Ansar Jerusalem beheads 4 Egyptians accused of being Israeli 'spies'

By Thomas JoscelynAugust 29, 2014

A masked Ansar Jerusalem terrorist is shown standing behind four blindfolded Egyptian civilians, who were accused of being Israeli "spies." All four were beheaded later in the same video.

Ansar Jerusalem, (also known as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis), has released a video displaying the graphic beheadings of four Egyptian civilians the group accused of being "spies" for Israel. According to Ansar Jerusalem, Israel has supposedly killed the group's members in cross-border drone strikes launched in the Sinai, including an alleged bombing on July 23. Egyptian government officials have denied Israeli involvement.
The video was first released on Ansar Jerusalem's official Twitter feed, which has since been taken down.
At the beginning of the video, a masked terrorist is shown reading a statement while standing behind the four civilians, who are kneeling and blindfolded. The video then cuts to images of slain Ansar Jerusalem members and a photo of a burned vehicle, which the group says was struck by an Israeli missile.

Much of the video is then devoted to showing the four men's "confessions." They say that they gave information to Israeli intelligence in return for payments. Their confessions are made under clear duress, and should not be accepted at face value.
After the footage of the four purported confessions is aired, the video returns to the scene of the masked terrorist and others standing behind them. The men are then beheaded and their decapitated heads are placed on their corpses.
In the past, Ansar Jerusalem has published videos showing members of Egyptian security forces and other alleged spies being executed. But the new video marks an escalation in the violent tactics the group is willing to broadcast in its propaganda.
The video comes just over one week after the Islamic State, which claims to rule over a "caliphate" stretching over large portions of Iraq and Syria, released a video featuring the beheading of American photojournalist James Foley.
Ansar Jerusalem's own execution video is comparable to the Islamic State's, and the group may have decided to release it after Foley's death received so much international attention.
Earlier this year, an Ansar Jerusalem leader voiced his support for the Islamic State. And the Egyptian press has published rumors that Ansar Jerusalem has sworn bayat (an oath of allegiance) to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the Islamic State's emir. But these rumors are, thus far, false. Ansar Jerusalem did not publicly endorse, let alone swear allegiance to, Baghdadi after his subordinates claimed in late June that he now rules as "Caliph Ibrahim." It is likely that some members of Ansar Jerusalem do support the Islamic State, but the extent of that support is unclear. And there are other indications that the group is allied with al Qaeda.
Al Qaeda avoids beheading videos
Al Qaeda has shied away from videos such as the ones produced by the Islamic State and now Ansar Jerusalem. In 2005, for example, Ayman al Zawahiri wrote a letter to Abu Musab al Zarqawi, who was then the head of al Qaeda in Iraq. Zarqawi was notorious for his barbaric executions, which were recorded for the world to see. But Zawahiri argued that such tactics, while they may be justified, were counterproductive when it comes to building popular support for the jihadist ideology.
"Among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace who love and support you will never find palatable ... are the scenes of slaughtering the hostages," Zawahiri wrote to Zarqawi. Zawahiri continued: "You shouldn't be deceived by the praise of some of the zealous young men and their description of you as the shiekh of the slaughterers, etc. They do not express the general view of the admirer and the supporter of the resistance in Iraq, and of you in particular by the favor and blessing of God."
Zawahiri did not argue that Zarqawi should spare his hostages; he simply didn't want Zarqawi to carry on with his over-the-top executions, which sicken the stomachs of even potential supporters.
"[W]e can kill the captives by bullet," Zawahiri wrote, because "[t]hat would achieve that which is sought after without exposing ourselves to the questions and answering to doubts." Simply put, Zawahiri argued, "We don't need this." Zawahiri comprehended that "more than half of" the jihadists' "battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media," and unspeakable acts of barbarism can be a liability, no matter how justifiable they are from the jihadists' perspective.
Al Qaeda and its various branches have executed hostages and they will continue to do so. In 2002, for instance, 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed beheaded Daniel Pearl, a reporter for The Wall Street Journal. And al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has executed hostages as well. However, al Qaeda's senior leaders do not think that graphic snuff videos are an effective means for promulgating their message.
The difference in tactics can be seen in how al Qaeda has handled the captivity of Warren Weinstein, an American who has been held by the group since 2011, and the recent release of Peter Theo Curtis by the Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's official branch in Syria.
Earlier this month, al Qaeda released a message directed at Weinstein's family. "We are not interested in retaining the prisoner in our protection; we are only seeking to exchange him in return for the fulfillment of our demands that we have conveyed," the message reads. Al Qaeda did not threaten to behead Weinstein if its demands were not met. The organization encouraged Weinstein's family to "pressurize" the American government into bartering for his release.

