by sacking hundreds of personnel. After protestors destroyed many of the SSI’s headquarters a few months after the uprising, the SSI was formally dissolved and replaced by the National Security Service. Many, however, just see this institution as the old guard with a new name.
The environment in which the security forces have been operating has radically changed since 2011. The police, which have generally been feared rather than respected, are now attacked frequently. Hundreds are believed to have been injured in the last month alone, and since January 2011 around 200 officers have been killed. Police cars have also been burnt and checkpoints and buildings attacked; while recently, a trend has emerged of the families of detained suspects attacking police stations to free their relatives.

At the same time, the police force is also dealing with internal problems. Most police officers have low wages and suffer, as do most Egyptians, from the rising cost of living and the deterioration of the country’s economic situation. These pressures are particularly acutely felt by low-ranking and newly-recruited officers who work difficult hours for relatively little pay.

Additionally, within the Ministry of Interior, there have long been certain kinds of discrimination that can add an extra layer of discontent from within. For example, the recruitment of new officers and awarding of promotions are allegedly often decided based on social criteria such as social class.

 

The need for real reform

The main goal of any restructuring or reform process would be to build a modern and efficient police force that would be able to both provide security and protect human rights such as the right to peaceful protest. And real reform cannot be based on merely substituting the leadership with new faces. On the contrary, it must be deep and institutionalised.

Several topics are on the reform agenda. One of the most important of these regards a certain police culture which is believed to have encouraged violations and police impunity in the past. Several NGOs and experts have thus proposed changing the police academy’s syllabus to emphasise public service and provide legal training around human rights.

Another initiative being called for is to bolster laws against torture and abuse of suspects, activities which were arguably encouraged during Mubarak’s reign in the name of national security.
To help reform the force, some have proposed the formation of a kind of independent police syndicate outside the Ministry of Interior that could help defend the rights and interests of the police, give the opportunity to individual officers to take greater responsibility in decision-making, and generally hold officers more accountable for their actions.

Elsewhere, there have been calls for the police force to become subject to greater public oversight, and to ensure the force is placed under civilian leadership. The current form of parliamentary control seems to have proven ineffective given the fact that the legislative committee responsible for the police has been mainly composed of deputies who were ex-police generals or chiefs. Truly civilian control could help reform one of the pillars of the new democracy that Egyptians seek to establish.

Other proposals have including more straightforward gestures to enhance accountability and improve the police’s relationship with the public; for instance, each officer could wear a name tag to facilitate the complaints process. And many have called for the integration of female officers.


As positive as it is that many solutions have been proposed, a key factor that remains is political will. Strangely, after decades of being fiercely chased by the police, the Muslim Brotherhood, now leading the country, does not seem to be seriously interested in reforming the police. This perhaps leaves the challenge of driving reform and restructuring to the force itself. Success in changing this institution’s old habits would be a significant leap forwards on the road towards establishing a modern effective democracy.

http://thinkafricapress.com/egypt/police-under-fire-need-reform 

Egypt: IMF, FMF and the MFO

 

 

 

by J. Millard Burr

  |  

23-Aug-12

EGYPT: IMF, FMF AND THE MFO


"President Barack Obama himself, among other personnel from the US administration, promised Egypt $2 billion in the form of debt swaps and credit guarantees in 2011, shortly after Mubarak was unseated. These promises, however, have yet to materialise."  ("US ambassador discuss[es] assistance to Egypt," Ahram Online, Cairo, 17 August 2012.)

IMF TO THE RESCUE

     On 15 August the Egyptian Finance Minister Momtaz El Said met with U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Anne Patterson to discuss previously promised U.S. foreign aid funding.  Also discussed were Egypt government efforts to restore Egypt’s national economy and prospects for an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan.

     Regarding the IMF loan, Patterson agreed that given the political stability it was a "good time" for Egypt to resume negotiations with the IMF. In fact, new negotiations were pending and on 22 August IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde was to visit Cairo to re-open discussions that were initiated shortly after protests erupted across Egypt in January 2011.

