LikyWeaks


UNCLAS CAIRO 000123 
 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR EG
 
SUBJECT: EGYPT:  COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT FOR THE 
PROCUREMENT OF TWENTY-FOUR (24) F-16 BLOCK 50/52 AIRCRAFT 
TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT NATIONAL DEFENSE MISSION REF: EGYPTIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LETTER OF REQUEST (08-171) FOR LETTER OF OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE (LOA) DATED 25 SEPT 08.
1.(SBU) Description. REF A is the GOE request to procure twenty-four (24) F-16 Block
 50/52 aircraft to support their national defense mission. The GOE long-term plan is
 to procure a total of forty-five (45) F-16 Block 50/52 aircraft with twenty-four 
(24) of those being procured at this time and twenty-one (21) additional aircraft 
being requested in the future when funding permits. Although the aircraft procured
 will be Block 50 or Block 52 depending upon the engine that the EAF decides to 
procure, the aircraft will have the software set to comply with Egypt,s non-CISMOA
 status. This limits the full capability of the aircraft until the EAF is 
authorized any increased capability in accordance with a signed CISMOA. 
At that point, the software can be reset to provide the appropriate CISMOA-compliant
 capability. The F-16 Fighting Falcon is a compact, multi-role fighter aircraft. It
 is highly maneuverable and has proven itself in air-to-air combat and air-to-surface
 attack. The F-16 Block 50/52 aircraft provides a high-performance weapon system for 
the United States and allied nations. The Egyptian Air Force currently operates a 
fleet of 195 F-16 Block 15/32/40 aircraft. The F-16 Block 50/52 is the latest 
mass-produced common configuration F-16 aircraft available for procurement and is 
currently in use by the United States Air Force.

2.(SBU) Reason the purchaser desires the articles or services. The procurement of 
these aircraft is desired by Egypt for three main reasons: A. These aircraft will he
lp modernize the EAF fighter aircraft fleet. B. These new F-16s will potentially 
replace an estimated 180 non-flyable MiG-21 airframes and an unspecified number of 
non-flyable F-7 airframes according to sources within the EAF. C. The procurement will replace 24 EAF F-16s that have been destroyed in mishaps since Egypt began operating the F-16.

¶3. (SBU) How the articles or services would affect the recipient,s force structure. The EAF originally procured 220 F-16s over the past 26 years, but has lost 25 through attrition. The 24 requested F-16s would backfill 24 of those lost aircraft. The EAF MiG-21 and F-7 fleets require replacement due to their age and diminishing operational readiness. This new aircraft will replace a minimum estimated total of 180 of those aircraft. There will be no change to the existing mission and primary roles of the F-16.

¶4. (SBU) How the articles or services would contribute to both the U.S. and the recipient,s defense/security goals. The F-16 Block 50/52 will enable the EAF to defend its people, borders, the Suez Canal and the resource of the Nile River from enemy attack. It will offer US-Egyptian interoperability opportunities that are not available in the MiG-21 or F-7. The procurement would revitalize the EAF fighter fleet so that the EAF may focus on moving forward as a US ally through US-based training, joint exercises and toward joint operations with the US and its other allies. The current state of the EAF fighter fleet causes the Egyptian government to pour precious manpower, money, and resources into the constant struggle of keeping their aging fleet of MiG-21s and F-7s flying. The new procurement would enable the EAF to shift personnel, funding and resources from a rapidly diminishing fleet of obsolescence-prone aircraft to a weapon system with a great capability that will be operational when needed.

5.(SBU) Justification for the type and quantity of articles or services requested. The F-16 Block 50/52 is the only logical, cost-effective choice for modernizing the EAF fighter aircraft fleet. The EAF currently operates 195 F-16s and has operated the F-16 with support from the United States for 26 years. The EAF has developed wide-scale in-country F-16-specific maintenance/logistics support and has an in-country F-16 Flying Training Unit where new pilots are trained to fly the F-16. The EAF has a corps of pilots, technicians and engineers who are already familiar with the F-16 at the operational and intermediate levels. The F-16 Block 50/52 aircraft are currently in the U.S. Air Force inventory and long-term sustainability through the U.S. logistics system is a distinct advantage. The EAF has in-country depot capability to repair over 300 different F-16 parts. Most of these parts are compatible with the EAF version F-16 Block 50/52. The EAF has in-country depot-level aircraft modification capability through the F-16 Falcon-UP modification program. This program and capability enables the EAF to significantly increase the service-life of their current F-16 fleet and any subsequent F-16 procurements. The EAF has established in-country partial depot capability to overhaul certain F-16 engine sections and this capability is upgradeable to support the F-16 Block 50/52. Egypt continually upgrades its avionics testing and repair capability to keep pace with the advancing technology in the F-16 aircraft. Egypt uses the US logistics/supply system to complement its in-country F-16 support efforts. Egypt participates in all USAF Technical Coordination Groups so that they receive the latest information available on technical issues and advances related to the F-16.

6.(SBU) Combatant Commander's concurrence to the introduction of a new war-fighting capability to the nation or region. Combatant Commander's concurrence will be provided separately.

7.(SBU) Anticipated reactions of the neighboring nations. The procurement of these additional F-16 aircraft is not expected to influence the regional balance of power or cause negative reactions from any of Egypt's neighbors. The EAF wishes to procure a unique version of the F-16 Block 50/52 that will be capable of firing the medium-range AIM-7 Sparrow radar-guided missiles that are currently in the EAF inventory. The EAF version of the F-16 Block 50/52 will definitely be able to fire the short-range AIM-9 Sidewinder heat-seeking missile and will have a 20mm cannon. The potential exists for the aircraft to be configured with the AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) should the US Government decide to release those munitions to Egypt in the future. This new F-16 procurement introduces a limited increase of technology to Egypt, but does not introduce new technology to the region. Several regional allies have recently purchased similar airframes through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. These assets will enhance Egypt,s ability to participate in combined regional training exercises. This procurement would not impact Israel's qualitative military edge.

8.(SBU) Assessment of the nation's ability to account for, safeguard, operate, maintain, and support the articles. The GOE has demonstrated the intent and ability to protect sensitive, classified military technology over an extended period. Egypt signed a General Security of Information Agreement with the US and, as a customer, has purchased and protected the sensitive technology of other U.S. weapon systems. The EAF has an in-country F-16 pilot training school and they develop their corps of F-16 pilots through that school. The EAF has significant depot-level capability that enables them to repair over 300 F-16 parts, modify F-16 aircraft to extend the service life of the aircraft, and overhaul or repair F-16 engine subassemblies within the country of Egypt. The EAF works closely with the US Government for complementary logistics support of their F-16 fleet. Although the EAF has an F-16 engine management program that is lacking as compared the USAF engine management program, the EAF is making good progress with the US engine program offices to improve their overall engine management capability. Egypt has met all previous F-16 security and End Use Monitoring (EUM) requirements.

9.(SBU) Training required either in-country or in the United States and anticipated reactions resulting from the presence of U.S. trainers in country. Specialized training on the F-16 Block 50/52 under this new procurement would be performed in-part by an in-country US military Extended Training Services Support (ETSS) team. Each of the previous 4 EAF F-16 procurement increments was supported by an ETSS team of 10 or more personnel. There is currently an ETSS team assigned to one of the EAF F-16 bases as part of the procurement of the most recent increment of EAF F-16s. ETSS teams have been a part of the Egyptian community for 26 years with only positive impact to the country and region. Also, a team of trainers from the prime contractor and subcontractors would likely be sent to Egypt to augment the ETSS until initial training of the EAF is complete. The ETSS would remain and provide the remaining longer-term support. No required training outside of Egypt related to this procurement is anticipated at this time.

