U.S. Muslims to reclaim 'Jihad' with an ad campaign

By AFP
Chicago
US Muslims launched an advertising and social media campaign Friday in the hopes of reclaiming the word jihad from extremists who insist on equating the spiritual quest with terrorism.

The campaign features Muslims describing their personal struggles -- the meaning of jihad -- on bus ads, Twitter, Facebook and a dedicated website: myjihad.org.

“MyJihad is to build friendships across the aisle,” says one ad showing an African American man leaning on the shoulder of a Jewish friend.

"MyJihad is to march on despite losing my son," says another ad, featuring a portrait of a mother with her three remaining children.

“MyJihad is to not judge people by their cover,” says a third, framed by two women in headscarves.

It was sparked by a series of hateful ads calling Muslims “savages” and urging people to “defeat jihad” that were plastered on buses and trains in New York, Chicago and San Francisco.

But it also speaks to a larger frustration among “mainstream” Muslims with how a basic tenant of their faith has been distorted and demonized, said Ahmed Rehab who helped launch the campaign.

“Jihad is a term that has unfortunately been widely misrepresented by the actions of Muslim extremists first and foremost, and by attempts at public indoctrination coming from Islamophobes who claim that the minority extremists are right and the majority of Muslims are wrong,” said Rehab, who is the executive director of the Chicago branch of the Council on American-Islamic Relations.“The MyJihad campaign is about reclaiming Jihad from the Muslim and anti-Muslim extremists who ironically, but not surprisingly, see eye to eye on Jihad.”

The ads have been placed on buses in Chicago and Rehab hopes to raise funds to expand the campaign to buses and trains in New York, Washington, San Francisco, Seattle, Houston, Dallas, Cleveland and Oklahoma City.

Organizers are also working to get the ads on buses in Toronto, London, Manchester, Sydney and Melbourne.

http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/12/15/255166.html

Profiler: Sacha Dratwa

Israel’s social media war run by 26-year-old

 

Social media have become tools for popular movements like the Occupy Wall Street protest and the Arab spring. But Israel may be the first country to launch a propaganda war using Facebook and Twitter.

And the lieutenant running this virtual smackdown is a 26-year-old snowboarder named Sacha Dratwa, a Belgian immigrant who leads a team of social media soldiers.

According to Tablet magazine, for the past two years Dratwa has been in charge of the Israeli Defense Forces' "YouTube and Facebook presence and turned it into the most globally visible arm of the Israeli military."

Facebook, the magazine reports, only became available to Israel around 2008-2009, and it was considered a kids' toy. (Remember those days?)

But that was then. Now, Dratwa tells Tablet, "We believe people understand the language of Facebook, the language of Twitter." His team tweeted, for example, about an Israeli girl injured by a Hamas rocket, after a photo of a baby killed by an Israeli missile was posted on Twitter. The IDF commissioned a Foursquare-style game for frequent visitors to its blog, and it posts YouTube videos of drone strikes and assassinations.

Want to know more about Dratwa? Just head over to his mostly public Facebook profile. As Gizmodo points out, the guy running the cyberwar is also just a guy, doing "guy stuff" like drinking with his buddies, hitting the slopes and "commanding a cyber propaganda squad."

http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/lookout/israel-social-media-war-run-26-old-201813409.html 

Reuter's: Israel’s Iron Dome – graphic of the day

Israel’s Iron Dome, the anti-missile defense system, is playing an increasingly important role in their escalating battle with Gaza based militants. A military spokeswoman said that Iron Dome has shot down at least 222 incoming rockets since Wednesday with a 90% success rate. Today’s graphic shows how the Iron Dome works.

Poverty Study in Egypt

Take a look at:

Obstaclesto Access Basic Services and Households' Strategies to Manage Risks and Copewith Existing Poverty in Egypt.