     In May 2011 the Egyptian economy was in free-fall.  To halt the decline Egyptian officials had entered talks with the World Bank and it appeared that Egypt was about to receive a major infusion of financial aid.  Ostensibly, Cairo was to recieve some $4.5bn in assistance over the next two years, and World Bank President Robert Zoellick himself stated that it was indeed the Bank's desire to support the "Arab Spring."  According to Zoellick, Bank funds would be made conditional on Egypt's willingness to modernize its economy." (BBC, 24 May 2011 "Egypt and Tunisia to get $6 billion from World Bank.")

     Egypt-IMF talks then stalled in June—at a time when the IMF seemed poised to approve a $3 billion loan.  During a time of great political uncertainty in Egypt an arrangement seemingly had been reached that would achieve an orderly devaluation of the Egyptian pound and attack the problem of a growing budget deficit. But Egypt backed off and no final agreement was reached. In December 2011, talks were resumed but once again stalled.  And as the months passed analysts felt that to have the required effect on the Egyptian economy the IMF would have to fund much more than the $3 billion originally considered.  

     The army's Military Council, which was really in charge of the talks, admitted that it was responsible for postponing an agreement. The military leadership did not want to be condemned for what they thought would be a very unpopular move. Yet, as it lingered, in December 2011 Moody's downgraded Egypt's credit rating. The move occurred shortly after Egypt's leadership (or what passed for it) rejected the IMF's $3 billion credit arrangement first broached in June 2011. As General Mokhtar al-Mullah told reporters in December 2011,"The easiest thing would have been for the military council to accept the loans from abroad, give it to Egyptians to live a better life, and then hand over power and the Egyptian people would have been responsible to repay these debts."

     By 2012 the cost of domestic borrowing had increased, and foreign reserves were reduced by half.  Egyptian exports fell, and the crucial tourist industry continued its downward slide.  When the budget deficit reached 11% of gross domestic product, devaluation of the Egyptian pound had to be considered whether the military liked it or not. Today, Most economists are aware that the Egyptian economy is a mess, and to be effective an IMF package would now need to be somewhere in the range of $10-15 billion.

     In advance of the Patterson-El Said meeting it had been announced by Abdallah Shehata, economic advisor to President Mohammed Morsi, that his government was preparing an entirely new program for the forthcoming IMF negotiations.  It would emphasize "social justice," something that undoubtedly would appeal to Washington, to Secretary of State Clinton and Ambassador Patterson.  El-Said explained that with regard to the "low-income sector" the government intended to "minimise the socio-economic gap between citizens.”  An organization dominated by urbanites and professionals, it is hard to see what the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimun) can do to better the lives of millions of farm families—the poorest of the poor. A land reform law of 1953 limited individual holdings to no more than 200 acres. Second and third agrarian reform laws further limited the area of landholdings.  With no land to play with, it is likely that the Ikhwan will introduce more subsidies, placing more pressure on an already overburdened budget.
 
FOREIGN AID

     At his meeting with Patterson El Said admitted that the issue of greatest immediate importance was the missing funds that had been promised by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and Kuwait.  El Said noted that his government was daily expecting the arrival of a half billion dollars (of two billion that had been promised) from Qatar. In addition, a major tranche of funds promised by Saudi Arabia was said to be in the pipeline. As for the others, who could guess?

     With regard to United States economic assistance, following the meeting Ambassador Patterson informed the press that a U.S. State Department delegation would arrive in Cairo by the end of August.  Discussions would be held on the latest political and economic developments, "and the means of providing Egypt with funds, especially after the appointment of Egypt's new government." (Ahram Online, 17 August 2012)

     Prior to the fall of the Mubarak government, Egypt annually received more United States foreign aid (civilian and military) than any country except for Israel. It has averaged slightly more than $2 billion per annum since the signing of the Camp David Peace Accords.  The amount of American Foreign Military Financing (FMF) has varied very little from year to year, and funds devoted to economic assistance, and generally channeled through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), has slowly declined since 1998.

