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المحافظة على وحدة ليبيا: التحديات الأمنية في حقبة ما بعد القذافي
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 6, 2011 (IPS) - A booming private security industry - triggered mostly by terrorist threats, domestic insurgencies and drug wars - deploys some 20 million armed personnel worldwide: twice the number of police officers, according to the annual 2011 Small Arms Survey released here.
Outside of war zones in Asia and Africa, the Latin American region has the highest ratio of arms per employee: about 10 times higher than in Western Europe.
Keith Krause, director of the Small Arms Survey Programme, says in prisons, at airports, along borders, and on the street, security provision is increasingly in the hands of private actors.
"The key question to which we don’t know the answer is whether these evolving arrangements are enhancing or impairing security," he adds.
In some countries, the survey points out, the 20 million figure represents a doubling or even a tripling of the number of private security workers over the past 10-20 years.
Government outsourcing of many security functions appears to be driving the boom, among other factors.
Still, despite the rapid growth of the sector, private security personnel hold far fewer firearms than do state security forces, according to the survey.
A review of data for 70 countries reveals they hold no more than four million firearms, compared to some 26 million held by law enforcement and 200 million held by armed forces.
The Survey also includes case studies examining the dynamics of both public and private security provision in Cote d'Ivoire, Haiti and Madagascar.
The Small Arms Survey, an independent research project funded by multiple governments, is the 11th annual global analysis of small arms issues.
Published by Cambridge University Press, and commissioned by the Small Arms Survey Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, the study says regulation and accountability mechanisms have not kept up with the growth of the private security industry.
Meanwhile, a United Nations Working Group has been trying to rein in the widespread human rights abuses by these private military and security companies (PMSCs).
A draft International Convention on the Regulation, Surveillance and Monitoring of PMSCs has already been discussed by more than 150 academics and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) worldwide.
The proposed draft, which spells out legislative oversight and judicial measures to punish private security firms for any unlawful acts, has also been submitted to member states for their comments.
The PMSCs currently operating in war zones include ArmorGroup International, Dyncorp International, EOD Technology Inc., KBR, Kulak Construction Co., Prime Projects International, PWC Logistics, Global Risks Solutions, Mitchell Jessen and Associates, the Shaw Group and Sallyport Global Services.
Some of these companies have been accused of advising the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on torture and body-guarding techniques, and also trained police forces in torture techniques in at least one Latin American country.
Advanced Precision Kill Weapon
BAE Systems announced that the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System scored its first-ever penetrating guided-rocket shots with the M282 warhead during recent tests at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. The tests, deemed successful by U.S. Army and Navy representatives, illustrate the product's exceptional capability to engage targets at close range and penetrate complex targets.
المحافظة على وحدة ليبيا: التحديات الأمنية في حقبة ما بعد القذافي
طرابلس/بروكسل | 14 Dec 2011
كما توضح موجة العنف الأخيرة في ليبيا بجلاء، فإن مصير المليشيات التي أطاحت بنظام القذافي ينبغي أن يُعالَج بعناية خشية أن يعرّض المرحلة الانتقالية في ليبيا للخطر.
"المحافظة على وحدة ليبيا: التحديات الأمنية في حقبة ما بعد القذافي" ، وهو أحدث تقارير مجموعة الأزمات الدولية، يدرس التحديات الناشئة عن وجود عدد كبير من القوات والميليشيات المحلية التي لعبت دوراً حاسماً في الإطاحة بنظام القذافي لكنها باتت تشكل الآن تهديداً كبيراً لأمن البلاد. بعد أن حظي المجلس الوطني الانتقالي بسرعة باعتراف دولي واسع، فإنه أصبح بسرعة أيضاً وجه الثورة. إلاّ أن الصورة مختلفة على الأرض. لقد تميزت الانتفاضة بقدر كبير من اللامركزية وبوجود ألوية عسكرية مستقلة وذاتية التسليح والتدريب في شرق البلاد وغربها على حد سواء وتشكيلة واسعة من القوات في طرابلس. اليوم، يذكر أن ثمة 125,000 ليبي مسلح ينتظمون في عضوية أكثر من مئة ميليشيا. وهذه الميليشيات في طريقها لمأسسة أنفسها، مقلّدة التنظيم المتبع في الجيوش النظامية وتنخرط في أنشطة مستقلة (تسجيل الأشخاص والأسلحة؛ واعتقال وحبس الأشخاص) تترسخ بشكل متزايد.