معوقات الحصول على الخدمات الأساسية وكيفية مواجهة الأسر للمخاطر والتعايش مع الفقر 

The Women of Asgarda

Check out The Women of Asgarda in Spotlight 

The Quint Border Region: The World’s Most Under-Reported Terror Hot Spot

By: Kerry Patton

10/09/2012 (11:54am)

 

 Anyone who researches terrorism has likely come across a place in South America known as the Tri-border region, a remote area where Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina border one another that is often mentioned as a safe haven for Islamic radicals. But as more and more intelligence officers begin to understand this very old South American safe haven, they also need to start paying attention to another hotspot: The Quint-border region in Africa.

South America's Tri-border region is certainly unique. Very few travel inside the region. And for good reason; it is a remote, semi-lawless and often times extremely dangerous place. But imagine that there’s a new place in the world that's very similar to the Tri-border territory -- that includes an additional two nation states. That’s the Quint-border expanse, and it’s just as remote and lawless, but also far more dangerous.

The Quint-border region is thousands of miles from South America situated in the west-southwest region of Africa. It’s called the “Quint” region because it consists of five different borders -- Nigeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. It’s the location counterterrorists need to begin paying close attention to in order to stay on top of our enemy’s initiatives.

The Tri-border region in South America may never have become what it is today if it weren’t for the treacherous terrain in the region. It is comprised of heavy jungle with thick canopies making it difficult even for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) air platforms to monitor.

But with all things considered, a lot of hard evidence is missing from much of the continuing claims about this region being South America’s terror “hot spot.” While there’s little question that the Tri-border region is filled with illegal activity that ranges from black markets to organized crime, the extent of Islamist terrorist groups operating in the region remains questionable.

Terror groups such as Hezbollah, Al-Jihad (Islamic Jihad), Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group), Hamas and Al-Qaeda probably had a presence in the Tri-border region - evidence points to this - but most of this evidence is historical; there’s little proof that these groups have a significant presence in the region today. Multiple nation states’ have worked to weed out some of the bad guys from the region.

Today, there is absolutely no definitive evidence of any largescale terrorist operations in the region. Yes, some active terror supporters have been captured in the region as of late, but that does not mean the region should still be considered a terror hot bed.

When it comes to definitive evidence about terror hot spots, though, there is substantiation that one such area location exists, and it’s the Quint-border region. Africa is unique. Over the years, it has shifted multiple times from a heavily influenced Islamic region to a Christian zone. Today, it is shifting back to a very influential Islamic continent. Geospatial mapping shows a rapid movement of Islamic infiltration throughout Africa, starting in the north and moving southward. Unfortunately, this Islamic shift is filled with extreme radicalization.

We rarely hear about such terror safe havens because they aren’t all that sexy. Most safe havens lack physical violence. Terrorists are smart and they don’t necessarily enjoy “defecating where they eat.” But violence has imploded inside Africa’s Quint-border region.

Northern Nigeria has been ravaged by Islamist violence in recent years. Boko Haram, an Al Qaeda-linked Islamic terror group, has consistently been on the offensive, committing mass genocide against Christian communities living in the northern half of the country.

Hezbollah also has a relatively heavy presence in the Niger Delta. The official website of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria quoted an African security expert explaining why Hezbollah has a relatively large presence in the region: “One reason is the large population of Lebanese Shi’ites who left their country during the civil war in the 1970s. They deal in trade, communications, minerals and other fields. Ironically, so do many of the Israelis in the region, which means people from both groups may meet up in the business world … the warning must be taken seriously by business people in the area, at least for the time being.”

That "warning" comes from multiple threats related to kidnappings -- a terror tactic frequently used by terrorist groups in the region.

Mali recently experienced a coup that was heavily influenced and led by Islamists closely aligned with Al Qaeda. As mentioned in my May, 2012 Homeland Security Today commentary, West Africa: Al Qaeda’s New Home, “Today, the nation of Mali has been seized by Al Qaeda elements. This once democratic nation has been toppled by a military coup, and those who arguably now control the nation in the aftermath of its instability have allied themselves with Al Qaeda. And there have been talks between the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) Tuareg rebels and Al Qaeda.”

I further noted that the “Tuareg rebellion of 2012 is an independence war against the Malian government in the Sahara desert region of the Azawad led by the MNLA, which is composed of former insurgents and a significant number of returning and heavily armed Tuareg fighters who fought for either the National Transitional Council or the Libyan army during the Libyan civil war.”

