blow·back/ˈblōˌbak/
The unintended adverse results of a political action or situation.Friday, December 30, 2011
Wednesday, December 28, 2011
Understanding Propaganda in North Korea: The Vice Guide to North Korea
If you have watched the news lately, you would have probably came across scenes of north Koreans crying to mourn their former leader Kim Yong Il in a hysteric way.
Fake? not fake? who knows?? but anyway, you should understand the propaganda & manipulation that these people live into.
The following clips are a three part short documentary made by two people who had the chance to get into North Korea. It's a rare trip into one of the very last old- style propaganda dens.
Part 1:
Part 2:
Part 3:
Fake? not fake? who knows?? but anyway, you should understand the propaganda & manipulation that these people live into.
The following clips are a three part short documentary made by two people who had the chance to get into North Korea. It's a rare trip into one of the very last old- style propaganda dens.
Part 1:
Part 2:
Part 3:
Monday, December 26, 2011
المحافظة على وحدة ليبيا
اقرأ المحافظة على وحدة ليبيا: التحديات الأمنية في حقبة ما بعد القذافي في غرفة الحرب
Egypt and the Idealist-Realist Debate in U.S. Foreign Policy
By George Friedman
The first round of Egyptian parliamentary elections has taken place, and the winners were two Islamist parties. The Islamists themselves are split between more extreme and more moderate factions, but it is clear that the secularists who dominated the demonstrations and who were the focus of the Arab Spring narrative made a poor showing. Of the three broad power blocs in Egypt - the military, the Islamists and the secular democrats - the last proved the weakest.
It is far from clear what will happen in Egypt now. The military remains unified and powerful, and it is unclear how much actual power it is prepared to cede or whether it will be forced to cede it. What is clear is that the faction championed by Western governments and the media will now have to accept the Islamist agenda, back the military or fade into irrelevance.
One of the points I made during the height of the Arab Spring was that the West should be careful of what it wishes for - it might get it. Democracy does not always bring secular democrats to power. To be more precise, democracy might yield a popular government, but the assumption that that government will support a liberal democratic constitution that conceives of human rights in the European or American sense is by no means certain. Unrest does not always lead to a revolution, a revolution does not always lead to a democracy, and a democracy does not always lead to a European- or American-style constitution.
In Egypt today, just as it is unclear whether the Egyptian military will cede power in any practical sense, it is also unclear whether the Islamists can form a coherent government or how extreme such a government might be. And as we analyze the possibilities, it is important to note that this analysis really isn't about Egypt. Rather, Egypt serves as a specimen to examine - a case study of an inherent contradiction in Western ideology and, ultimately, of an attempt to create a coherent foreign policy.
Western countries, following the principles of the French Revolution, have two core beliefs. The first is the concept of national self-determination, the idea that all nations (and what the term "nation" means is complex in itself) have the right to determine for themselves the type of government they wish. The second is the idea of human rights, which are defined in several documents but are all built around the basic values of individual rights, particularly the right not only to participate in politics but also to be free in your private life from government intrusion.
The first principle leads to the idea of the democratic foundations of the state. The second leads to the idea that the state must be limited in its power in certain ways and the individual must be free to pursue his own life in his own way within a framework of law limited by the principles of liberal democracy. The core assumption within this is that a democratic polity will yield a liberal constitution. This assumes that the majority of the citizens, left to their own devices, will favor the Enlightenment's definition of human rights. This assumption is simple, but its application is tremendously complex. In the end, the premise of the Western project is that national self-determination, expressed through free elections, will create and sustain constitutional democracies.
It is interesting to note that human rights activists and neoconservatives, who on the surface are ideologically opposed, actually share this core belief. Both believe that democracy and human rights flow from the same source and that creating democratic regimes will create human rights. The neoconservatives believe outside military intervention might be an efficient agent for this. Human rights groups oppose this, preferring to organize and underwrite democratic movements and use measures such as sanctions and courts to compel oppressive regimes to cede power. But they share common ground on this point as well. Both groups believe that outside intervention is needed to facilitate the emergence of an oppressed public naturally inclined toward democracy and human rights.
This, then, yields a theory of foreign policy in which the underlying strategic principle must not only support existing constitutional democracies but also bring power to bear to weaken oppressive regimes and free the people to choose to build the kind of regimes that reflect the values of the European Enlightenment.