يقول وليم لورانس، مدير مشروع شمال أفريقيا في مجموعة الأزمات، "تم تحرير ليبيا على أجزاء، غالباً من خلال ثورات محلية ومجموعات عسكرية شكلت في كل حالة على حدا واستعملت الوسائل العسكرية والمفاوضات على حد سواء في تحقيق أهدافها". ونتيجة لذلك، فقد نما عدد كبير من القوات المحلية والميليشيات التي يمكن أن تدعي بأنها جزء مشروع من حركة التحرر الوطنية".
المشكلة التي تطرحها الميليشيات تعكس حقائق صعبة حول المشهد السياسي الذي أنتجها في الأصل. المنشقون عن نظام القذافي، الذين لعبوا دوراً محورياً في تشكيل المجلس الوطني الانتقالي والجيش الوطني التابع للثورة، يتهمهم مقاتلو الثورة بالانتماء إلى النظام القديم. وتسهم الخلافات بين المناطق وكذلك بين الإسلاميين والعلمانيين في تشكيل هذه الديناميكية. الأسلحة متوافرة بكثرة وتسود الشكوك بين المقاتلين المسلحين. الأهم من كل ذلك هو أن المجلس الوطني الانتقالي ورث بلداً يتمتع بإرث طويل من الإدارة المحلية ووزارات منقسمة وغير حاسمة تعزز الشكوك حيال السلطة المركزية.
إلى أن يتم تشكيل هيئة حاكمة مشروعة وإلى أن يتم تطوير مؤسسات وطنية ذات مصداقية ، خصوصاً في مجالات الدفاع، والشرطة، وتقديم الخدمات الحيوية، من المرجح أن يظل الليبيون متشككين إزاء العملية السياسية، ويصرون في نفس الوقت على الاحتفاظ بأسلحتهم والمحافظة على الهيكلية الحالية للألوية المسلحة غير النظامية. إن محاولة فرض حصيلة مختلفة ستكون بمثابة اللعب بالنار، وليس هناك كبير أمل في نجاحها.
لكن ذلك لا يعني عدم القيام بشيء. على المجلس الوطني الانتقالي أن يتواصل بوضوح، وأن يعمل بشفافية وأن يتشاور بشكل وثيق مع المجالس العسكرية المحلية وقادة المجتمعات المحلية حول جميع القضايا المرتبطة بنزع السلاح، وحل هذه الأولوية وإدماجها. ينبغي أن يتفق الجميع على جملة من القواعد والسلوكيات المشتركة لجميع المقاتلين – خصوصاً من حيث معاملة المحتجزين – ومضافرة جهودهم من أجل إدماج الثوار المسلحين، خصوصاً أصغرهم سناً، وذلك من خلال تقديم وظائف مدنية بديلة. وينبغي على المجتمع الدولي أن يقدم المشورة والمساعدة الفنية.
يقول روبرت مالي، مدير برنامج الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا في مجموعة الأزمات، "سيكون لقيام جهاز تنفيذي يفتقر إلى الشرعية بعملية نزع السلاح وحل الألوية من أعلى أثر عكسي. ركّز القذافي السلطة في يديه دون أن يبني دولة مركزية. ينبغي أن يقوم الذين حلوا محله بالعكس تماماً".
