Showing posts with label 25 january revolution. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 25 january revolution. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 26, 2013

Mubarak, Morsi, and then?

 
 
 
 
 
 
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Muriel Mirak-Weissbach

Muriel Mirak-Weissbach is a political journalist specialising in economic, political and cultural development in the Arab and Islamic world for thirty years. She is the author of two books published by Ithaca Press Through the Wall of Fire, Armenia – Iraq – Palestine: From Wrath to Reconciliation, and Madmen at the Helm: Pathology and Politics in the Arab Spring.
In his famous novel Animal Farm, George Orwell satirized the outcome of the Bolshevik revolution and Stalinism. His allegorical tale showed how a gang of animals had risen up against the exploitative farmer and seized power, only to reproduce the political structures they had sought to eliminate.



Something similar may be unfolding in Egypt. After the 2011 revolution, in which mass forces mobilized nationally over 18 days and forced President Hosni Mubarak to resign, an interim military government came in, followed by the Muslim Brotherhood, led by Mohammad Morsi, declared winner of the May–June 2012 presidential elections. Now, less than a year after assuming power, Morsi, who pledged to be the president of all Egyptians, is being denounced as ‘no better than Mubarak’, even the ‘new pharaoh of Egypt’. Masses of Egyptians, including many formations that constituted the revolutionary movement that ousted Mubarak, are again taking to the streets this time demanding Morsi’s downfall, carrying posters which explicitly identify him as the reincarnation of the ousted dictator. Some are calling on the military to intervene, at least temporarily, to oversee a transition to democratic rule.

In my book on the psychological aspects of the Arab upheavals,[*] I posed the following question: are dictators, most often characterized by narcissism and other personality disorders, born or are they made? Are they doomed by traumatic childhood experiences and other social conditions to become tyrannical leaders, or are they well-meaning individuals who, once assuming political power, turn into such? Is it the case that ‘power corrupts’?

Egypt, as I witnessed during a recent visit to Cairo, provides a good case study. When he was inaugurated last June, Morsi, a leading figure of the Islamists so long persecuted by Mubarak, enjoyed public support. This was the case despite the fact that the electoral process had not been free from controversy, regarding the procedures leading to the vetting of candidates and the actual voting and tallying.

It did not take long for Morsi to fall from grace, and it was all of his own doing. His first big mistake was to overrule the Supreme Constitutional Court by calling the dissolved parliament back into session. This was the beginning of a continuing challenge to state institutions, the judiciary and military. On 22 November he issued a declaration in which he decreed (à la Mubarak) special powers to the president, i.e. to himself. Thus, all his decisions, decrees, laws etc., were protected from changes or cancellation. He also arrogated the right to take any measures he deemed necessary to protect the revolution. Although public pressure forced him to retract some of these measures, he did not fully receive the message. Instead, he rammed through a constitutional draft put together by an Islamist-dominated rump constituent assembly, announced a referendum and then new elections. Morsi proceeded to fill all possible political as well as civilian positions with people from his party, the Muslim Brotherhood, or, Ikhwan in Arabic. Egyptians call this the Ikhwanization of political and public life and compare it most unfavorably with the nepotism and favoritism characteristic of the Mubarak era. Not only has the Muslim Brotherhood put its people in ministries, but also in leadership positions of businessmen’s associations, religious and civil society organizations, etc. As Mustafa El-Labbad from the Al Sharq Center for Strategic Studies told me in an interview, through this Ikhwanization process, businessmen associated with the Brotherhood are reaping benefits as they did earlier; they are the same ‘compradors, only this time bearded.’

When I asked my Egyptian friends why Morsi was making such egregious errors, jeopardizing the power he and his movement had so long aspired to, the answer I got was: ‘it’s ideological.’ In fact, if these reports are reliable, Morsi’s Brotherhood government would like to introduce a number of demands that can only be understood as issuing from ideological concerns. Among them are the calls for eliminating a traditional Egyptian spring festival, changing the national anthem, removing music from school curricula and the like.
Egyptians of all political tendencies are demanding responsible leadership to lead the country into a new era. This means restoring public order and economic security, and finally introducing institutions of truly representative government. The number of people killed during demonstrations has been rising and the economy is on the verge of collapse. Unless the Morsi regime wakes up to political reality, it will be as readily dispensed with as was the Mubarak regime. Elections called by Morsi for Parliament cannot take place if the opposition, which, though not unified programmatically, represents a secure majority of the population, successfully leads a boycott. And if the economically and politically important governorate of Port Said, which has become a center of protest, refuses to take part, then the elections will be meaningless. Even if the polls were to be held, if only the Brotherhood and other Islamist parties were to take part, and if they were to ‘win’, that would be a Pyrrhic victory, which international bodies would have great difficulty in acknowledging.