Complex Questions and Choices
The case of Egypt raises an interesting and obvious question regardless of how it all turns out. What if there are democratic elections and the people choose a regime that violates the principles of Western human rights? What happens if, after tremendous Western effort to force democratic elections, the electorate chooses to reject Western values and pursue a very different direction - for example, one that regards Western values as morally reprehensible and aims to make war against them? One obvious example of this is Adolph Hitler, whose ascent to power was fully in keeping with the processes of the Weimar Republic - a democratic regime - and whose clearly stated intention was to supersede that regime with one that was popular (there is little doubt that the Nazi regime had vast public support), opposed to constitutionalism in the democratic sense and hostile to constitutional democracy in other countries.
The idea that the destruction of repressive regimes opens the door for democratic elections that will not result in another repressive regime, at least by Western standards, assumes that all societies find Western values admirable and want to emulate them. This is sometimes the case, but the general assertion is a form of narcissism in the West that assumes that all reasonable people, freed from oppression, would wish to emulate us.
At this moment in history, the obvious counterargument rests in some, but not all, Islamist movements. We do not know that the Islamist groups in Egypt will be successful, and we do not know what ideologies they will pursue, but they are Islamists and their views of man and moral nature are different from those of the European Enlightenment. Islamists have a principled disagreement with the West on a wide range of issues, from the relation of the individual to the community to the distinction between the public and private sphere. They oppose the Egyptian military regime not only because it limits individual freedom but also because it violates their understanding of the regime's moral purpose. The Islamists have a different and superior view of moral political life, just as Western constitutional democracies see their own values as superior.
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2011/12/06/egypt_and_the_idealist-realist_debate_in_us_foreign_policy_99788.html
It is far from clear what will happen in Egypt now. The military remains unified and powerful, and it is unclear how much actual power it is prepared to cede or whether it will be forced to cede it. What is clear is that the faction championed by Western governments and the media will now have to accept the Islamist agenda, back the military or fade into irrelevance.
One of the points I made during the height of the Arab Spring was that the West should be careful of what it wishes for - it might get it. Democracy does not always bring secular democrats to power. To be more precise, democracy might yield a popular government, but the assumption that that government will support a liberal democratic constitution that conceives of human rights in the European or American sense is by no means certain. Unrest does not always lead to a revolution, a revolution does not always lead to a democracy, and a democracy does not always lead to a European- or American-style constitution.
In Egypt today, just as it is unclear whether the Egyptian military will cede power in any practical sense, it is also unclear whether the Islamists can form a coherent government or how extreme such a government might be. And as we analyze the possibilities, it is important to note that this analysis really isn't about Egypt. Rather, Egypt serves as a specimen to examine - a case study of an inherent contradiction in Western ideology and, ultimately, of an attempt to create a coherent foreign policy.
The first principle leads to the idea of the democratic foundations of the state. The second leads to the idea that the state must be limited in its power in certain ways and the individual must be free to pursue his own life in his own way within a framework of law limited by the principles of liberal democracy. The core assumption within this is that a democratic polity will yield a liberal constitution. This assumes that the majority of the citizens, left to their own devices, will favor the Enlightenment's definition of human rights. This assumption is simple, but its application is tremendously complex. In the end, the premise of the Western project is that national self-determination, expressed through free elections, will create and sustain constitutional democracies.
It is interesting to note that human rights activists and neoconservatives, who on the surface are ideologically opposed, actually share this core belief. Both believe that democracy and human rights flow from the same source and that creating democratic regimes will create human rights. The neoconservatives believe outside military intervention might be an efficient agent for this. Human rights groups oppose this, preferring to organize and underwrite democratic movements and use measures such as sanctions and courts to compel oppressive regimes to cede power. But they share common ground on this point as well. Both groups believe that outside intervention is needed to facilitate the emergence of an oppressed public naturally inclined toward democracy and human rights.
This, then, yields a theory of foreign policy in which the underlying strategic principle must not only support existing constitutional democracies but also bring power to bear to weaken oppressive regimes and free the people to choose to build the kind of regimes that reflect the values of the European Enlightenment.