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2011/mena/holding-libya-together-security-challenges-after-qadhafi.aspx?alt_lang=ar
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2011/mena/holding-libya-together-security-challenges-after-qadhafi.aspx?alt_lang=ar
The Covert Intelligence War Against Iran
By Scott Stewart
There has been a lot of talk in the press lately about a “cold war” being waged by the United States, Israel and other U.S. allies against Iran. Such a struggle is certainly taking place, but in order to place recent developments in perspective, it is important to recognize that the covert intelligence war against Iran (and the Iranian response to this war) is clearly not a new phenomenon.
Indeed, STRATFOR has been chronicling this struggle since early 2007. Our coverage has included analyses of events such as the defection to the West of Iranian officials with knowledge of Tehran’s nuclear program; the Iranian seizure of British servicemen in the Shatt al Arab Waterway; the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists; the use of the Stuxnet worm to cripple Iranian uranium enrichment efforts; and Iranian efforts to arm its proxies and use them as a threat to counteract Western pressure. These proxies are most visible in Iraq and Lebanon, but they also exist in Yemen, Afghanistan, Syria, the Palestinian territories, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.
While the covert intelligence war has been under way for many years, the tempo of events that can readily be identified as part of it has been increasing over the past few months. It is important to note that many of these events are the result of hidden processes begun months or even years previously, so while visible events may indeed be increasing, the efforts responsible for many of them began to increase much earlier. What the activities of recent months do tell us is that the covert war between Iran and its enemies will not be diminishing anytime soon. If anything, with the current withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq and Iranian nuclear efforts continuing,we likely will see the results of additional covert operations — and evidence of the clandestine activity required to support those operations.
Ramping Up
All eyes were on this covert intelligence war after The New York Times published an article Jan. 15 reporting that the United States and Israel worked together to create and launch Stuxnet against the Iranian nuclear program. The visible events related to the intelligence war maintained a relatively steady pace until Oct. 11, when the U.S. Department of Justice announced that two men had been charged in New York with taking part in a plot by the Iranian Quds Force to kill Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States, Adel al-Jubeir, on U.S. soil.
In early November, a 
new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report was issued detailing Iranian efforts toward a nuclear weapons program. While this report did not contain any major revelations, it did contain new specifics and was more explicit than previous IAEA reports in its conclusion that Iran was actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The IAEA report resulted in an Israeli-led diplomatic and public relations campaign urging more effective action against Iran, ranging from more stringent sanctions to military operations.
new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report was issued detailing Iranian efforts toward a nuclear weapons program. While this report did not contain any major revelations, it did contain new specifics and was more explicit than previous IAEA reports in its conclusion that Iran was actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The IAEA report resulted in an Israeli-led diplomatic and public relations campaign urging more effective action against Iran, ranging from more stringent sanctions to military operations.
Then, in the early afternoon of Nov. 12, explosions occurred at an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) ballistic missile base near Tehran, killing 17 people, including a high-ranking IRGC commander who was a critical figure in Iran’s ballistic missile program. Iran has insisted the blast was accidental, but speculation has since spread that the explosion could have been part of a sabotage operation carried out by Israeli intelligence. Israeli intelligence officials also have undertaken not-so-subtle efforts to ensure that outside observers believe they were responsible for the blasts.
Later on Nov. 12, the Bahraini government went public with the discovery of an alleged plot involving at least five Bahrainis traveling through Syria and Qatar to carry out attacks against government and diplomatic targets in Bahrain. Iran vehemently denied it was involved and portrayed the plot as a fabrication, just as it responded to the alleged plot against the Saudi ambassador.
plot involving at least five Bahrainis traveling through Syria and Qatar to carry out attacks against government and diplomatic targets in Bahrain. Iran vehemently denied it was involved and portrayed the plot as a fabrication, just as it responded to the alleged plot against the Saudi ambassador.
The next day, the Iranian press reported that Ahmad Rezai, the son of Mohsen Rezai — who is the secretary of Iran’s Expediency Council, a former IRGC commander and a presidential contender — was found dead at a hotel in Dubai. The deputy head of the Expediency Council told the Iranian press that the son’s death was suspicious and caused by electric shocks, while other reports portrayed the death as a suicide.