     FMF that averaged more than $1.3 billion per annum allowed Egypt to receive U.S. military hardware.  Inter alia, it has included jet aircraft, Apache helicopters, aerial surveillance aircraft, and armored personnel carriers.  The Egyptian military could also purchase equipment directly from U.S. defense contractors in excess of the annual FMF payment.  Both the Pentagon and Foggy Bottom have argued that FMF provides the cornerstone to a very cordial relationship, and Egyptian leaders called the FMF "untouchable compensation" for the continuation of peace with Israel.  Just how the Morsi government with its recent change of military leadership stands on the issue of U.S. military aid is presently unclear.

      From news reports following their meeting one could assume that Ambassador Patterson gave assurances that Washington had already reached a decision, and aid to Egypt would continue without conditions.  And given the tenor of Egyptian news reports that followed, one might easily assume that U.S. economic assistance might even be enhanced.
 
MILITARIZING THE SINAI

     As a result of the disorder during Egypt's "Arab Spring", on 28 January 2011 an Egyptian military communiqué ordered the national police to relinquish their posts while the army restored order throughout the nation.  In short order, many police departed the Sinai and that region devolved into chaos. Conditions were so hectic that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, fearing the increase of arms smuggling into Gaza, "agreed to let Egypt deploy 800 additional troops to the Sinai" to fill a power vacuum in the area.  This occurred even though, "the two countries' peace accords stipulate the peninsula should be demilitarized." (Bradley and Mitnick, "Bedouin Arms Smugglers See Opening in Sinai, The Wall Street Journal, 5 February 2011.)

     Six months later, Israeli forces reportedly checkmated what it called a "spectacular" border attack conceived by an Al Qaida affiliate.  Hatched within the Gaza Strip, the plot was to be the fourth in a series of attacks on Sinai gas pipeline that supplies Israel with 35% of its need (and Gaza with all its gas).  On 14 August three Egyptian army brigades of 1,700 men, an equal number of police, and 3,400 security personnel, backed by tanks and personnel carriers, drove across the Sinai and into the Mediterranean towns of El Arish and Sheikh Zuweyid. Once those towns were occupied the convoy continued on to Rafah, an Egyptian town bordering with  Gaza.  An Egyptian military communiqué reported that the occupation force had gained control of a region that had been lost to lawless and terrorist elements.  Unfortunately, despite the occupation the attacks on the gas pipeline continued.  

     Ironically, it was then little noted in the media that the movement of Egyptian forces into the eastern Sinai was yet again a contravention of the Camp David Accords and Article 2, Annex I, which defines the limits of responsibility (the "Security Arrangements") in the various geographic zones.  Whether Israel (and the United States) agreed to what was a violation of the terms of the 33-year-old peace treaty has never been clarified.  Still, It has been reported in the Israeli press that the military appendix to the Accords was modified after the situation in Sinai began to deteriorate; it apparently allowed for the addition of seven additional Egypt military battalions in the Sinai. If true, it is assumed that the United States, which is a guarantor of the agreement, agreed to the increase.  

     In effect, by 2012 the Egyptian army has remilitarized the eastern Sinai—a sector it had been excluded from for more than three decades. The military continued to claim that its move was in response to the presence of 2,000 well-organized and heavily armed Islamist gunmen and a passel of smugglers that threatened the peace. Left unsaid was the reality that the Egyptian military felt that the number of rebels was obviously more than the existing Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) present in the Sinai could handle.

 QUO VADIS MFO

    As an addendum to the 1978 Camp David Accords, in August 1981 the United States, Egypt and Israel signed a Protocol to the Camp David Treaty of Peace establishing the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). The MFO mission was required to implement the security provisions of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace and prevent any violation of its terms. The agreement placed strict limitations on the presence of Egyptian military and police in the Sinai Peninsula.