10.(SBU) Possible impact of any in-country U.S. presence that might be required as a result of providing the article. U.S. Government civilian personnel and U.S. contractors are permanently assigned to Egypt to support the current EAF F-16 program. Those US positions have been filled for 26 years. There is an anticipated plus-up of US personnel in-country that would be necessary to support the arrival, bed-down and support of the increased number of F-16s resulting from this procurement. A majority of the plus-up personnel will be on temporary duty status and a small minority of the plus-up personnel will likely be required to remain in Egypt permanently. There is no expected negative impact that would result from these additional Americans being in Egypt. Additionally, US Government teams and US contractor teams routinely travel to Egypt to support the various US-provided weapon systems of the Egyptian military including the current F-16 fleet. There is no expected negative impact that would result from the continued presence of these Americans in Egypt.

11.(SBU) Source of financing and the economic impact of the proposed acquisition. Egypt plans to procure these 24 F-16 Block 50/52 aircraft and all related training, support and infrastructure improvements as a total package utilizing Foreign Military Financing. The Egyptians will only accept the offer for the procurement if the amortization of financing meets their established budgeted payment schedule. In order for the new aircraft to fire AIM-7 Sparrow as requested, a modification of the avionics package is required. This will affect the long range funding of this program and other large procurement programs currently in work. In addition, this system engineering would have to be reversed if the AIM-120 AMRAAM is purchased in the future. Egypt is not planning to use national funds to pay for any portion of this procurement. The economic impact of the proposed acquisition on the US is expected to infuse $2 billion into the US economy over the acquisition period.

12.(SBU) Human rights considerations relevant to the proposed acquisition. None.

13.(SBU) A plan for end-use monitoring for sensitive and advanced warfighting technology and the SAO,s plan for compliance verification. The Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) Egypt has a robust Golden Sentry Program. The Golden Sentry Program representative and Security Assistance Officer (SAO) responsible for the program will coordinate for the review and maintenance of required documentation. All parties will maintain serial number lists of all components within the inventory or transferred and will conduct the mandated inspections as required. This coordination will ensure that historical copies of all EUM inspection results and customer,s physical security and accountability control plans remain on file. The Egyptian military currently has 195 F-16s in country. Egypt has maintained accountability and security of these aircraft without unauthorized loss, theft, or access to date. The GOE has expressed the willingness to meet U.S. guidelines for accountability and security of these new aircraft, and the Office of Military Cooperation will conduct End Use Monitoring of all required components if this request is approved.

14.(SBU) Recommendation whether the USG should approve transfer of the article and justification. The country team supports USG approval of the GOE procurement of twenty-four (24) F-16 Block 50/52 aircraft. This procurement will replace aircraft lost to attrition and will replace fighter aircraft that are beyond their useful life. It would also encourage the demilitarization of older aircraft. This procurement will dissuade Egypt from using national funds to buy fighters from another country. It will also increase the percentage of US-built equipment in the Egyptian inventory. The procurement may be seen as encouragement for Egypt to sign a CISMOA as well. Although release of the AIM-120 AMRAAM to Egypt was by no means offered, promised or guaranteed to the GOE, MOD or EAF with this procurement, this procurement would create the possibility for Egypt to seek the AIM-120 should they sign a CISMOA in the future. The AIM-7 Sparrow capability currently requested is an option for this purchase; however AIM-120 capability is far superior and could be added with engineering modifications assuming a CISMOA is in place. We support the sale to the degree that MOD can afford the new equipment and still fund the follow-on support of all current Egyptian military programs. We support this sale if the cost does not jeopardize other important future procurements. The US Government is in a position to build a stronger relationship with the Government of Egypt by enabling the GOE to modernize its fighter aircraft fleet with the US-built and US-supported F-16 Block 50/52 aircraft. This is a coordinated mission position. SCOBEY



WikiLeaks Iraq Shooting Video Analysis



STRUCTURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE THE SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED NETWORKS
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release October 7, 2011
EXECUTIVE ORDER
- - - - - - -
STRUCTURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE THE SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED NETWORKS AND THE RESPONSIBLE SHARING AND SAFEGUARDING OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America and in order to ensure the responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified national security information (classified information) on computer networks, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Policy.
Our Nation's security requires classified information to be shared immediately with authorized users around the world but also requires sophisticated and vigilant means to ensure it is shared securely. Computer
networks have individual and common vulnerabilities that require coordinated decisions on risk management.
This order directs structural reforms to ensure responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified information on computer networks that shall be consistent with appropriate protections for privacy and civil liberties. Agencies bear the primary responsibility for meeting these twin goals. These structural reforms will ensure coordinated interagency development and reliable implementation of policies and minimum standards
regarding information security, personnel security, and systems security; address both internal and external security threats and vulnerabilities; and provide policies and minimum standards for sharing classified information both within and outside the Federal Government. These policies and minimum standards will
address all.......Click here to read the full document


Wikileaks and the El-Masri case: Innocent CIA torture victim more than just a leaked cable





Wikileaks Bulgaria: ARMS DEALER WARNS THAT EGYPT IS HUNTING FOR MANPADS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 001686

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR PM, EUR/NCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2016
TAGS: ETTC PARM PTER EG BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA: ARMS DEALER WARNS THAT EGYPT IS HUNTING
FOR MANPADS

REF: A. SOFIA 1119
¶B. SOFIA 1204
¶C. STATE 146913

Classified By: CDA Alex Karagiannis, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (S) SUMMARY: In a December 18 meeting with an Embassy Political Officer, a well-connected Bulgarian arms broker told us that he had recently rebuffed an Egyptian MoD order for Bulgarian MANPADS, which he viewed as a proliferation risk. He warned that the Egyptians seemed to view the order
as very time-sensitive and that they were likely to seek MANPADS elsewhere in the Balkans after being turned down in Bulgaria. Post has reason to suspect the source's motive for sharing this information with us; we have no way of verifying its veracity. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (S) On December 18, Nikolai Gigov called a lunch meeting with Poloff at the offices of his company -- the arms trading firm Delta Group (commonly known as "Delta G"). The purpose was to inform us that he had recently received a large order from the Egyptian Ministry of Defense. He had accepted part of the order -- for T-72 tank rounds and parts; however, he claimed to have declined the Ministry's order for 150 Strela
MANPADS systems. Gigov appeared unaware of the U.S.-Bulgarian MANPADS agreement, which is classified in both countries at the Secret level. He claimed to have rebuffed the Egyptians of his own initiative, because of his doubts about the type of missiles ordered and the urgency with which
the MoD seemed to require them.

¶3. (S) Gigov reported being confused as to why Egypt would place an order for outdated Strela missiles (he did not specify the specific model). "If you're a state," he asked rhetorically, "why not buy something better -- an Igla or Mistral system, or a Stinger?" Military planes have effective countermeasures for MANPADS such as the Strela, Gigov said -- "The only thing they're good for is shooting down a civilian aircraft." Gigov speculated openly that the weapons may have been intended to be diverted elsewhere.
When asked specifically if the order had come from Arab International Optronics, an Egyptian MoD-owned firm that has bought MANPADS parts from Bulgaria in the past (reftels), Gigov hedged, before restating that the order came "from the MoD."

¶4. (S) Gigov said that such deals typically were slow-moving affairs, but he emphasized the sense of urgency that he perceived from the Egyptian side on this particular deal. The Egyptians did not specifically describe the deal as time-sensitive, he said; however, the frequent phone calls and follow-up messages he had received from their side indicated to him that this was the case. After declining the MANPADS portion of the order, he reported being contacted by the Egyptian defense attache with a request for an explanation.