On Nov. 20, the Los Angeles Times reported that U.S. intelligence officials confirmed the CIA had suspended its operations in Lebanon following the arrest of several of its sources due to sloppy tradecraft on the part of CIA case officers assigned to Beirut. Following this report, the Iranian government announced that it had arrested 12 CIA sources due to tradecraft mistakes. We have been unable to determine if the reports regarding Lebanon are true, merely CIA disinformation or a little of both. Certainly, the CIA would like the Iranians to believe it is no longer active in Lebanon. Even if these reports are CIA spin, they are quite interesting in light of the Oct. 11 announcement of the thwarted assassination plot in the United States and the Nov. 12 announcement of the arrests in Bahrain.
On Nov. 21, the United States and the United Kingdom launched a new wave of sanctions against Iran based on the aforementioned IAEA report. The new sanctions were designed to impact Iran’s banking and energy sector. In fact, the United Kingdom took the unprecedented step of totally cutting off Iran’s Central Bank from the British financial sector. The Canadian government undertook similar action against the Central Bank of Iran.
On Nov. 28, there were unconfirmed press reports of an explosion in Esfahan, one of Iran’s largest cities. These reports were later echoed by a STRATFOR source in Israel, and U.S. sources have advised that explosions did occur in Esfahan and that they caused a significant amount of damage. Esfahan is home to numerous military and research and development facilities, including some relevant to Iran’s nuclear efforts. We are unsure which facilities at Esfahan were damaged by the blasts and are trying to identify them.
an explosion in Esfahan, one of Iran’s largest cities. These reports were later echoed by a STRATFOR source in Israel, and U.S. sources have advised that explosions did occur in Esfahan and that they caused a significant amount of damage. Esfahan is home to numerous military and research and development facilities, including some relevant to Iran’s nuclear efforts. We are unsure which facilities at Esfahan were damaged by the blasts and are trying to identify them.
Elsewhere on Nov. 28, Iran’s Guardians Council, a clerical organization that provides oversight of legislation passed by Iran’s parliament, approved a bill to expel the British ambassador and downgrade diplomatic relations between the two countries. The next day, Iranian protesters stormed the British Embassy in Tehran, along with the British Embassy’s residential compound in the city. The angry — and well-orchestrated — mob was protesting the sanctions announced Nov. 21. Iranian authorities did not stop the mob from storming either facility.
Iranian authorities did not stop the mob from storming either facility.
On Dec. 1, the European Union approved new sanctions against some 180 Iranian individuals and companies over Iran’s support of terrorism and its continued nuclear weapons program. The European Union did not approve a French proposal to impose a full embargo on Iranian oil.
In the early hours of Dec. 4, a small improvised explosive device detonated under a van parked near the British Embassy building in Manama, Bahrain. The device, which was not very powerful, caused little structural damage to the vehicle and none to the building itself.
The next day, an unnamed U.S. official confirmed Dec. 4 reports from several Iranian news outlets that Iran had recovered an RQ-170 “Sentinel” unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in Iranian territory. The Iranian reports claimed that Iranian forces were responsible for bringing down the Sentinel — some even said the Iranians were able to hack into the UAV’s command link. U.S. officials have denied such reports, and it is highly unlikely that Iran was able to take control of a UAV and recover it intact.
Outlook
The United States is currently in the process of completing the withdrawal of its combat forces from Iraq. With the destruction of the Iraqi military in 2003, the U.S. military became the only force able to counter Iranian conventional military strength in the Persian Gulf region. Because of this, the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq will create a power vacuum that the Iranians are eager to exploit. The potential for Iran to control a sphere of influence from western Afghanistan to the Mediterranean is a prospect that not only frightens regional players such as Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey but also raises serious concerns in the United States.