Complex Questions and Choices
The case of Egypt raises an interesting and obvious question regardless of how it all turns out. What if there are democratic elections and the people choose a regime that violates the principles of Western human rights? What happens if, after tremendous Western effort to force democratic elections, the electorate chooses to reject Western values and pursue a very different direction - for example, one that regards Western values as morally reprehensible and aims to make war against them? One obvious example of this is Adolph Hitler, whose ascent to power was fully in keeping with the processes of the Weimar Republic - a democratic regime - and whose clearly stated intention was to supersede that regime with one that was popular (there is little doubt that the Nazi regime had vast public support), opposed to constitutionalism in the democratic sense and hostile to constitutional democracy in other countries.
The idea that the destruction of repressive regimes opens the door for democratic elections that will not result in another repressive regime, at least by Western standards, assumes that all societies find Western values admirable and want to emulate them. This is sometimes the case, but the general assertion is a form of narcissism in the West that assumes that all reasonable people, freed from oppression, would wish to emulate us.
At this moment in history, the obvious counterargument rests in some, but not all, Islamist movements. We do not know that the Islamist groups in Egypt will be successful, and we do not know what ideologies they will pursue, but they are Islamists and their views of man and moral nature are different from those of the European Enlightenment. Islamists have a principled disagreement with the West on a wide range of issues, from the relation of the individual to the community to the distinction between the public and private sphere. They oppose the Egyptian military regime not only because it limits individual freedom but also because it violates their understanding of the regime's moral purpose. The Islamists have a different and superior view of moral political life, just as Western constitutional democracies see their own values as superior.
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2011/12/06/egypt_and_the_idealist-realist_debate_in_us_foreign_policy_99788.html
Thursday, December 22, 2011
My report to BBC on the Institute of Egypt (not my voice but my script, footage & direction) احتراق المجمع العلمي المصري وضياع وثائق عريقة
Watching my country's heritage being burnt by a bunch of morons under the banner of a revolution, I decided to join the Public Committee to save the Institute of Egypt. Having lived a rich experience under the water, the fire, stones &..etc, I decided to document this public effort aiming at rescuing Egyptian heritage.
I went on the second day with BBC's camera and made the following report, out of the footage I took over the two days. However, the voice isn't mine.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/multimedia/2011/12/111221_egypt_science_building.shtml
I went on the second day with BBC's camera and made the following report, out of the footage I took over the two days. However, the voice isn't mine.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/multimedia/2011/12/111221_egypt_science_building.shtml
Sunday, December 18, 2011
محاولة يائسة لانقاذ التراث
في يوم اجازتي الظريف، فوجئت بخبر "نهب المجمع العلمي". حسيت بمرارة بشعة، كنت لسه حاسسها الليلة اللي قبليها لما عرفت انه اتحرق.
رحت وأنا مش عارف هقابل حد ولا لأ جريت على المجمع أول مطلعت من المترو. وأنا داخل على الشارع لقيت بنات عمالة تكسر في طوب الرصيف، عادي شفنا قبل كده. كملت والحيط اأسمنتي اللي بناه الجيش عمال يوضح أكتر. الجامعة الأمريكية على ناصية وقدامها على ناصية بردو المجمع العلمي، بيفصلهم شارع بالطول. آخر سور المجمع الحيطة الأسمنت. يعني يا جزم مكنتوش عارفين تبنوا البتاع بعد حيطة المجمع على الناصية، سايبينو كده مكشوف لوحده؟ ما علينا. لقيت واحد عند الشباك عمال يسلك كتب. قربت علية وبنبرة شك فيها أمل في نفس الوقت سألته: أنت تبع وزارة الثقافة؟؟ متمنيا أن يقول أه لحسن كده هيبقى فيها عركة من أولها. قالي احنا لجنة شعبية وبنوديها للجيش. الحمدلللله. طيب، بقيت بخد منه الكتب واستفها لغاية لما جم ناس كانت بتنقل دفعة كتب. النقطة المتفق عليها مع وزارة الثقافة هي نقطة الصاعقة اللي قدام السفارة الأمريكية. في ناس معينة هي اللي بتنقل عشان الحاجة متوهش. طبعا كل شوية يجي عيل خازوق طفيلي يأخد ورقة يبص فيها، واخدها احطها يقلي هاشوفها يابا بس، يا ياد يا ابن ال*** يا سنتيح تشوف ايه.