Background:

¶5. (S/NF) Nikolai Gigov is an extremely well-connected businessman, whose legitimate business interests besides Delta G include insurance and private security ventures as well as ownership of Sofia's Lokomotiv soccer club. He is widely alleged to have brokered arms deals with the former Yugoslavia in violation of UN embargoes, and may have an ongoing role in illegal traffic in methamphetamines. He has family ties to Serbia, and displays a vocal antipathy toward Muslims. Through a combination of personal ties and liberal
political donations, Gigov counts many of Bulgaria's most powerful figures as "close personal friends," including President Parvanov, Interior Minister Petkov, and Sofia Mayor Borisov. He recently put these ties to use as the local agent for EADS, helping the European consortium win the MoD's competition to supply the Bulgarian military with Eurocopter helicopters. He has also worked with General Dynamics to supply Bulgarian-origin weapons and munitions to the Afghan National Army, and has indicated to us that he is interested in representing either Boeing or Lockheed in the MoD's anticipated tender for fighter aircraft.

Comment:

¶6. (S) We believe that Gigov was attempting to curry favor with us by calling this meeting, but have no way of verifying the facts of his story. He badly wants a relationship with the U.S. Embassy -- possibly for commercial reasons and possibly in an attempt to clean up his reputation. It is possible that he is merely shopping rumors in an attempt to convince us of his bona fides; however it is impossible to dismiss his allegations. As reftels indicate, Egypt has been a traditional customer for Bulgarian MANPADS, and the detail with which Gigov recounts the purported order would make for a very ambitious fabrication.
SOFIA 00001686 002 OF 002
¶7. (U) XXXXXXXXXXXX

KARAGIANNIS
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/12/06SOFIA1686.html


 
EGYPT AND ISRAEL SIGNED GAS DEAL
 
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. 
The full text of the original cable is not available. 
C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 004972 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2015 
TAGS:        
SUBJECT: EGYPT AND ISRAEL SIGNED GAS DEAL 
 
 
Classified by ECPO Counselor John Desrocher for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
 1.  (C)  Israeli Infrastructure Minister Binyamin Ben Eliezer 
and Egyptian Oil Minister Sameh Fahmi publicly signed June 30 
in Cairo a memorandum of understanding for Egyptian gas sales 
to Israel.  Negotiations on this agreement have dragged out 
over 10 years largely because of political concerns in Egypt. 
 In an effort to distance itself from the political 
implications, the GOE encouraged the formation in 2000 of the 
Egyptian Eastern Mediterranean Gas joint venture company, 
owned by Israeli businessman Yossi Mieman's Merhav Group 
(25%), Egyptian businessman Hussein Salem (65%), and the 
GOE's Egyptian Gas Holding Company (10%).  Having a private 
company negotiate with the Israel Electric Corporation made 
the arrangement more palatable for the GOE.  The parties 
concluded an agreement in principle in early summer 2004 and 
concluded a framework agreement in February 2005.  The 
agreement signed today was a political understanding between 
the two governments; today's signing, witnessed by Egyptian 
Prime Minister Nazif, was the most high-profile public 
recognition of the deal to date.  A commercial agreement 
laying out the precise terms remains pending. 
 
 2.  (SBU)  According to the agreement, an offshore pipeline 
will be constructed from El Arish in Sinai up to the coast of 
Israel, bypassing Gaza.  Construction could begin as early as 
October 2005 with Egyptian gas possibly flowing to Israel by 
the second half of 2006.  Under the agreement, Egypt would 
provide approximately 1.7 billion cubic meters of gas per 
year 15 years for a total amount of USD 2.5 billion, making 
this Egypt's most lucrative gas deal ever. 
 
 
Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo 
 
You can also access this site through the 
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. 
 
CORBIN
http://dazzlepod.com/cable/05CAIRO4972/?q=hussein%20salem  



Cables Sanna on Yemenite Jews: SAADA JEWS SAFE IN SANAA

                        

                          
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHYN #0395/01 0731350
ZNR UUUUU ZZH(CCY CHANGED PARA 7/8 TO SBU AD910D39 MSI9700)
P 141350Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6547
INFO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0230 UNCLAS SANAA 000395 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CORRECTED COPY - PARA. 7 AND 8 CHANGED TO SBU 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y  (CHANGE PARA 7/8 TO SBU) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS:          
SUBJECT: SAADA JEWS SAFE IN SANAA 
 
REF: A. SANAA 85 
      B. SANAA 115 
 
 1. (U) SUMMARY:  Poloffs met on March 13 in Sanaa with Jewish 
families displaced by fighting that erupted in Saada in late 
January (reftels).  Poloffs met, under the auspices of the 
MFA and Interior Ministry, with approximately 30 people from 
two major families.  All members of the Jewish community that 
we spoke to voiced their gratitude to President Saleh for his 
support and protection.  They also explained that they are 
proud to be Yemenis, and have no desire to leave their 
country.  The families requested that poloffs provide 
religious texts in advance of the Passover holiday in April, 
and invited members of the Embassy community to join in the 
festivities.  END SUMMARY 
 
"All We Have Is God and Saleh" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 2. (U) Poloffs had separate meetings with the two largest 
Jewish families who were displaced from their homes in 
al-Salem, Saada governorate due to threats to their safety by 
supporters of rebel leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi.  All 45 of 
the al-Salem Jews are living in apartments at the Tourist 
City complex across the street from the Embassy.  The 
apartments that poloffs visited were furnished with 
armchairs, mattresses, televisions, gas cooking stoves, 
running water, and electricity.  NOTE:  The Tourist City 
complex is a gated community with soldiers guarding the 
entrances, small parks, swimming pools, and shops.  Despite 
its name, Tourist City is not a major tourist destination, 
but is a mixed-use residential and commercial complex housing 
a variety of Yemenis and foreigners.  The complex is owned by 
a relative of President Saleh.  END NOTE 
 
 3. (U)  During the first meeting, a middle-aged man 
representing his community thanked poloffs sincerely for 
their visit and explained that the families' needs have been 
taken care of by President Saleh and by Uthman Hussein Fayed 
al-Mugalli, a Member of Parliament from Saada, who is 
providing their food and spending money.  He emphasized the 
gratefulness of the Jewish community to the President, saying 
"all we have is God and Saleh." 
 
"We Will Not Move From Yemen Even a Step" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 4.  (U) Asked about Israeli press reports alleging that they 
were forbidden from leaving the country to go to Israel, the 
Jewish families strongly denied such claims, explaining that 
they are Yemenis and will not move from Yemen "even a step." 
"We are Yemenis until death," they reiterated and expressed 
love for their country.  One individual commented that 
"religion belongs to God and the country belongs to all."  In 
addition, they explained that they did not have problems 
before the Al-Houthi rebellion, and that they have been 
protected by the tribes for generations. 
 
Security 
- - - - - 
 
 5. (U) Poloffs asked whether the families would want to 
return to Saada after the conflict came to an end.  All but 
one expressed a desire to return back to their homes, but 
explained that "we cannot leave here until we have a secure 
place to go to."  One elderly woman told poloff that she did 
not want to return to Saada, even after the conflict is 
resolved.  She explained that her brother was killed seven 
years ago and her son was physically attacked five years ago. 
 She explained that she did not know why they were attacked. 
Poloff asked whether they were targeted because they were 
Jews, or because of a general lack of security, but she 
repeated that she did not know and did not connect the 
attacks to the al-Houthis.  She said that her son was taken 
care of and received medical attention at the government's 
expense. She reiterated, however, that she did not want to 
leave Sanaa, as she feels safe in the capital city. 
 