As we have noted before, we don’t believe that a military attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities alone is the answer to the regional threat posed by Iran. Iran’s power comes from its ability to employ its conventional forces and not nuclear weapons. Therefore, strikes against its nuclear weapons program would not impact Iran’s conventional forces or its ability to interfere with the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz by using its conventional forces asymmetrically against U.S. naval power and commercial shipping. Indeed, any attack on Iran would have to be far broader than just a one-off attack like the June 1981 Israeli strike at Osirak, Iraq, that crippled Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons program.
Because of this difficulty, we have seen the Israelis, Americans and their allies attacking Iran through other means. First of all, they are seeking to curb Iran’s sphere of influence by working to overthrow the Syrian regime, limit Syria’s influence in Iraq and control Hezbollah in Lebanon. They are also seeking to attack Iran’s nuclear program by coercing officials to defect, assassinating scientists and deploying cyberwarfare weapons such as the Stuxnet worm.
It is also necessary to recognize that covert action does not occur in a vacuum. Each covert activity requires a tremendous amount of clandestine intelligence-gathering in order to plan and execute it. With so much covert action happening, the clandestine activity undertaken by all sides to support it is obviously tremendous. But as the frequency of this activity increases, so can sloppy tradecraft.
Finally, as we examine this campaign it is remarkable to note that not only are Iran’s enemies using covert methods to stage attacks on Iran’s nuclear program and military capabilities, they are also developing new and previously unknown methods to do so. And they have shown a willingness to allow these new covert attack capabilities to be unveiled by using them — which could render them useless for future attacks. This willingness to use, rather than safeguard, revolutionary new capabilities strongly underscores the importance of this covert campaign to Iran’s adversaries. It also indicates that we will likely see other new forms of covert warfare emerge in the coming months, along with revolutionary new tactical applications of older forms.
The Assassination of Gaddafi - GRTV Backgrounder
Private Security Industry Booming, Says Small Arms Survey
By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 6, 2011 (IPS) - A booming private security industry - triggered mostly by terrorist threats, domestic insurgencies and drug wars - deploys some 20 million armed personnel worldwide: twice the number of police officers, according to the annual 2011 Small Arms Survey released here.
Outside of war zones in Asia and Africa, the Latin American region has the highest ratio of arms per employee: about 10 times higher than in Western Europe.
Keith Krause, director of the Small Arms Survey Programme, says in prisons, at airports, along borders, and on the street, security provision is increasingly in the hands of private actors.
"The key question to which we don’t know the answer is whether these evolving arrangements are enhancing or impairing security," he adds.
In some countries, the survey points out, the 20 million figure represents a doubling or even a tripling of the number of private security workers over the past 10-20 years.
Government outsourcing of many security functions appears to be driving the boom, among other factors.
Still, despite the rapid growth of the sector, private security personnel hold far fewer firearms than do state security forces, according to the survey.
A review of data for 70 countries reveals they hold no more than four million firearms, compared to some 26 million held by law enforcement and 200 million held by armed forces.
The Survey also includes case studies examining the dynamics of both public and private security provision in Cote d'Ivoire, Haiti and Madagascar.
The Small Arms Survey, an independent research project funded by multiple governments, is the 11th annual global analysis of small arms issues.
Published by Cambridge University Press, and commissioned by the Small Arms Survey Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, the study says regulation and accountability mechanisms have not kept up with the growth of the private security industry.
Meanwhile, a United Nations Working Group has been trying to rein in the widespread human rights abuses by these private military and security companies (PMSCs).
A draft International Convention on the Regulation, Surveillance and Monitoring of PMSCs has already been discussed by more than 150 academics and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) worldwide.
The proposed draft, which spells out legislative oversight and judicial measures to punish private security firms for any unlawful acts, has also been submitted to member states for their comments.