حصل زعيق جامد أوي وهجمة أمن مركزي. طبعا احنا لزقين في السور الأسمنت ففيه بينا وبين ناصية الشارع اللي بيحصل فيه ضرب بتاع 30 متر. كل الناس جريت جريت واحنا واقفبن في الخن، والرجالة اللي حاولينا اختاروا طبعا الرجولة الرياضية وجريو هما كمان. مش مهم. الأمن المركزي لقيناه قدامنا بيجري ورا الناس، الاعداد و الصويت مخليا المنظر مبهر، ملحقتش أصور لأنهم بصلنوا وجريوا علينا وواحد رفع حجرة واحنا قاعدين نجعر كتب كتب كتب ورافعين يافطة اللجنة الشعبية لحماية المجمع العلمي. الحمدلله ان فيه واحد بيعرف يقرا اللهم خلاص خلاص ، سيبوا دول.
ده كان الكر، دقيقة ورجعوا هما بيجروا ووراهم الناس ونداءات بريف هيرت اييييييييييييييييييييييييييييييييييييييييه. اني وايز، اتنين عساكر اتشنكلوا، أوبح على الشلاليت والضرب. والعيال والبغال اللي خدوا حجارة وهاتك يا ترزيع في راسهم. وطبعا شوية ***** حرصوا على أن يخدوا الدرع والخوذة ويجرو فرحانين. المهم المنظر كالآتي................اقرأ الباقي في "7amousha"
Saturday, December 17, 2011
Thursday, December 15, 2011
Tuesday, December 13, 2011
Online Think Tank ???
I was lately thinking if policy analysis can be accessed easily by every one. What if both junior and senior analysts as well as student have their articles published widely? What if you don't have to buy periodicals in order to access decent policy analysis? Why do you have to read what newspapers or specialized publications choose to publish?? Why wouldn't every thinking educated brain have an equal chance to analyze and get read?
Anyway, its the idea of creating an online open source portal for political analysis. The concept is simple:
Anyway, its the idea of creating an online open source portal for political analysis. The concept is simple:
Any body can publish any analysis concerning any topic at any moment. Its open for everyone and created as well by everyone.
If you are interested leave a comment on this post or send me an email & lets get down to business.
Sunday, December 11, 2011
Saturday, December 10, 2011
Creative Destruction Triology - By F. William Engdah
Read Creative Destruction Triology by F. William Engdah in Suspicious Minds
Thursday, December 8, 2011
The Covert Intelligence War Against Iran
By Scott Stewart
There has been a lot of talk in the press lately about a “cold war” being waged by the United States, Israel and other U.S. allies against Iran. Such a struggle is certainly taking place, but in order to place recent developments in perspective, it is important to recognize that the covert intelligence war against Iran (and the Iranian response to this war) is clearly not a new phenomenon.
Indeed, STRATFOR has been chronicling this struggle since early 2007. Our coverage has included analyses of events such as the defection to the West of Iranian officials with knowledge of Tehran’s nuclear program; the Iranian seizure of British servicemen in the Shatt al Arab Waterway; the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists; the use of the Stuxnet worm to cripple Iranian uranium enrichment efforts; and Iranian efforts to arm its proxies and use them as a threat to counteract Western pressure. These proxies are most visible in Iraq and Lebanon, but they also exist in Yemen, Afghanistan, Syria, the Palestinian territories, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.
While the covert intelligence war has been under way for many years, the tempo of events that can readily be identified as part of it has been increasing over the past few months. It is important to note that many of these events are the result of hidden processes begun.............Read more in the War Room
Read more: The Covert Intelligence War Against Iran | STRATFOR
Wednesday, December 7, 2011
Sunday, December 4, 2011
Friday, December 2, 2011
Egypt's Elections 2011
اقرأ تقرير مركز المعلومات ودعم اتخاذ القرار في مجلس الوزراء عن المرحلة الأولى من الانتخابات في الصفحة الجديدة انتخابات مصر 2011
For more details, look at the Report of Center for Information & Support of Decision Making, Council of Ministers, provided in the new page Egypt Elections 2011
للمزيد من التفاصيل عن الانتخابات البرلمانية المصرية، انظر الصفحة الجديدة انتخابات مصر 2011
For more details on Egypt's Parliamentary Elections, visit the new page Egypt Elections 2011
GRTV Backgrounder: The Assassination of Gaddafi
Watch The Assassination of Gaddafi - GRTV Backgrounder in The War Room
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