Education and Religious Practice 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 6. (U) Poloff inquired about the educational status of the 
approximately 30 children among the displaced, and the 
families explained that they were not attending schools. One 
woman stated that they need to attend Hebrew schools and 
there are no such schools in Sanaa, so families are 
home-schooling the children.  One community elder asked for 
notebooks and pens for the children, which Pol OMS provided 
the same afternoon.  Community elders also said that, while 
their material needs were being met by the Yemeni Government, 
they did not have any religious materials, as they fled their 
homes in Saada without them.  One elder asked if the Embassy 
could provide some religious texts in Hebrew in time for the 
Passover holiday, which he hoped Embassy officers could 
celebrate with the families. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
           
 
7.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Post was able to confirm through this visit 
that the Jewish families are provided housing and protection 
by the ROYG.  The MFA was cooperative in setting up the 
meeting, although Interior Ministry officials were present 
during most of our discussions.  In keeping with Yemeni 
tradition, however, a woman poloff was able to meet and talk 
separately with the Jewish women, who echoed their male 
relatives' praise for Saleh's protection and affirmation of 
their desire to stay in Yemen. 
 
 8. (SBU)  Post will work with the NEA/ARP Yemen/Oman deskoff to 
find a U.S. organization that may be able to send 45 
religious texts that the community elders requested of poloff 
in time for Passover. 
KRAJESKI
 
http://dazzlepod.com/cable/07SANAA395/?q=hussein%20salem  
 

DASD Kahl Meeting with Egyptian Military Officials


VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHEG #0257/01 0591345
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 281345Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0433
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 000257

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28
TAGS:
SUBJECT: DASD Kahl Meeting with Egyptian Military Officials

CLASSIFIED BY: Donald A. Blome, Minister Counselor, DOS, ECPO;
REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

1. (C) Key Points:



-- On January 31, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the
Middle East Dr. Colin Kahl met with Major General Mohammad
al-Assar, Assistant to the Minister of Defense, Major General Ahmad
Moataz, Chief of the American Relations Branch, and Major General
Fouad Arafa, Consultant to the Military Intelligence Department.



-- During the meeting, Kahl discussed the need to incorporate a
military strategy that included symmetrical and asymmetrical
capabilities, pursuing a capabilities-based approach to security
assistance, FMF issues, balance of power in the region, nuclear
weapons in the Middle East, current U.S. policy towards Iran,
Egyptian efforts to counter-smuggling and interdict illicit weapons
destined for Gaza, and the release of advanced weapons systems.



-- The Egyptian defense officials continued to stress that the
threats facing the United States were different from Egypt's, and
Egypt needs to maintain a strong conventional military to counter
other armies in the region.



--------------------------------------------- ----------------------
--------------

Egypt's Current Security Concerns and National Defense Policy

--------------------------------------------- ----------------------
---------------



2. (C) During the 31 January 2010 meeting, al-Assar
constantly referred to the numerous unstable security situations in
the Middle East that influenced Egyptian military doctrine to
include: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon/Hezbollah,
Palestine/HAMAS, Yemen, Sudan/Darfur, Somalia, Eritrea, Piracy
issues, Algeria, and al-Qaida. Al-Assar emphasized that ethnic
conflict throughout the region and border issues could have a
negative impact on Egyptian sovereignty at any time. al-Assar
commented that he did not expect any of these security situations
to resolve in the near future; instead, he believed the list would
grow even larger.



3. (C) al-Assar outlined Egypt's National Defense Policy
which he stated was based on a defensive, capabilities-based
strategy instead of threat-based. The number one priority is the
defense of Egyptian land and the Suez Canal. Other goals include:
preparedness for unexpected threats such as terrorism; the
achievement of regional stability; interoperability with Egypt's
military partners; and a leading role for Egypt in the region.
Al-Assar provided the Egyptian military's list of regional
threats/concerns such as Nile Basin water rights and the conflicts
in Darfur and southern Sudan. He commented that one never knows
what Libya might do and that it was essential that Egypt maintain
the balance of power on its eastern border. He reiterated the fact
that Israel possesses unconventional weapons and sophisticated
conventional weapons, which creates a regional imbalance and
contributes to instability. He noted that stability in the region
cannot be attained without balance of power. He stated that the
Egyptian military doctrine did not intend to gain an edge on any
other country in the region or cause offense to anyone.



4. (C) Al-Assar complained that the Egyptian military
sometimes felt pressured by the United States to reform its
doctrine and capabilities to counter asymmetric threats. He
emphasized that the threats faced by the United States were
different from Egypt's. He commented that tanks and aircraft were
necessary to fight asymmetrical threats as well. He referred to
General Patreaus' Sadr City battle plan against extremists and
noted that this plan depended on the use of tanks and aircraft in
Iraq. He called on Dr. Kahl to educate Congress about Egypt's
military needs and not put limits on the numbers of aircraft and
tanks. He noted that the Egyptian military preferred to purchase

its weapons and armaments from the United States, but that Egypt's
national security was a red line and they could go elsewhere if
they had to.



--------------------------------------------- ----

Security Assistance and Modernization

--------------------------------------------- ----



5. (C) Dr. Kahl commented that the U.S. military had learned
some hard lessons about the promises and limits of technology
during the first years of the war in Iraq. Kahl stated that there
are no longer any purely conventional military conflicts in the
world and the last large conventional war was the First Gulf War.
The current challenge for modern armies is to find the right
balance between conventional and irregular forces and doctrines to
fight what Secretary Gates refers to as "hybrid wars." Kahl
commented that the U.S. lost more tanks in Iraq to roadside bombs
than in battles with Iraqi tanks. He also noted that information
technology in the modern war was just as valuable as military
equipment in order to have the ability to rapidly communicate and
assess the environment.



6. (C) Dr. Kahl reiterated that a modern military should rely
on quality equipment rather than a large quantity of outdated
armaments, and should place a greater emphasis on the scope of its
aggregate capabilities vice number of high-end weapons platforms.



7. (C) Major General Fouad Arafa interjected during the
discussion to note that the spirit of the Camp David accord was
that there would be a 2:3 balance between Egypt and Israel's
security assistance. Egypt's role was to keep a certain balance of
power in the region that would not allow other parties to go to
war. Egypt had fulfilled this role faithfully for the last 30
years. al-Assar added that the current ratio of 2:5 was a
violation of the Camp David ratio.



--------------------------------------------- --------

Yemen, Iran, and the Weapons Free Zone

--------------------------------------------- ---------





8. (C) al-Assar noted that Iran effectively interfered in
the internal affairs of Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq. He commented
that Iran's nuclear ambitions would significantly change the
balance of power in the region and was contributing to further
regional instability and intensifying the conflicts. Al-Assar
stated that Egypt views Iran as a threat to the region and its
conventional and unconventional weapons would only increase the
instability in the region. Al-Assar commented that if Iran was
successful in obtaining nuclear weapons, it would only encourage
other countries in the Middle East to pursue the same path.



9. (C) Al-Assar brought up President Obama's pledge to
pursue a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. He
called on the United States to not ignore the Israeli nuclear
program. He stated that Israel's nuclear program only gave Iran
justification for creating its own nuclear weapons. If Iran
obtained nuclear weapons, it would only embolden Iran to use
Hezbollah and HAMAS with impunity.



10. (C) Dr. Kahl stated that ultimate goal for the United States
was the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East. However, it was not
possible to draw strict parallels between Iran's acquisition of
nuclear weapons and other Middle Eastern countries. Iran is the

only country in the world that was currently threatening to wipe an
entire country off the map, and Tehran reinforced this message
through destabilizing activities pursued by its proxies in the
region. The goal of a NWFZ in the Middle East could take 10-20
years to achieve; however, the international community could not
wait 20 years to address Iran's nuclear program and needed to
figure out ways to slow down the clock on the Iran's nuclear
ambitions.