Al Qaeda has not threatened to kill Warren Weinstein, an American who has been in the group's custody since 2011.

Al Qaeda's message was likely inspired by the success the Taliban had in exchanging Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl for the top five Taliban commanders held at Guantanamo.
Interestingly, As Sahab, al Qaeda's official propaganda arm, included the hashtag #JamesFoley in one tweet that featured the message to Weinstein's family. Al Qaeda seemed to be inviting a comparison between Weinstein's captivity and Foley's.
And just days after the Islamic State released its video of Foley's execution, the Al Nusrah Front released Curtis from its custody. The deal to release Curtis was brokered by Qatar, which provides a permissive fundraising environment for Al Nusrah and other jihadist groups. Although the deal to free Curtis had been in the works prior to the release of the Foley execution video, the difference between Curtis' fate and Foley's says much about how the rival jihadist groups are approaching hostage operations.
Some supporters of the Islamic State, which is at odds with Al Nusrah, have even denounced Curtis's release on their social media accounts.

Read more: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/08/ansar_jerusalem_behe.php?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+LongWarJournalSiteWide+%28The+Long+War+Journal+%28Site-Wide%29%29#ixzz3BsVxCXzY

On Security, Violence, Al Qaida, Policy & the Army in Sinai...

May 16 Kidnapping Sparks Security Policy Debate in Egypt
May 27, 2013 | Ahmed Abou Taleb

http://globalriskinsights.com/2013/05/27/may-16-kidnappings-indicative-of-insecurity-in-sinai/

On the 16th of May a group of gunmen conducted a daring attack against Egyptian security forces in Sinai . They kidnapped seven people, of which six were border control police and one an army soldier, who were heading back to their homes to spend their holiday. Seven days after the kidnapping the soldiers were freed. Although this is not the first time security personnel have been kidnapped in Sinai this group in particular were received by the President, the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Internal Affairs.

The incident, which led to a strike among border control police officers, resulted in the launch of a military operation to free the soldiers. It also provoked a wider debate on security on the Sinai peninsula, raising questions on whether it has became a new base for Al Qaida in the region. Likely, it draws attention to Egypt’s changing security policy under the country’s new leadership and the potential repercussions on the relationships with both Palestinians and Israelis.

Kidnapping is one of the many sorts of violence used against security authorities in Egypt after the revolution. It became a frequently employed technique by Bedouin tribes in order to contest government decisions or demand the release of condemned and sentenced members of the tribe. While usually used against tourists, kidnappings sometimes extended to police officers.

After the January 2011 revolution, police forces faced increasing attacks against its personnel, camps and police stations, which made it difficult to resume core tasks – especially in the troubled Sinai, where many policemen were substituted with military personnel. Being subject to brutal security measures under Mubarak regime, some of the peninsula’s tribes, particularly in the geographically challenging middle Sinai area, exploited the void. Not only did they start using heavy arms, usually coming from Libya or through Gaza channels, during their smuggling and trafficking activities. They also resorted to extreme force to revenge the police and especially the State Security Service and the public order Central Security Forces.

Army personnel targeting growing in Egypt

Yet, the 16th of May assault has novel elements to take into consideration. It is the first recorded case of an army officer being kidnapped. Bedouin tribes have dared to confront police forces several times but avoided confrontation with the army. During the chaos that followed the 2011 revolution, some military checkpoints were randomly shot at by unidentified armed men, but with hardly any injuries. The only recorded army officer death was during an attack on a police station in July 2011.
Egypt's President Mohamed Morsi

Direct organized violence against the army started for the first time last August, when a jihadist group launched a sudden and shocking attack on a military border camp, during the iftar evening meal in the holy fasting month of Ramadan, leaving 16 army recruits dead. The alarming attack reflected how some radical groups think of the army soldiers as “infidels”, against which fighting in Ramadan is a sort of holy war. With no one held responsible for that attack until now, violence against the military armed forces seems to be subject to a potential increase as well as normalization. Army personnel might no longer enjoy the immunity they have enjoyed in the region and eventually become targets to attacks and kidnappings, as the police personnel have been for the last two and a half years.

Another factor marking this incident is the usage of Al Qaida-like videos, a new technique emerging in Egypt. Few days after capturing the soldiers, the kidnappers issued a video featuring the soldiers being tied and blindfolded, each citing his name and affiliation. The army recruit was in the middle and directed a message to President Morsi and the Minister of Defense on behalf of the kidnappers. Their demands were to release a group of jihadists sentenced to death after having made an armed parade and launching a heavily armed attack on a police station and a court in the capital of Northern Sinai province in July 2011. Another video was released after the liberation of the kidnapped soldiers by a self-claimed jihadist group, which declared its intention to fight the Egyptian military everywhere in the country.