     The MFO role was initiated in April 1982, the same day that Israel returned sovereignty of the Sinai to Egypt. Under Article 2, Annex I, of the Peace Treaty the Sinai Peacekeeping Zones were delimited.  The Peninsula was divided into three geographically defined zones" In Zone A, located just to the east of the Suez Canal, Egypt was allowed to quarter a mechanized infantry division with a total of 22,000 troops; Zone B, to the east of A and an area comprising the second third of the Sinai, allowed Egypt to emplace four border security battalions and civilian police.  Zone C, which was the most problematic of the three, was located between Line B and the Egypt-Israel border. In Zone C, only the MFO and the Egyptian civilian police were permitted.  In that zone three battalions of MFO were quartered at two bases: MFO headquarters with two infantry battalions (Colombia, Fiji, etc.,) at North Camp was located south of the Mediterranean town of El Arish; an American battalion was quartered at South Camp north of Sharm el Sheikh, now a well known tourist destination.
 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

   In Israel it was reported on 19 August that the government of Israel had asked Egypt to withdraw armored vehicles—including tanks and armored personnel carriers—that had "entered the Sinai in force ten days earlier in contravention of the peace treaty between the two nations." Apparently, their deployment had only been admitted "retroactively." (Gil Ronen, Arutz Sheva)  The Egyptian response to the demand was seen in Israel as an indication of how relations with the Morsi government would proceed.

     Two days later Al Ahram, Egypt's state-run media megaphone, "dismissed the matter as a fabrication of the Israeli news media and said that the move had been fully coordinated with the Israeli military." (Isabel Kershner, AP, 21 August 2012)  Israeli news reports that followed claimed that the Israeli cabinet had authorized the use of Egyptian helicopter gunships, but the movement of a mass of tanks into the Sinai was neither approved nor coordinated with Israel. There next followed an even more disturbing report: Egyptian Anti-Aircraft Missiles were sighted in Sinai. (Gil Ronen, Arutz 7, 20 August 2012)  If true, it was a dangerous provocation because their deployment could only be intended for use against Israeli aircraft.  Meanwhile, in Washington, which is a tripartite member of the Camp David Accords and should be concerned with the deteriorating conditions in the Sinai, nothing of substance has been revealed either in Foggy Bottom or the Pentagon.

CONCLUSION

     From its beginning the MFO has been assiduous in protecting its image as a neutral entity devoted to keeping the peace in the Sinai.  It is not, however, a fighting force.  And under present conditions it is incapable of continuing its peacekeeping role envisioned for it by the 1982 agreement. In the slipstream of the military intrusions that began in early 2011, the MFO raison d'etre has been shattered.  The pier on which Egypt-Israel peace was moored has now been washed away.  To keep the peace today a multinational force would require heavy weapons and armored vehicles.  

     It is presently unclear what the United States, Egypt, or Israel expect of the MFO.  It is likely, however, that Egypt's Morsi will expel it soon unless something like U.S. foreign assistance would change Ikhwan thinking.  For the Muslim Brotherhood a foreign presence on Egyptian soil is no more welcome than the American military presence in Saudi Arabia was welcomed by its Islamist populace.   

     It would only seem logical that before the United States begins to consider any new foreign aid package—and the renewal of the annual billion-dollar stipend that is paid to the Egyptian military—there should be a new tripartite agreement that responds to what has now become the creeping remilitarization of the Egyptian Sinai.  For more than a quarter-century U.S. assistance to Egypt has been predicated on the willingness of Cairo to keep the peace with Israel. Now, however, with a sea-change in the both the government of Egypt and in its armed forces leadership, it is time to discern what Egypt's intentions for the Sinai are.  Certainly, a decision must be reached regarding the MFO.  A decision should be made as soon as possible regarding the role that institution should play in the Sinai, or whether its presence in its current form is necessary. 

http://econwarfare.org/viewarticle.cfm?id=4528&goback=.gmp_944357.gde_944357_member_152152321 

US presses wary ally Egypt on Israel, democracy

AP)  WASHINGTON — In this chaotic post-revolution period, the United States on Wednesday sought to press its wary allies in Egypt's army leadership to bolster ties with Israel and stick to scheduled elections later this year, even though a new set of leaders much less friendly to the U.S. and the Jewish state may be the winners.