11. (C) Major General Fouad Arafa joined the conversation stating
that Iran was using the various Middle East conflicts for its own
ambitions and was gaining power because of its interference in the
internal affairs of the Middle Eastern countries. It was essential
to cut Iran's connections and influence in the regional conflicts
in Lebanon, Israel, and Palestine in order to decrease the level of
influence Iran enjoyed in the region. Iran was effectively using
Arab public opinion to advance its goals. Dr. Kahl agreed and
reinforced the need for continued Arab engagement on this issue to
ensure a "unified front" on the part of the international
community.



12. (C) Kahl stated that the United States had reached out to
Iran in 2009 through unconditional talks and that this was meant as
a test of Iran's willingness to prove that its nuclear program was
for peaceful civilian use. Iran, however, had not seized this
opportunity to resolve international concerns. Kahl speculated
that European countries and even Russia, which would not have
supported the sanctions in the past, were now ready to increase
pressure on Iran.



-------------------------

Counter-smuggling

-------------------------



13. (C) Dr. Kahl extended his appreciation for Egypt's enhanced
counter-smuggling efforts in the past year, but expressed concern
over recent increases in smuggling activity into the Gaza strip and
HAMAS' efforts to rearm. Dr. Kahl emphasized that the United
States understands that this is an especially sensitive political
issue internally in Egypt, as well as in the region. Dr. Kahl
noted that the United States was looking forward to the positive
completion of the BTADs project and thanked the Egyptian Military
for its agreement-in-principle to sign a follow -on statement for
future BTADs support as this provided an opportunity for further
cooperation on counter-smuggling and border security. He also
underscored the importance of targeting smuggling networks and
their financiers in Sudan and the Sinai-not just their activities.



14. (C) Dr. Kahl renewed Secretary of Defense Gate's offer to
assist the Egyptian military in expanding its counter-smuggling
efforts on the Sudanese border and the Red Sea region.



15. (C) Al-Assar stated that the smuggling tunnels threatened the
national security of Egypt (highlighting HAMAS specifically) and
that "terror" could come to Egypt via these tunnels. Egypt has
spent approximately $40 million to purchase the steel for the
underground wall on the Gaza border, and Egypt was paying the cost
of this wall in terms of public opinion both within Egypt and the
region. He noted that once the wall was in place, the time would
come to pressure Israel to take responsibility for the humanitarian
situation in Gaza. Dr. Kahl reaffirmed that in all of engagements
with Israel, the U.S. officials strongly encourage Israel to open
crossings into Gaza to allow humanitarian goods to cross, and that
Egypt's focus must be affixed on thwarting the movement of illicit
weapons into the strip.



-------------

Homework

-------------



16. (C) Dr. Kahl encouraged Egypt to sign a Communications
Electronics Security Agreement (CESA aka CISMOA) with the Unites
States, which would pave the way for the transfer of advanced
technology to Egypt and greatly increase interoperability.
Al-Assar stated that Egypt had "its reasons to delay a decision on
a CISMOA." He noted that thousands of Egyptian military officers
have participated in training and education programs in the United
States and learned about U.S. technology and strategy. He
commented that the younger officers are frustrated with the delay
in obtaining political release for more advanced U.S. technology.
Specifically, al-Assar referred to TOW2B and JAVELIN, which he
commented had already been released to other countries. Al-Assar
noted that a CISMOA was not a condition for obtaining these
systems, but instead they were held up due to a "third party".



17. (C) Al-Assar commented that Egypt was in negotiations with
Iraq to supply the Iraqi military with approximately 140 tanks,
which are manufactured at the FMF tank facility. He noted that the
Egyptian Ministry of Defense was awaiting the United States
positive response to its request for approval of the transfer. Dr.
Kahl noted that the U.S. was considering this request and would
provide a response soon.



18. (C) Al-Assar encouraged Dr. Kahl to convince the U.S.
Congress that Egypt was worth more than $1.3 billion a year. Dr.
Kahl mentioned that Egypt receives the second largest amount of
assistance in the world, and that during these difficult financial
times in the United States, it was unlikely that annual flow of FMF
would increase. He did however reassure the Egyptian officials
that the USG would continue to advocate for current levels of FMF
and push back on any attempts to condition those funds.
SCOBEY
http://dazzlepod.com/cable/10CAIRO257/



Wikileaks Ethiopia Files: Ethiopia Bombs Itself, Blames Eritrea

by Thomas C. Mountain

September 16, 2011



Recently released Wikileaks Ethiopia files expose how Ethiopian security forces planted 3 bombs that went off in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa on September 16, 2006 and then blamed Eritrea and the Oromo resistance for the blasts in a case that raises serious questions about the claims made about the bombing attempt against the African Union summit earlier this year in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
In a report  from 2006 marked “Secret ; Subject: Ethiopia: Recent Bombings Blamed on Oromos Possibly the Work of GOE [Government of Ethiopia]” “Classified By: Charge [d’Affairs] Vicki Huddleston”, “An embassy source, as well as clandestine reporting, suggests that the bombing may have in fact been the work of the GoE security forces.” (Cable reference id: #06ADDISABABA2708.)
At the time, the western media reported the Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) claims that the bombs were “part of a coordinated terror attack by the OLF [Oromo Liberation Front, the oldest national  liberation movement in Ethiopia] and  Sha’abiya (Eritrea) aimed at disrupting democratic development”.
The Wikileaks report goes on, “a typically reliable information source” who “contacted Post to report that” the bodies of three men found at the bomb sites “had been picked up by police a week prior, kept in detention and tortured. He said police then left the men in a house and detonated explosives nearby, killing 3 of them.”
This exposes the history of how the Ethiopian regime has planted bombs and then blamed Eritrea and the Ethiopian resistance. The lies that make up the official version of this alleged terrorist attack raises serious questions about the credibility of the recently released report by the UN via its US State Department affiliate, the Monitoring Group for Eritrea and Somalia, which blames the Eritreans and the OLF for the January bombing attempt at the African Union summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Identical lies about a nearly identical “terrorist attack”, all accepted as fact by the western media. This should also deliver another body blow to the Obama White House and its claims that Eritrea supports terrorism in the Horn of Africa.
So once again the bellowing against Eritrea by the USA and it lackeys at the UN going back to 2006 is exposed as complete bunkum and an identical frame up of Eritrean and the Oromo resistance in Ethiopia that has been regurgitated by the UN and its truth challenged Monitoring Group on Eritrea and Somalia must be subject to a more critical scrutiny. Based on this expose’ it can only be hoped that the UN inSecurity Council, which has yet to decide whether to pass severe sanctions against Eritrea, will refrain from doing so.

http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/09/16/wikileaks-ethiopia-files-ethiopia-bombs-itself-blames-eritrea/ 


ADDRESSING MIC´S OBJECTIONS TO D&G FUNDING FOR "UNREGISTERED" NGOS


VZCZCXYZ0000
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DE RUEHEG #0399/01 0591048
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8310 C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 000399

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE PASS F, USAID

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018

TAGS:

SUBJECT: ADDRESSING MIC´S OBJECTIONS TO D&G FUNDING FOR "UNREGISTERED" NGOS

Classified by Ambassador Francis Ricciardone for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) SUMMARY: On February 17, we received a letter from Minister of International Cooperation Fayza Aboulnaga directing USAID to cease funding four American and six Egyptian organizations. These groups received democracy and governance (D&G) grants under USAID´s direct grants program in the last six months. One organization cited in the letter, which has been distributing children´s books on human rights, had the books seized by state security services on February 20. All of the organizations fall outside the letter of our 2004 agreement which stipulated that any U.S. NGO receiving direct USAID grants have an agreement with the MFA, and that any Egyptian NGO must be registered by the Ministry of Social Solidarity. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) On February 17, Minister of International Cooperation Fayza Aboulnaga wrote the Ambassador asking USAID to stop funding four U.S. and six Egyptian organizations under the D&G direct grants program on the grounds that those organizations have not been properly registered as NGOs. The Ambassador intends to meet with Aboulnaga to work out a way forward that will allow funding to these and similar organizations.