As Al Qaida has become more of an ideology, using a number of guerilla war and media techniques, rather than an organization, it is hard to tell if those who made the videos were directly affiliated with Bin Laden’s or Al Zawhiri’s Qaida. Furthermore, waging internal FARC-style warfare against the army in Egypt seems like a far-fetched and dismissed plot.

However, there is still a potential threat to Egypt’s Army. The military can become an easy target because most of its soldiers are recruits who are serving their one to three years of compulsory military service. Being spread all over the country makes them subject to assaults – on their holiday for example – just like the kidnapped soldiers. Moreover, many of them were......Read More

CNN: A Stand in the Sinai

This is a CNN Report about the human trafficking from Eastern Africa all the way to Israel passing by Sinai, where smugglers and gangs turn the life of those illegal immigrants into hell. A sad disgusting story, but its not the first to report. Local Newspaper like Al Masry Al Youm & Youm7 had already made extensive reports about these horrific stories

Mais toujours pas de reponse.

Targeting Tribal Leaders: A New Militant Tactic in Sinai

By Ashley Lindsey

Militants killed Egyptian tribal leader Khalaf al-Menahy and his son Aug. 13 as the two were returning from a conference in east Sinai organized and attended by tribal leaders to denounce militancy, according to Sinai security forces. The senior al-Menahy was a prominent proponent of bolstering the Sinai Peninsula's representation in Egypt's parliament and of improving security in the region. He also was a prominent sheikh in the Sawarka tribe, said to be the largest in Sinai. Following his burial Aug. 13, the tribe vowed to seek vengeance.
This is the first reported case of militants attacking tribal leaders in Sinai. It comes soon after an attack on Egyptian security forces Aug. 5 and an attack on military checkpoints in northern Sinai on Aug. 8.
Although the militant tactic of targeting tribal leaders is new to Sinai, the tactic has been common in conflict zones in the Middle East and South Asia, such as in Yemen, Iraq and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. Though it can offer many benefits to these militants -- including weakening the targeted tribe and possibly leading to its co-option -- these kinds of attacks tend to only succeed in zones with little government control and against tribes that cannot effectively retaliate. Examining similar instances of this tactic thus provides a helpful tool for assessing the consequences of attacks against tribal elements in the Sinai Peninsula.

A Widespread Militant Tactic

Yemen

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has operated openly in Yemen's tribal-dominated southern and eastern provinces for years. It has sought to expand its presence and operations by winning over local tribes using tactics such as strategic marriages.
Lately, it appears to have begun a shift from wooing tribal leaders to intimidating them. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula recently failed in an attempt to assassinate tribal leader Majed al-Dhahab in the city of Radda in Bayda province. An important tribal leader, al-Dhahab participated in the offensive to drive al Qaeda -- and his own cousin, a local al Qaeda leader -- from the region after the militant group seized control of Radda in January. Al-Dhahab's son received a package that unbeknownst to him contained a bomb, which he was instructed to give to his father. However, the package exploded in his arms Aug. 4 before he could deliver it. Immediately after his son's death, al-Dhahab received a call warning him that the group would kill anyone who opposed it.
The group followed up with another attack on tribal elements Aug. 5. A suicide bomber detonated an explosive device at a wake in Jaar, killing 45 people. The dead included several tribal fighters who had participated in the June Yemeni government offensive against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and the wounded included a tribal leader.
The region's tribes have not publicly vowed to retaliate against the militant group. If they are capable of doing so, they probably will respond to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's attacks. But the tribes could be too weak to mount an effective response, especially in the wake of attacks on their leadership structure. This could cause some tribesmen to abandon the fight, allowing militants to try to resume activity in the region's towns should they wish.

Iraq and the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border

Although new to Yemen, militants frequently used the tactic of attacking tribal leaders during the U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The tactic is still frequently used, especially in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. In one significant instance, in 2007 al Qaeda in Iraq assassinated high-profile Sunni tribal Sheikh Abdul-Sattar Abu Risha, who led the Anbar Awakening Council. A U.S. ally, Abu Risha had formed the council, uniting dozens of Sunni tribes in the province against al Qaeda in Iraq. His killing backfired on the militant group, generating a massive outpouring of sympathy for Abu Risha and prompting the tribes in the province to join in vowing to fight al Qaeda in Iraq to the death.
In southern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban are deeply embedded into the tribal system. They have effectively used the tactic of assassinating tribal leaders to eliminate obstacles to their operations and evolution. To this end, they regularly employ suicide operations, armed assaults and roadside bombs against anti-Taliban militias known as lashkars and against tribal leaders in northwestern Pakistan.
One area particularly affected by such attacks is Bajaur, a Pakistani agency that borders Afghanistan's Kunar province. After numerous attacks on tribal leaders and members of peace committees in Bajaur, the Mamond tribe announced July 25 that the tribal leaders had formed a lashkar to prevent cross-border attacks. Hundreds of elders, leaders and religious figures of various subtribes and peace committees pledged their support for this militia. As with the killing of Abu Risha, the Afghan Taliban attacks on tribesmen and leadership in the region spurred a fiercely united response across numerous tribes, with the new militia even expressing a willingness to enter Afghanistan to attack Taliban leaders.