What awaits Egypt is something that George Orwell did not contemplate in his fictional scenario: a new revolution. Although it is politically heterogeneous, the opposition can find its unity in a commitment to representative government. Civil disobedience has spread across the country, intellectuals and artists are issuing statements demanding Morsi’s resignation. And the opposition is also wielding that invincible weapon of humor. The most popular weekly television show is ‘The Program’, featuring Bassem Youssef, the Egyptian answer to American political satirist Jon Stewart. Youssef devotes most of his show to biting ridicule of Morsi and the Brotherhood. The 6 April Movement, which was at the forefront of the revolution, launched an initiative to send Morsi to the moon and collected over 20,000 signatures, placing his name on an online competition sponsored by the Axe Apollo Space Academy. Novelist Ibrahim Abdel-Meguid was quoted in Al-Ahram weekly in late February, saying: ‘If he is not getting the message from the demonstrations, and if he is not getting it from the jokes wanting to send him to the moon, then he might get it from the statements addressed to him directly.’ He added: ‘Morsi had his chance, but he failed to make anything of it. His performance shows that he is totally disconnected from what is going on in the country. He must really come from the moon, and he might as well go back there.’

http://www.ithacapress.co.uk/creator/muriel-mirak-weissbach 

Wednesday, September 28, 2011

US presses wary ally Egypt on Israel, democracy



AP)  WASHINGTON — In this chaotic post-revolution period, the United States on Wednesday sought to press its wary allies in Egypt's army leadership to bolster ties with Israel and stick to scheduled elections later this year, even though a new set of leaders much less friendly to the U.S. and the Jewish state may be the winners.

Ahead of a meeting between Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Egyptian Foreign Minister Muhammed Amr, the State Department said it was encouraged by the way Egypt's military council has defused tensions with its neighbor after protesters recently stormed the Israeli embassy in Cairo. But State officials expressed continued concerns over the interim government's commitment to ending the emergency laws that were a mainstay of abuse during Hosni Mubarak's three-decade rule.

"It is obviously a very important time in Egypt," spokeswoman Victoria Nuland told reporters. "We have a broad and deep relationship working to support the democratic transition in Egypt that is under way."

The American demands on Egypt represent in some ways the twin set of hopes and fears for all the movements for greater democracy in the Arab world. The Obama administration has championed them but hopes to corral their energy so that political transitions from Tunisia to Yemen don't slide back into renewed military domination or unleash a powerful new wave of intolerant populism — as occurred after Iran's Islamic revolution 32 years ago.

With Egypt, the United States is facing a precarious balancing act. It is trying to lay the foundation for renewed relations with a future government that will be more democratic if less amenable to U.S. interests. And it is attempting to convince Egypt's leaders to salvage ties with Israel and maintain counterterrorism and diplomatic efforts that may be deemed vital for American national security, but not necessarily supported by the Egyptian people.

The fraying of relations with Israel has especially concerned the United States, which has been lobbying much of the world in recent weeks against a Palestinian bid for recognition as a state and U.N. membership. Egypt, which under Mubarak often played a key mediation role between the two sides, has come out determinedly for the Palestinian bid over fierce Israeli opposition.

And with elections around the corner, Washington's challenge is only likely to get more difficult. At stake is American influence in a crucial geopolitical space linking North Africa to the Arabian Peninsula. Also in question is how the U.S. projects power in a part of the world where al-Qaida and other Islamist extremists still pose a threat to the United States, and where the six-decade Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to hamper American relations with Arab countries

Among American officials, the early hopes of a triumph for democracy and rule of law after Mubarak's February ouster, alongside a continuum of U.S.-Egyptian cooperation, have slipped somewhat amid increasingly worrying signs: the apparent chaos in the Israeli embassy storming, the arrests of demonstrators and bloggers, the extension of the Mubarak-era emergency law empowering authorities to detain people without charge and stamp out strikes and demonstrations.

The vote for Egypt's legislative People's Assembly starts Nov. 28 and the less powerful Shura Council on Jan. 29, with both parliamentary houses to begin their session in March. And well-organized Islamist parties could make significant gains, with the hardline Muslim Brotherhood likely to parlay any new power into a far tougher line on cooperation with the United States and Israel.