3. (SBU) In the case of the four U.S.-based institutes cited in Aboulnaga´s letter - MidAmr Group, Search for Common Ground Productions, Counterpart International Inc. and Transparency International - the organizations have "not as yet concluded the required standing agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs" as required under the November 10, 2004 exchange of letters by then-Ambassador Welch and Aboulnaga. The MIC letter further states that the six Egyptian groups on the list have not been properly registered by the Ministry of Social Solidarity.

4. (C) It appears that MIC is attempting to close a loophole in the civil companies law that we have used to fund civil society organizations which have either not been able to obtain Ministry of Social Solidarity registration (under Law 84 governing NGOs), or have not been able to obtain permission from that ministry to receive foreign funding. Organizations that have not been able to obtain MSS registration have registered as civil companies in order to have some legal status. But since these "civil companies" fall outside of Law 84, they do not require MSS permission to receive foreign funds. We have been granting funds only to Egyptian NGOs that are registered with MSS or which are "civil companies." In some cases, when existing NGOs have not had permission to receive foreign funds from MSS, they have created civil companies, and received USAID funds via those entities. In the case of the U.S. groups, we are not aware of any that have obtained agreements with the MFA.

5. (C) This is not the first time MIC has raised this issue, though it is the first time that it has specifically directed us to cease funding groups falling outside the terms of the November 2004 agreement. In an exchange of letters with the Ambassador in 2006, Aboulnaga complained that USAID was funding organizations that "have not completed the required registration procedures" but did not specifically mention any civil companies. The Ambassador´s response finessed the "civil companies" issue by stating USAID had not and would not "transfer funds to Egyptian non-governmental organizations which have not been legally registered." Minister of Social Solidarity, Ali Moselhy, did complain to the acting USAID director this past summer about U.S. use of the civil company "loophole."

The direct D&G grant process

----------------------------

6. (SBU) Under the 2004 agreement, USAID informs MIC in writing of approved D&G grants on a quarterly basis. The names of the groups noted in Aboulnaga´s letter appear to have been taken from USAID notifications of new grants through letters submitted to MIC in October 2007 and January 2008. Since the start of Direct Grant program, USAID has given 42 grants to Egyptian organizations. Twenty-five are registered as NGOs. The other seventeen are civil companies, law firms, or limited liability partnerships. The February 17 letter mentioned only six of the seventeen non-NGO organizations. A total of 38% of our direct assistance grants go to "civil companies" that are not registered with MSS.

Books seized

------------

7. (SBU) On February 24, [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN], called USAID asserting that State Security had confiscated thousands of copies of [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] a children´s book distributed by [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] to public schools and libraries. In addition, some [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] lawyers were detained in Sharqiya, and were released after they agreed to halt the book distribution and not to speak to the press. Books were confiscated in Beni Suef and Sharqiya; in Sohag the Governor himself blocked the confiscation. Two independent Egyptian newspapers reported the confiscation. An MFA cabinet advisor told DCM categorically that the seizure and the Aboulnaga letter were not "orchestrated."

The Way Ahead

-------------

8. (C) The Ambassador will approach MIC´s Aboulnaga in the coming days to seek to resolve our differences over NGOs. We suspect that Aboulnaga is armed with a GOE interagency decision, coordinated with MFA and MSS, to close the loophole allowing "civil companies" to receive foreign funds. Our response will be that MSS has serially failed to register NGOs and that anticipated registration was the basis for our original agreement. Likewise, our agreement was reached based on the mutual expectation that U.S. and international NGOs would be registered by MFA. Three years later, the MFA has not reached an agreement with a single international NGO that we are funding or would like to fund. Meanwhile, we can point to conversations in which MIC and MFA have assured us that the U.S. NGOs could operate without formal status. Many of the civil companies have NGO "sister" institutions that qualify for U.S. assistance under our agreement with MIC, but have encountered difficulty in obtaining permission to receive funds, due to MSS inaction. We have no room to argue either the fact at issue or Aboulnaga´s interpretation of the 2004 agreement. Therefore, we intend to cease funding the civil companies listed in her letter until we can reach an understanding on a new way forward. We will continue to fund the American and international NGOs, regardless of her letter, on the grounds that these organizations do not have offices in Egypt; we will contend that therefore they do not require agreements with the MFA. But we will also work towards a more workable understanding on this point.

RICCIARDONE

http://dazzlepod.com/cable/08CAIRO399/



 Wikileaks: NEXT STEPS FOR ADVANCING DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT


This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 001351

SIPDIS

NEA FOR A/S WELCH, PDAS CHENEY, DAS CARPENTER
NEA FOR ELA
NSC FOR DNSA ABRAMS
TUNIS FOR MEPI (MULREAN)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2016
TAGS:
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS FOR ADVANCING DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT

Classified by Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary and Introduction: Sometime in the next six
years, Egypt will undergo a leadership succession. The
United States' goals for this succession should be to promote
an opening to establish a representative government that will
secure Egyptian stability, prosperity, and friendship for a
generation. There is scant movement in that direction now.
Whether or not 77-year old Hosni Mubarak survives his
six-year term, his regime is ossifying and increasingly out
of touch. His enlightened economic cabinet has a negligible
political base and gets little credit outside of elite
circles. The National Democratic Party's popularity is in
decline. The military still expects to inherit the
Presidency. But the Muslim Brotherhood's confidence is
growing.

2. (C) Egyptians want reform, or at least an end to
stagnation. The disagreements arise over breadth and speed.
Egyptians care more deeply about reforms that will improve
their living standards--and they are growing less patient.
But the GOE insists on its own pace: moderately slow for
economic reforms, glacial for political opening. With no
elections for the next fifteen months, the high visibility
focus of our democracy strategy needs replacement. President
Mubarak's proposed reform program, as stated in his campaign
promises and subsequent speeches, although modest, provides
the starting point for USG engagement. In addition, we
should:

--Urge the regime to broaden its agenda to include electoral,
media, police, and anti-corruption reform--and at least begin
planting the seeds of transformation within the military.

--Continue to help the legal political parties through IRI
and NDI, with a focus on the ruling NDP.

--Continue USG support through USAID and MEPI to Egyptian
civil society, including advocacy for structural reforms
through key legislation and technical assistance.

--Ensure the political success of the economic reform program
and review our military assistance program with a focus on
IMET.

--Broaden our diplomatic strategy to build support for the
democracy agenda among regime elites, including the First
Lady. End introduction and summary.

-----------
Assumptions
-----------

3. (C) Proposed next steps are based on the following
assumptions:

--Mubarak remains our indispensable regional ally but will
move too slowly on the reform agenda. Reforms not blessed by
Mubarak will not be achievable during the remainder of his
rule.

--The NDP will remain the dominant political party in Egypt
with control over the parliament through 2011. The party
leaders themselves recognize that its "popularity" is based
almost entirely on patronage and control of the security
apparatus; internal reforms are needed, but breaking with old
habits and entrenched interests will be slow and difficult.

--The Muslim Brotherhood's appeal will grow as long as it
continues to fill the void in public services left by
government, and the void in political space left by the
absence of any other meaningful opposition.