 

Upsides and Downsides of a Militant Tactic

Militant groups attack tribal leaders to increase their influence and area of operations. From the militants' perspective, removing a tribal leader ideally will weaken the targeted tribe. This could end the tribes' resistance and even lead to the its being co-opted by the militant group due to a leadership vacuum following the militant attack. The weakening of the tribe could leave the group no choice but to allow the militant group to operate unchallenged in its territory. Even though assassinated tribal leaders are replaced and the leadership structure remains intact, tribal leaders in the area could be persuaded to adopt a more accommodating stance on the presence of militants.
Success for a militant group in the long term happens under two conditions. First, the militants must be acting in an area with a tribal patronage network and limited government oversight. Without such a network, attacks on tribal leaders in efforts to co-opt and intimidate that tribe would not provide any significant gain. In Yemen, for example, the patronage and tribal network are very strong and in most cases enjoy greater legitimacy and power than the government. Attacks against tribal chiefs there are accordingly tantamount to attacks on the local government. On the one hand, that means tribal networks can band together and shun foreign militant elements as one community. On the other hand, if al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is able to coerce a tribe into aligning with it, the militant group will then enjoy access to that tribes' resources, will gain the ability to plan and launch attacks in that area, and could even gain better relations with neighboring tribes.
Second, the group must be militarily capable of overwhelming the targeted tribe and its allies or at least of gaining the upper hand. As can be seen from the Iraq example, killing Abu Risha backfired because his tribe was large, committed and militarily strong, and it had the support of several allied Sunni tribes that belonged to his Anbar Awakening Council.
The tactic of targeting a tribal leader thus comes with certain risks. When the aforementioned two conditions are not met, a militant group exposes itself to great danger when it targets tribal leaders.

 

Consequences of the Sinai Assassination

The Sinai Peninsula meets the requirement of limited government control and strong tribal networks. The question then becomes whether the Sinai tribes can muster a strong defense against the militants. In the coming weeks, it will be important to look for signs of the retaliation pledged by al-Menahy's Sawarka tribe and others allied with it. This retaliation could come in the form of attacks against the militants passing through Sawarka and its allied tribes' territory.
Tribal retaliation could also come in the less aggressive, yet still effective, form of supplying increased logistical support and intelligence to the Egyptian government. Increased weapons seizures and the arrest of key leaders suggest that tribal sources on the ground are providing intelligence to Cairo. A targeted campaign against the militants already has begun, with Egyptian planes bombing the mountains of El Arish on Aug. 15. The intelligence for these attacks likely came from local tribes.
The success of tribal and Egyptian security efforts against the militants will determine whether the militants miscalculated their position in Sinai when they attacked a key tribal leader. The resilience of militants in Sinai also will help determine whether they can continue to stage attacks against Egypt and Israel.

Read more: Targeting Tribal Leaders: A New Militant Tactic in Sinai | Stratfor

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/targeting-tribal-leaders-new-militant-tactic-sinai?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120816&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=536cf9b22736498fb84bb3f864738f1a

An Israeli report on Sinai - Sinai: A New Front

By Ehud Yaari ((A Washington institute Policy Note))

Since Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from Gaza and last year’s Egyptian revolution, the Sinai Peninsula has emerged as a new hotspot in the complex Arab-Israeli conflict, with an expanding terrorist infrastructure that makes it another front of potential confrontation. The Bedouin are now in a position to initiate crises that neither Israel nor Egypt wants, while also influencing the struggle against Hamas. Measures are needed to prevent the total collapse of security in and around the peninsula, avoid the rise of an armed, runaway Bedouin statelet, and minimize the risk of Israeli-Egyptian peace imploding under the pressures of the wild Sinai frontier.

Throughout History and until quite recently, the vast, arid expanses of the Sinai Peninsula served mainly as a formidable buffer zone between the Nile Valley rulers and their adversaries governing the Levant and Mesopotamia. In modern Egyptian historical literature, the area is often referred to as “Box of Sand,” while the great Israeli strategist Yigal Alon, in a 1959 book describing the regional military equation, called it the............Read more

20th Century Battlefields - 1973 Yom Kippur War

What happened on the 6th of October/Yom Kippur day?



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