Ahead of a meeting between Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Egyptian Foreign Minister Muhammed Amr, the State Department said it was encouraged by the way Egypt's military council has defused tensions with its neighbor after protesters recently stormed the Israeli embassy in Cairo. But State officials expressed continued concerns over the interim government's commitment to ending the emergency laws that were a mainstay of abuse during Hosni Mubarak's three-decade rule.

"It is obviously a very important time in Egypt," spokeswoman Victoria Nuland told reporters. "We have a broad and deep relationship working to support the democratic transition in Egypt that is under way."

The American demands on Egypt represent in some ways the twin set of hopes and fears for all the movements for greater democracy in the Arab world. The Obama administration has championed them but hopes to corral their energy so that political transitions from Tunisia to Yemen don't slide back into renewed military domination or unleash a powerful new wave of intolerant populism — as occurred after Iran's Islamic revolution 32 years ago.

With Egypt, the United States is facing a precarious balancing act. It is trying to lay the foundation for renewed relations with a future government that will be more democratic if less amenable to U.S. interests. And it is attempting to convince Egypt's leaders to salvage ties with Israel and maintain counterterrorism and diplomatic efforts that may be deemed vital for American national security, but not necessarily supported by the Egyptian people.

The fraying of relations with Israel has especially concerned the United States, which has been lobbying much of the world in recent weeks against a Palestinian bid for recognition as a state and U.N. membership. Egypt, which under Mubarak often played a key mediation role between the two sides, has come out determinedly for the Palestinian bid over fierce Israeli opposition.

And with elections around the corner, Washington's challenge is only likely to get more difficult. At stake is American influence in a crucial geopolitical space linking North Africa to the Arabian Peninsula. Also in question is how the U.S. projects power in a part of the world where al-Qaida and other Islamist extremists still pose a threat to the United States, and where the six-decade Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to hamper American relations with Arab countries

Among American officials, the early hopes of a triumph for democracy and rule of law after Mubarak's February ouster, alongside a continuum of U.S.-Egyptian cooperation, have slipped somewhat amid increasingly worrying signs: the apparent chaos in the Israeli embassy storming, the arrests of demonstrators and bloggers, the extension of the Mubarak-era emergency law empowering authorities to detain people without charge and stamp out strikes and demonstrations.

The vote for Egypt's legislative People's Assembly starts Nov. 28 and the less powerful Shura Council on Jan. 29, with both parliamentary houses to begin their session in March. And well-organized Islamist parties could make significant gains, with the hardline Muslim Brotherhood likely to parlay any new power into a far tougher line on cooperation with the United States and Israel.

While any new government would likely honor the 1979 accords with Israel, the result may be one closer to cold peace than regional partnership. Neither the remnants of the old regime nor youth-driven secular groups are keen to assume the banner of Mubarak's unpopular legacy or ignore the voices on the streets which mobilized so forcefully against Mubarak.

Similarly, the U.S. can't push too hard right now against the fragile military council guiding the transition. For all its failings, the administration sees it as the best hope for a stable transition. A collapse in the reform process or a retrenchment away from free and fair elections, and toward a military junta, would provide a devastating example for a Middle East that is still largely in revolt.

With Syrian demonstrators desperately pressing for the end of Bashar Assad's regime, Yemen on the brink of an all-out civil war and Libya's opposition authorities seeking to destroy Moammar Gadhafi's remaining resistance, the U.S. is keen to hold up a successful democratic transition that provides an example to the region and safeguards American interests. Having both won't be easy.
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/09/28/ap/cabstatepent/main20112857.shtml

Wikileaks: NEXT STEPS FOR ADVANCING DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 001351

SIPDIS

NEA FOR A/S WELCH, PDAS CHENEY, DAS CARPENTER
NEA FOR ELA
NSC FOR DNSA ABRAMS
TUNIS FOR MEPI (MULREAN)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2016
TAGS:
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS FOR ADVANCING DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT

Classified by Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary and Introduction: Sometime in the next six
years, Egypt will undergo a leadership succession. The
United States' goals for this succession should be to promote
an opening to establish a representative government that will
secure Egyptian stability, prosperity, and friendship for a
generation. There is scant movement in that direction now.
Whether or not 77-year old Hosni Mubarak survives his
six-year term, his regime is ossifying and increasingly out
of touch. His enlightened economic cabinet has a negligible
political base and gets little credit outside of elite
circles. The National Democratic Party's popularity is in
decline. The military still expects to inherit the
Presidency. But the Muslim Brotherhood's confidence is
growing.

2. (C) Egyptians want reform, or at least an end to
stagnation. The disagreements arise over breadth and speed.
Egyptians care more deeply about reforms that will improve
their living standards--and they are growing less patient.
But the GOE insists on its own pace: moderately slow for
economic reforms, glacial for political opening. With no
elections for the next fifteen months, the high visibility
focus of our democracy strategy needs replacement. President
Mubarak's proposed reform program, as stated in his campaign
promises and subsequent speeches, although modest, provides
the starting point for USG engagement. In addition, we
should:

--Urge the regime to broaden its agenda to include electoral,
media, police, and anti-corruption reform--and at least begin
planting the seeds of transformation within the military.

--Continue to help the legal political parties through IRI
and NDI, with a focus on the ruling NDP.

--Continue USG support through USAID and MEPI to Egyptian
civil society, including advocacy for structural reforms
through key legislation and technical assistance.

--Ensure the political success of the economic reform program
and review our military assistance program with a focus on
IMET.

--Broaden our diplomatic strategy to build support for the
democracy agenda among regime elites, including the First
Lady. End introduction and summary.

-----------
Assumptions
-----------

3. (C) Proposed next steps are based on the following
assumptions:

--Mubarak remains our indispensable regional ally but will
move too slowly on the reform agenda. Reforms not blessed by
Mubarak will not be achievable during the remainder of his
rule.

--The NDP will remain the dominant political party in Egypt
with control over the parliament through 2011. The party
leaders themselves recognize that its "popularity" is based
almost entirely on patronage and control of the security
apparatus; internal reforms are needed, but breaking with old
habits and entrenched interests will be slow and difficult.

--The Muslim Brotherhood's appeal will grow as long as it
continues to fill the void in public services left by
government, and the void in political space left by the
absence of any other meaningful opposition.

--The Brotherhood's parliamentary election success--which
confirmed both its organizational skills and popular
appeal--has entrenched GOE resistance to electoral reform.

--Civil Society elites will remain engaged in reform
discussions but without influence or capacity to effect
meaningful systemic change before Mubarak leaves office.

--The economic cabinet will remain in place but will be
reluctant to tackle aggressively painful steps, such as
rationalizing subsidies. Economic reform has not yet
benefitted the Egyptian "street."

--The Emergency Law will be extended in May 2006 for
twenty-four months; the parliament will continue to work on a
replacement anti-terror law ostensibly modeled on western
statutes that will stress state security requirements rather
than the protection of individual liberties.

--The security apparatus will resist change on the grounds
that it is de-stabilizing. The military will be a drag on
reform but will not actively engage unless its economic
equities are threatened or it perceives a serious threat to
stability.

----------
Next Steps
----------

4. (C) Extend ESF-funded technical assistance to GOE
ministries and the parliament to sustain and, if possible, to
accelerate and expand the Mubarak political reform program.
Stated GOE goals include the following:

-- Replace emergency law with anti-terror legislation,
modeled on western anti-terror statutes.

-- Seek Parliamentary input on constitutional reform.

-- New judicial authority law.

-- Amending the press law, including eliminating the
imprisonment penalty for defamation (to protect journalists).

-- New law amending criminal procedures, including
provisional detention.

-- New law aimed at supporting decentralization and
strengthening elected local councils' supervisory roles.