--The Brotherhood's parliamentary election success--which
confirmed both its organizational skills and popular
appeal--has entrenched GOE resistance to electoral reform.

--Civil Society elites will remain engaged in reform
discussions but without influence or capacity to effect
meaningful systemic change before Mubarak leaves office.

--The economic cabinet will remain in place but will be
reluctant to tackle aggressively painful steps, such as
rationalizing subsidies. Economic reform has not yet
benefitted the Egyptian "street."

--The Emergency Law will be extended in May 2006 for
twenty-four months; the parliament will continue to work on a
replacement anti-terror law ostensibly modeled on western
statutes that will stress state security requirements rather
than the protection of individual liberties.

--The security apparatus will resist change on the grounds
that it is de-stabilizing. The military will be a drag on
reform but will not actively engage unless its economic
equities are threatened or it perceives a serious threat to
stability.

----------
Next Steps
----------

4. (C) Extend ESF-funded technical assistance to GOE
ministries and the parliament to sustain and, if possible, to
accelerate and expand the Mubarak political reform program.
Stated GOE goals include the following:

-- Replace emergency law with anti-terror legislation,
modeled on western anti-terror statutes.

-- Seek Parliamentary input on constitutional reform.

-- New judicial authority law.

-- Amending the press law, including eliminating the
imprisonment penalty for defamation (to protect journalists).

-- New law amending criminal procedures, including
provisional detention.

-- New law aimed at supporting decentralization and
strengthening elected local councils' supervisory roles.

We currently have no direct cooperation with the Parliament.
Previous support has foundered on Egyptian efforts to use
assistance as patronage. Assistance should be low-key;
emphasis should be on the technical. We can provide much
information assistance through normal mission resources, at
minimal cost, outside of USAID programs. We should also
ensure coordination between technical assistance and pilot
programs already underway in the field. For example, efforts
on decentralization legislation should benefit from USAID's
existing work with governorate-level councils. We can use
normal advocacy measures to support reformers pressing for
higher-end reforms than Mubarak now seems to envision, e.g.,
supporting Governors who advocate constitutional change to
permit local election of Governors.

5. (C) Pressing the GOE to expand its reform agenda to
include major electoral, media, and police reform, and
anti-corruption:

--On elections, we favor establishment of an independent
electoral commission, based on the Iraqi model. Given GOE
ambivalence, we should use speakers programs, IVs and other
indirect messaging to promote this idea, until it is adopted
as "Egyptian." IFES also proposes an ambitious civil society
focused project to build domestic support for electoral
reform.

--USAID has already embarked on a $16 million program to
support private media and encourage media privatization.
This effort was dealt a setback when Mubarak himself told
journalists on March 1 that state-owned newspapers would not
be privatized. Nonetheless we should engage the cabinet and
the parliamentary leaders on public sector media reform, even
as we find ways to support private media.

--On police reform, DS and S/CT have presented a proposal for
counter-terrorism training that would expand our in-country
cooperation. Post has also solicited an INL proposal for a
Strategic Leadership Course for senior police commanders
aimed at promoting community policing, regard for human
rights and developing a more professional police corps.
Deployment of in-country police and Justice attaches could
promote new levels of law enforcement cooperation. The
Ministry of Interior and perhaps the Presidency are opposed
to what they regard as a covert intelligence effort, but Mrs.
Mubarak has pressed MOI to accept more U.S. "transformational
police training." We should continue to seek an arrangement
that will address their concerns.

--The GOE needs to pursue a meaningful anti-corruption
program if it wishes to take this cudgel away from the MB.
We can provide technical assistance and public affairs
programming. Global metrics are readily available.

6. (C) Technical support to legal political parties through
IRI and NDI: Having assessed the elections, the institutes
now recognize what the parties need. The NDP will likely not
participate with other parties in the room, so it may be
necessary to develop separate tracks in the program for the
ruling party and the opposition. Even with the NDP on board,
we can expect blowback by anti-reform elements. The
institutes should keep their programs low-key and the USG
apprised. Their programs should incorporate the full range
of Egypt's civil rights priorities, such as bringing more
women and Christians into the political process. The 2007
Shura elections and the 2008 local council elections--and the
development of the legislation promised to reform the
later--will be the key medium-term tests. In addition to
continued support for international implementers like NDI and
IRI, we should also proceed with supporting additional
engagement on Egypt by additional international NGOs such as
Transparency International, Freedom House, and the American
Bar Association.

7. (C) Continue USAID's and MEPI's work with civil society
organizations: The Ibn Khaldun Center and others produced
impressive results on domestic monitoring during the
parliamentary elections and merit continued support. With no
elections for fifteen months, these groups need a new focus.
The next phase should bring civil society into a process for
identifying new priorities and concerted action. This must
be an Egyptian process, but we should advocate our
priorities, such as human rights, religious freedom, women's
and children's rights (including female education), and
involvement by the citizenry in local education policy.
USAID's new Family Justice Program will engage NGOs to raise
public awareness about the legal rights of women and
children, as well as the legal services available to these
disadvantaged groups. These efforts will also face
reactionary criticism of "bribery" and "meddling."

8. (C) Recognize that economic reforms complement
democratic reform: We should revitalize the Free Trade
Agreement and move forward with notification to Congress at
the earliest possible political opening. Failing that, we
should develop new programs to maximize the benefits of the
QIZs. The biggest challenge facing Egyptian manufacturers in
the QIZ program is finding Israeli content. Expanding
outlets for Israeli content would create Egyptian jobs and
exports. USAID could usefully study how to optimize the QIZ
benefit. USAID should also continue work with the Egyptian
economic cabinet on tackling subsidies in a politically
sensitive manner. The current initiative to shift USAID
economic support to "sectoral reform programs" linked to
several benchmarks, including democratization, can play a key
role.

9. (C) Initiate an internal long-range review of U.S.
military assistance: This issue requires much further
discussion but we need to define the linkages between our
military assistance program and Egypt's progress towards
representative government. At a minimum, this review should
expand IMET programs--the most purposefully "transformative"
form of U.S. military assistance--to bring more Egyptian
officers for training in the United States.

-------------------
Diplomatic Strategy
-------------------

10. (C) In addition to programmatic steps, we need a fresh
approach with Mubarak. He resents and ridicules the U.S.
reform agenda. We should aim at influencing the narrow group
of individuals that surround him. These are: EGIS Chief
Omar Soliman, Presidential Chief of Staff Zakariya Azmi,
Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif, and Gamal and Suzanne Mubarak.
(The older Mubarak son Alaa has apparently renounced
politics.) Of these key players, the person with whom we
have the least contact is Suzanne Mubarak. In her meetings
with the Ambassador, the Egyptian First Lady has expressed
concern over Egypt's standing abroad and acknowledged the
importance of, for example, police reform. It was Mrs.
Mubarak that persuaded the Ministry of Interior to change
course and allow UNHCR to have access to Sudanese
asylum-seekers detained after the December 30 tragedy. More
than an advisor, she is a shrewd political player in her own
right, and is able to promote a range of programs, most
recently to combat trafficking in persons. Mrs. Mubarak will
not take on the nuts and bolts of reform, but she could
strengthen the political reform wing of the leadership. The
one-year anniversary of the FLOTUS visit to Egypt will be in
May. It would be gracious and possibly productive to invite
Mrs. Mubarak to the White House for a return visit.