Niger, the landlocked country bordering Mali, Nigeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Libya and Chad, is located in the heart of Africa’s hell. Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) saturates its north, Boko Haram is to the south, and Mali unrest is to its west. It also sets in the middle of a major illegal goods trafficking route. Since the French left Niger in 1960, the country witnessed approximately two dozen coups making it incredibly unstable … and prone to radicalization and a safe haven for terrorist activities.

Not every nation within the Quint-border region is filled with violence. Burkina Faso is relatively peaceful with a relatively strong government that so far has been willing to fight crime and corruption even though crime remains high. However, Burkina Faso is an African nation involved in a multi-million dollar a year cigarette smuggling adventure that contributes to multiple financial advancements for terror groups. What other illegal activities exist in Burkina Faso that contribute to an ongoing global terror dilemma?

The small African country of Burkina Faso is also a known drug and weapon smuggling hot zone. According to the US Department of State, “The organized crime that exists in Burkina Faso mostly revolves around the smuggling of weapons, commercial goods, illegal drugs and, to a lesser extent, human trafficking. Burkina Faso is known as a transit country for these activities although a small portion of these weapons, goods, drugs, and trafficked humans do remain in the country.”

According to a 2005 US Department of Labor Bureau of International Labor Affairs report, “Benin is a source, destination and transit country for the trafficking of children. Children from Benin are trafficked into Cameroon, Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, the Gulf States and Lebanon; children from Burkina Faso, Niger and Togo are sold into servitude in Benin.”

Make no mistake; those involved in human trafficking around the world often have ties to terror networks. They are identified as transnational criminal organizations, or TCOs. These TCO’s are major players in the Quint-border region responsible for financing terror.

There are serious locations in the world that are prone to mass terror activities. The identified Quint-border region could easily be construed as the world’s most dangerous hot spot with significant terror connections. A book could be written about the region’s activities, but we’ll leave that endeavor to intelligence officials.

There is enough data to support the foundation of a good working intelligence report. And this material comes at a critical time -- the war on terror continues, Africa has imploded with violence, and the US continues to run amok searching high and low for the snake’s head of terrorism to be cut off. Unfortunately, that head does not come in the form of a person; look at Al Qaeda’s capabilities even after the killing of Osama Bin Laden.

To effectively target terrorists, you must go to the location where they receive the most active and passive support, because without this support, they have nothing. There is no question that when it comes to Islamic terrorists, a great amount of their support comes from a key region, and that’s the Quint-border region.

Kerry Patton is a combat service disabled veteran who has worked in South America, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Europe focusing on intelligence and security, and has interviewed current and former terrorists, including members of the Taliban. Author of, Sociocultural Intelligence: The New Discipline of Intelligence Studies, you can follow Kerry on Facebook or at www.kerry-patton.com. 

http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/correspondents-watch/single-article/the-quint-border-region-the-worlds-most-under-reported-terror-hot-spot/d3a2696632954d92c74ec688a04d3bde.html 

Guevara is dead جيفارا مات

On the 8th of October 1967, this man, Mr. Ernesto Che Guevara, died.

You can look up his life but I prefer to speak of his death . 

Look up  an extensive chronology of his death here

 On Guevara's assassination:

On October 9th, 1967, Ernesto "Che" Guevara was put to death by Bolivian soldiers, trained, equipped and guided by U.S. Green Beret and CIA operatives. His execution remains a historic and controversial event; and thirty years later, the circumstances of his guerrilla foray into Bolivia, his capture, killing, and burial are still the subject of intense public interest and discussion around the world. 
 

As part of the thirtieth anniversary of the death of Che Guevara, the National Security Archive's Cuba Documentation Project is posting a selection of key CIA, State Department, and Pentagon documentation relating to Guevara and his death. This electronic documents book is compiled from declassified records obtained by the National Security Archive, and by authors of two new books on Guevara: Jorge Castañeda's Compañero: The Life and Death of Che Guevara (Knopf), and Henry Butterfield Ryan's The Fall of Che Guevara (Oxford University Press). The selected documents, presented in order of the events they depict, provide only a partial picture of U.S. intelligence and military assessments, reports and extensive operations to track and "destroy" Che Guevara's guerrillas in Bolivia; thousands of CIA and military records on Guevara remain classified. But they do offer significant and valuable information on the high-level U.S. interest in tracking his revolutionary activities, and U.S. and Bolivian actions leading up to his death.