We currently have no direct cooperation with the Parliament.
Previous support has foundered on Egyptian efforts to use
assistance as patronage. Assistance should be low-key;
emphasis should be on the technical. We can provide much
information assistance through normal mission resources, at
minimal cost, outside of USAID programs. We should also
ensure coordination between technical assistance and pilot
programs already underway in the field. For example, efforts
on decentralization legislation should benefit from USAID's
existing work with governorate-level councils. We can use
normal advocacy measures to support reformers pressing for
higher-end reforms than Mubarak now seems to envision, e.g.,
supporting Governors who advocate constitutional change to
permit local election of Governors.

5. (C) Pressing the GOE to expand its reform agenda to
include major electoral, media, and police reform, and
anti-corruption:

--On elections, we favor establishment of an independent
electoral commission, based on the Iraqi model. Given GOE
ambivalence, we should use speakers programs, IVs and other
indirect messaging to promote this idea, until it is adopted
as "Egyptian." IFES also proposes an ambitious civil society
focused project to build domestic support for electoral
reform.

--USAID has already embarked on a $16 million program to
support private media and encourage media privatization.
This effort was dealt a setback when Mubarak himself told
journalists on March 1 that state-owned newspapers would not
be privatized. Nonetheless we should engage the cabinet and
the parliamentary leaders on public sector media reform, even
as we find ways to support private media.

--On police reform, DS and S/CT have presented a proposal for
counter-terrorism training that would expand our in-country
cooperation. Post has also solicited an INL proposal for a
Strategic Leadership Course for senior police commanders
aimed at promoting community policing, regard for human
rights and developing a more professional police corps.
Deployment of in-country police and Justice attaches could
promote new levels of law enforcement cooperation. The
Ministry of Interior and perhaps the Presidency are opposed
to what they regard as a covert intelligence effort, but Mrs.
Mubarak has pressed MOI to accept more U.S. "transformational
police training." We should continue to seek an arrangement
that will address their concerns.

--The GOE needs to pursue a meaningful anti-corruption
program if it wishes to take this cudgel away from the MB.
We can provide technical assistance and public affairs
programming. Global metrics are readily available.

6. (C) Technical support to legal political parties through
IRI and NDI: Having assessed the elections, the institutes
now recognize what the parties need. The NDP will likely not
participate with other parties in the room, so it may be
necessary to develop separate tracks in the program for the
ruling party and the opposition. Even with the NDP on board,
we can expect blowback by anti-reform elements. The
institutes should keep their programs low-key and the USG
apprised. Their programs should incorporate the full range
of Egypt's civil rights priorities, such as bringing more
women and Christians into the political process. The 2007
Shura elections and the 2008 local council elections--and the
development of the legislation promised to reform the
later--will be the key medium-term tests. In addition to
continued support for international implementers like NDI and
IRI, we should also proceed with supporting additional
engagement on Egypt by additional international NGOs such as
Transparency International, Freedom House, and the American
Bar Association.

7. (C) Continue USAID's and MEPI's work with civil society
organizations: The Ibn Khaldun Center and others produced
impressive results on domestic monitoring during the
parliamentary elections and merit continued support. With no
elections for fifteen months, these groups need a new focus.
The next phase should bring civil society into a process for
identifying new priorities and concerted action. This must
be an Egyptian process, but we should advocate our
priorities, such as human rights, religious freedom, women's
and children's rights (including female education), and
involvement by the citizenry in local education policy.
USAID's new Family Justice Program will engage NGOs to raise
public awareness about the legal rights of women and
children, as well as the legal services available to these
disadvantaged groups. These efforts will also face
reactionary criticism of "bribery" and "meddling."