-------------------
Whither the Ikhwan?
-------------------

11. (C) The Brotherhood remains a major challenge. In many
ways, it is Egypt's essential civil society, having been
working in the fields of social welfare and citizen
mobilization since its founding in 1928. Its impressive
political mobilization skills, demonstrated in its success
rate in the 2005 parliamentary elections (88 seats won out of
150 contested), put the NDP and the other opposition to
shame. We cannot engage directly with the Brotherhood, but
we must urge the GOE to find a formula that can co-opt, win
over, or otherwise effectively thwart the direct threat of
the Brotherhood. We have been trying to persuade influential
Egyptians that the GOE/NDP tactics toward the MB (stop/start
repression) is failing, and that they should confront the
MB's ideology head-on, with direct debate by articulate
secularists. The GOE also could press the MB by posing a
number of key wedge issues (QIZs, regional peace, women's
rights, religious minorities, FTA, etc.) as a price for
legalization. Another (possibly tandem) tack would be to
consider a Track II approach that would send ex-USG officials
to meetings with the MB leadership in neutral places to gauge
the depth of the MB's commitment to democratic reform.

----------
Conclusion
----------

12. (C) In all likelihood, it will not be possible to make
great progress on democratic reform as long as President
Mubarak remains in office. Nonetheless, his firm rule offers
space and time to prepare civil society and some institutions
of the GOE for the day of his departure. These proposals
have the advantage of establishing a stronger framework for
cooperation on political action and reform across the
political spectrum for the years ahead, and positioning us to
create and take advantage of any opportunities. We do not
have a silver bullet, but we can press reforms that will
lead, inexorably, to the "death by 1000 cuts" of Egypt's
authoritarian system. There will be no "Orange Revolution on
the Nile" on Mubarak's watch, but we must aim to consolidate
each modest democratic advance. A steady, incremental
approach will continue to stretch Egypt toward a democratic
future.
RICCIARDONE
http://dazzlepod.com/cable/06CAIRO1351/


Wikileaks: Gamal Mubarak saw Tantawi & Suleiman as a threat 




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R 041717Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4450
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000974

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR WATERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2047
TAGS:
SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXX MP ON PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION

REF: A. 2006 CAIRO 4612
B. 2006 CAIRO 6600

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Economic and Political Affairs,
William R. Stewart, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: In a recent meeting with poloff, XXXXXXXXXXXX
parliamentarian XXXXXXXXXXXX discussed presidential son Gamal Mubarak's
possible succession of his father, and opined that Gamal
increasingly views Minister of Defense Mohamed Hussein
Tantawi and EGIS head Omar Suleiman as a threat to his
presidential ambitions. XXXXXXXXXXXX alleged that Tantawi recently
told him, in confidence, of his deepening frustration with
Gamal. End summary.

---------------------------------------------
GAMAL ANGLING TO "GET RID" OF HIS COMPETITION
---------------------------------------------

2. (S) On March 29, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted to poloff his assessment that
the recently approved constitutional amendments package is
largely aimed at ensuring Gamal Mubarak's succession of his
father, and "a more controllable, stable political scene when
he does take the reins." Opining that "Gamal and his clique"
are becoming more confident in the inevitability of Gamal's
succession, and are now angling to remove potential
"stumbling blocks," XXXXXXXXXXXX said that speculation among Cairo's
elite is that there could be a cabinet reshuffle as soon as
May or June, in which Minister of Defense Tantawi and/or EGIS
head Omar Suleiman would be replaced. "Those two are
increasingly viewed as a threat by Gamal and those around
him," and thus Gamal is reportedly pushing Mubarak to get
them out of the way, so they "could not pose any problems" in
the event of a succession. XXXXXXXXXXXX speculated that "hitches"
to a Gamal succession could occur if Mubarak died before
installing his son: "Gamal knows this, and so wants to stack
the deck in his favor as much as possible now, while Mubarak
is firmly in control, just in case his father drops dead
sooner rather than later."

3. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said XXXXXXXXXXXX had commented to him in a recent
private meeting that, "he has had it 'up to here' with Gamal
and his cronies, and the tremendous corruption they are
facilitating." "XXXXXXXXXXXX told me he is having trouble sleeping
at night," he continued, "and that he cannot stand what has
happened to the country, and what may yet happen to the
country." Disappointed by the recent constitutional
amendments, and skeptical about the will of either Mubarak or
Gamal to push forward meaningful political reforms, XXXXXXXXXXXX
said he viewed a post-Mubarak military coup as "the best
possible way out for Egypt ... we are in a terrible spot, and
that is the best of all the bad options available." (Note:
XXXXXXXXXXXX provided no further details about a possible coup
scenario, and appeared to simply be theorizing about the
future. To date, we have not heard other interlocutors
speculate about a possible coup option. End note).

----------------------------
CURRENT GOSSIP IN PARLIAMENT
----------------------------

4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that parliamentarians are abuzz over rumors
that, under newly amended constitutional Article 136 (which
now gives the president the ability to dissolve the People's
Assembly by executive decree alone, without a national
referendum), the People,s Assembly will be dissolved in
roughly a year, so as to rid it of the "troublesome" 88
Muslim Brotherhood MP's. New elections would then be held,
but "as under the new constitutional amendments, there will
be no direct judicial supervision of elections to help to
guard against fraud, the government can be expected to
engineer the results" so that there are far fewer MB MP,s in
the new parliament. "The government is happy to deal with
fairly tame and non-threatening oppositionists such as
XXXXXXXXXXXX, Wafd, and Taggamu. But they do not want such a
powerful bloc of MB MP,s to remain, particularly when they
would make the most noise in the event of a Gamal succession."

5. (C) In terms of his personal political aspirations, XXXXXXXXXXXX
told poloff he has XXXXXXXXXXXX the XXXXXXXXXXXX, founded by XXXXXXXXXXXX

---------------------------------------
XXXXXXXXXXXX
---------------------------------------

6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that hisXXXXXXXXXXXX (per ref B, a
XXXXXXXXXXXX), is XXXXXXXXXXXX at the XXXXXXXXXXXX, due to what XXXXXXXXXXXX termed the continuing XXXXXXXXXXXX. According
to XXXXXXXXXXXX, MinDef Tantawi called him XXXXXXXXXXXX to
ensure that XXXXXXXXXXXX was satisfied as to how XXXXXXXXXXXX was being
XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he engaged XXXXXXXXXXXX with XXXXXXXXXXXX, asking him to help get XXXXXXXXXXXX, as he has already XXXXXXXXXXXX and
"XXXXXXXXXXXX" XXXXXXXXXXXX allegedly checked with XXXXXXXXXXXX,
then replied that XXXXXXXXXXXX cannot be XXXXXXXXXXXX before he XXXXXXXXXXXX, as, "we are under terrible foreign pressure to
XXXXXXXXXXXX, so cannot XXXXXXXXXXXX, as they will
then criticize us for not XXXXXXXXXXXX too." XXXXXXXXXXXX
subsequent suggestion to XXXXXXXXXXXX both XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX went
unheeded. However, XXXXXXXXXXXX allegedly told XXXXXXXXXXXX that he had
instructed XXXXXXXXXXXX to not
undertake any procedures to divest XXXXXXXXXXXX of his
XXXXXXXXXXXX; XXXXXXXXXXXX
therefore believes XXXXXXXXXXXX will be able to re-assume XXXXXXXXXXXX

7. (S) Comment: While XXXXXXXXXXXX is a useful interlocutor and a
well-placed parliamentarian, we stress that he is the only
Embassy contact to date who has raised with us the spectre of
a post-Mubarak military coup. While discussion of
presidential succession is a favorite parlor game in Cairo
salons, hypothesizing about the acutely sensitive topic of a
coup is certainly not regularly undertaken in Egyptian
circles.
RICCIARDONE

http://dazzlepod.com/cable/07CAIRO974/



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