The PMSCs currently operating in war zones include ArmorGroup International, Dyncorp International, EOD Technology Inc., KBR, Kulak Construction Co., Prime Projects International, PWC Logistics, Global Risks Solutions, Mitchell Jessen and Associates, the Shaw Group and Sallyport Global Services.
Some of these companies have been accused of advising the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on torture and body-guarding techniques, and also trained police forces in torture techniques in at least one Latin American country.
Asked about the proposed convention, Nicolas Florquin, one of the authors of the chapter on private security companies in the Small Arms Survey, told IPS there are several ongoing processes to improve regulation of private security companies.
One is the intergovernmental working group appointed by the U.N. Human Rights Council to discuss options to regulate the industry. He said one option on the table is a convention.
Although experts have produced a draft, he pointed out, it is unclear how many states will support it, as it is a very controversial topic in a rather politiciSed forum, as a background check on the U.N. Human Rights Council will illustrate.
For instance, he said, the 1989 U.N. Convention on Mercenaries has only 32 states parties (those signing and ratifying), and mainly from the coalition of non-aligned countries.
Another process, he said, is the Montreux Document, basically a 'summary' of states' obligations with respect to PMSCs under international law, along with examples of good practices.
Some 36 states 'support' the process, including major 'contracting' states like the United States and UK, and also 'affected' states such as Iraq and Afghanistan.
It is not binding, but the standards it summarises are taken from other legally binding documents.
Additionally, there is an offshoot of the Montreux process, the International Code of Conduct for PMSCs, which basically enables PMSCs themselves to commit to many of the standards outlined in the Montreux Document.
Some 150 PMSCs have signed it, but mechanisms for oversight, monitoring, and accreditation are still under discussion, he added.
Asked whether an international convention to regulate the industry is feasible, Florquin told IPS: "The question of feasibility depends greatly on whether states involved in the Montreux process will back or not such a convention project."
"Obviously, they are more keen on the Montreux process, but we'll have to wait for more meeting of the government working group to see the positions of everyone," he noted.
(END)
One is the intergovernmental working group appointed by the U.N. Human Rights Council to discuss options to regulate the industry. He said one option on the table is a convention.
Although experts have produced a draft, he pointed out, it is unclear how many states will support it, as it is a very controversial topic in a rather politiciSed forum, as a background check on the U.N. Human Rights Council will illustrate.
For instance, he said, the 1989 U.N. Convention on Mercenaries has only 32 states parties (those signing and ratifying), and mainly from the coalition of non-aligned countries.
Another process, he said, is the Montreux Document, basically a 'summary' of states' obligations with respect to PMSCs under international law, along with examples of good practices.
Some 36 states 'support' the process, including major 'contracting' states like the United States and UK, and also 'affected' states such as Iraq and Afghanistan.
It is not binding, but the standards it summarises are taken from other legally binding documents.
Additionally, there is an offshoot of the Montreux process, the International Code of Conduct for PMSCs, which basically enables PMSCs themselves to commit to many of the standards outlined in the Montreux Document.
Some 150 PMSCs have signed it, but mechanisms for oversight, monitoring, and accreditation are still under discussion, he added.
Asked whether an international convention to regulate the industry is feasible, Florquin told IPS: "The question of feasibility depends greatly on whether states involved in the Montreux process will back or not such a convention project."
"Obviously, they are more keen on the Montreux process, but we'll have to wait for more meeting of the government working group to see the positions of everyone," he noted.
(END)
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=56387
20th Century Battlefields - 1973 Yom Kippur War
Part 1/6
Part 2/6
Part 3/6
Part 46
Part 5/6
Part 6/6
October 1973: The Israeli Intelligence Failure
This documentary tackles the failure of the Israeli intelligence to interpret the Egyptian movements prior to war. It lacks a lot by ignoring the Egyptian military efforts to manipulate the Israeli intelligence as well as the role of Egyptian double agents spies and the long lasting political man-oeuvres by the Sadat administration. Yet its worth a watch.
Yom Kippur War 1973: The Egyptian Revenge