While any new government would likely honor the 1979 accords with Israel, the result may be one closer to cold peace than regional partnership. Neither the remnants of the old regime nor youth-driven secular groups are keen to assume the banner of Mubarak's unpopular legacy or ignore the voices on the streets which mobilized so forcefully against Mubarak.

Similarly, the U.S. can't push too hard right now against the fragile military council guiding the transition. For all its failings, the administration sees it as the best hope for a stable transition. A collapse in the reform process or a retrenchment away from free and fair elections, and toward a military junta, would provide a devastating example for a Middle East that is still largely in revolt.

With Syrian demonstrators desperately pressing for the end of Bashar Assad's regime, Yemen on the brink of an all-out civil war and Libya's opposition authorities seeking to destroy Moammar Gadhafi's remaining resistance, the U.S. is keen to hold up a successful democratic transition that provides an example to the region and safeguards American interests. Having both won't be easy.
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/09/28/ap/cabstatepent/main20112857.shtml


Tuesday, September 13, 2011

ElBaradei Critiques the U.S., Yet Nurtures Ties

CAIRO—Hitting the streets of Cairo with bullhorn in hand, the former head of the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency has been demanding the immediate resignation of President Hosni Mubarak, denouncing the diplomacy of the Obama administration and defending the Muslim Brotherhood, a controversial Islamic group.
But despite Mohamed ElBaradei's seemingly anti-West rhetoric, the views he has expressed in the past are much more nuanced.
Former U.N. colleagues say the Nobel laureate gets along well with President Barack Obama and had numerous conversations with him in 2009 over pressuring Iran to halt its uranium enrichment activities. Mr. ElBaradei's personal Facebook page features a photograph of him shaking hands with Mr. Obama and smiling. Another shows him with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
Getty Images

Egyptian opposition leader Mohamed ElBaradei, center, prepared to address crowds in Cairo on Jan. 30.
And while as head of the IAEA Mr. ElBaradei was privately irked over Israeli policy—especially after its 2007 bombing of an alleged Syrian nuclear site—ex-colleagues say he shared warm relations with some Israeli leaders, including former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. More significantly, as a young diplomat with Egypt's Foreign Ministry, Mr. ElBaradei was part of the team that negotiated the peace settlement between Israel and Egypt at Camp David in 1978.
As a career diplomat, he's lived in a world vastly apart from the one that has produced the disenchanted youth fighting on Cairo's seething streets.
Mr. ElBaradei, 68 years old, was born in Cairo, the son of the late Mostafa ElBaradei, a lawyer who served as president of the Egyptian Bar Association.
After earning a bachelor's degree in law at the University of Cairo in 1962, Mr. ElBaradei joined Egypt's diplomatic service, and worked in U.N. missions in Geneva and New York. He earned a master's and doctorate in law at New York University in the early 1970s. Andreas Lowenfeld, an emeritus professor at NYU, recalls Mr. ElBaradei as "a strong student and a serious person."
As a law student, Mr. ElBaradei hung out in Greenwich Village amid growing protests over the Vietnam War. "That really in my view, and I think he would agree, shaped his view about the value of an open society," says Laban Coblentz, Mr. ElBaradei's longtime speechwriter.
He later joined the U.N. overseeing an international law program before working for the IAEA. He also taught law as an adjunct professor at NYU.
Mr. Coblentz says Mr. ElBaradei fondly recalls his years living in New York, including attending the opera and New York Knicks games. He also developed a fondness for cheeseburgers.
In 1997, Mr. ElBaradei became the head of the IAEA—but initially without the support of his own country. Mr. Mubarak's government favored Mohamed Ibrahim Shaker, a career diplomat and former Egyptian ambassador to the IAEA. But after Mr. Shaker and other candidates failed to win enough votes, the U.S. successfully lobbied for Mr. ElBaradei as a compromise candidate, according to people familiar with the matter.
Even as he disavowed interest in becoming Egypt's next president, Mr. ElBaradei said in an interview Wednesday that the country's foreign policy was "a failure" and that it "needs to be completely realigned."
As for his role going forward, he said, "all I want to do is share and deliver this country to catch up with the rest of the world."

Write to Steve Stecklow at steve.stecklow@wsj.com and David Crawford at david.crawford@wsj.com
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703960804576120643763303876.html#articleTabs%3Darticle