8. (C) Recognize that economic reforms complement
democratic reform: We should revitalize the Free Trade
Agreement and move forward with notification to Congress at
the earliest possible political opening. Failing that, we
should develop new programs to maximize the benefits of the
QIZs. The biggest challenge facing Egyptian manufacturers in
the QIZ program is finding Israeli content. Expanding
outlets for Israeli content would create Egyptian jobs and
exports. USAID could usefully study how to optimize the QIZ
benefit. USAID should also continue work with the Egyptian
economic cabinet on tackling subsidies in a politically
sensitive manner. The current initiative to shift USAID
economic support to "sectoral reform programs" linked to
several benchmarks, including democratization, can play a key
role.

9. (C) Initiate an internal long-range review of U.S.
military assistance: This issue requires much further
discussion but we need to define the linkages between our
military assistance program and Egypt's progress towards
representative government. At a minimum, this review should
expand IMET programs--the most purposefully "transformative"
form of U.S. military assistance--to bring more Egyptian
officers for training in the United States.

-------------------
Diplomatic Strategy
-------------------

10. (C) In addition to programmatic steps, we need a fresh
approach with Mubarak. He resents and ridicules the U.S.
reform agenda. We should aim at influencing the narrow group
of individuals that surround him. These are: EGIS Chief
Omar Soliman, Presidential Chief of Staff Zakariya Azmi,
Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif, and Gamal and Suzanne Mubarak.
(The older Mubarak son Alaa has apparently renounced
politics.) Of these key players, the person with whom we
have the least contact is Suzanne Mubarak. In her meetings
with the Ambassador, the Egyptian First Lady has expressed
concern over Egypt's standing abroad and acknowledged the
importance of, for example, police reform. It was Mrs.
Mubarak that persuaded the Ministry of Interior to change
course and allow UNHCR to have access to Sudanese
asylum-seekers detained after the December 30 tragedy. More
than an advisor, she is a shrewd political player in her own
right, and is able to promote a range of programs, most
recently to combat trafficking in persons. Mrs. Mubarak will
not take on the nuts and bolts of reform, but she could
strengthen the political reform wing of the leadership. The
one-year anniversary of the FLOTUS visit to Egypt will be in
May. It would be gracious and possibly productive to invite
Mrs. Mubarak to the White House for a return visit.

-------------------
Whither the Ikhwan?
-------------------

11. (C) The Brotherhood remains a major challenge. In many
ways, it is Egypt's essential civil society, having been
working in the fields of social welfare and citizen
mobilization since its founding in 1928. Its impressive
political mobilization skills, demonstrated in its success
rate in the 2005 parliamentary elections (88 seats won out of
150 contested), put the NDP and the other opposition to
shame. We cannot engage directly with the Brotherhood, but
we must urge the GOE to find a formula that can co-opt, win
over, or otherwise effectively thwart the direct threat of
the Brotherhood. We have been trying to persuade influential
Egyptians that the GOE/NDP tactics toward the MB (stop/start
repression) is failing, and that they should confront the
MB's ideology head-on, with direct debate by articulate
secularists. The GOE also could press the MB by posing a
number of key wedge issues (QIZs, regional peace, women's
rights, religious minorities, FTA, etc.) as a price for
legalization. Another (possibly tandem) tack would be to
consider a Track II approach that would send ex-USG officials
to meetings with the MB leadership in neutral places to gauge
the depth of the MB's commitment to democratic reform.

----------
Conclusion
----------

12. (C) In all likelihood, it will not be possible to make
great progress on democratic reform as long as President
Mubarak remains in office. Nonetheless, his firm rule offers
space and time to prepare civil society and some institutions
of the GOE for the day of his departure. These proposals
have the advantage of establishing a stronger framework for
cooperation on political action and reform across the
political spectrum for the years ahead, and positioning us to
create and take advantage of any opportunities. We do not
have a silver bullet, but we can press reforms that will
lead, inexorably, to the "death by 1000 cuts" of Egypt's
authoritarian system. There will be no "Orange Revolution on
the Nile" on Mubarak's watch, but we must aim to consolidate
each modest democratic advance. A steady, incremental
approach will continue to stretch Egypt toward a democratic
future.
RICCIARDONE
http://dazzlepod.com/cable/06CAIRO1351/

A Republic not a Democracy: an interesting look on political systems