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB5/ 

 

White House Memorandum, October 11, 1967: In another daily update, Walt Rostow reports to President Johnson that "we are 99% sure that 'Che' Guevara is dead." Rostow believes the decision to execute Guevara "is stupid," but he also points out his death "shows the soundness of our 'preventive medicine' assistance to countries facing incipient insurgency--it was the Bolivian 2nd Ranger Battalion, trained by our Green Berets from June-September of this year, that cornered him and got him." 

 

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB5/

Frilly Faces by Fatma El Mosallamy

You can see the entire online expo on the Art Dungeon

Twitter, PR & People

How Twitter is Changing Public Relations

The PR industry is changing for good. Social media networks like Facebook and Twitter have completely redefined the paradigm of public relations. A couple of years back, it would have been hard to imagine a micro-blogging service, all of 140 characters messages and that too not landing directly in your Inbox could be used as an effective means for maintaining public relations.

Social Media vs. Public Relations
It might sound surprising but for a long time, social media was viewed as a competitor to conventional PR techniques. While social media analysts predicted that PR industry is now dead, the latter retaliated by arguing that social media isn’t well suited for public relationships. And then, Twitter happened. As its popularity increased, it reduced the gap between social media and PR industry. And now, with thousands of Twitter’s PR success stories, it is widely viewed as the best PR technique in today’s age of Web 2.0

Is Conventional PR Dead?
Of course not! Twitter is a fascinating way of augmenting your organization’s PR capabilities. It’s not a tool to replace conventional PR techniques. Rather, it helps spread the message to a much wider audience than any other legacy PR mode. You can tweet about a press release or about a new media event for your organization and then see how the news spreads like fire in Tweetverse.

Good Customer Service, Great Public Relations
In order to get good publicity, it is important for an organization to provide good service. Twitter provides an unparallel mode of instant & real-time customer service. Queries can be answered instantaneously and the word spreads faster than wild fire.
Many companies have realized that Twitter is not only a great tool for marketing, it’s also an innovative medium of providing great customer service, thereby leading to a good public reputation and strong public relations.

Brand Monitoring
Twitter is a great place to monitor your brand’s reputation online. You get to know what people are talking about your brand. You can search for people who’d potentially be interested in your brand and reach out to them. Using Twitter’s advanced search functionality and several 3^rd party tools, you can determine if your brand is loosing its charm amongst customers and appropriately take corrective action.

Knowledge is Power
The PR industry thrives on knowledge and what better than an easily presentable source of vast knowledge like Twitter. As you follow and interact with more people, you gain more knowledge. Be it peers, competitors or clients, following them on Twitter makes sense as you gain more insights into their opinions.
Twitter is an always online 24 x 7 community with several knowledgeable and thoughtful people, so why not make the best out of it? As a wise man once said, there’s nothing better than learning from the pros.
Bill Gates once said “If I was down to my last dollar, I’d spend it on public relationships”. I’d rather say “If I was down to my last dollar, I’d spend it accessing Twitter to build public relations”

Douglas Idugboe, Digital and New Media Marketing Strategist. Founder and Chief Editor of Smedio! A Canadian Bestselling Author, Marketing Strategist, Speaker and Trainer, Who Loves Technology

 http://ht.ly/2UXer

 

Social Media Virality: Why Do People Retweet?

This post is a preview of some of the content in tomorrow's webinar, Virality: How to Catch It, with special guests Jay Baer and Tom Webster. Sign up now!
Want to get more retweets? We’ve found the key: Start tweeting about sports.
In a recent study I conducted on the social activity of Argyle's customer base, 21 of our 50 most retweeted accounts were sports-focused. For comparison, no other category had more than three accounts in the top 50. The most retweeted post in Argyle history was from an LA Lakers community site: "Steve Nash, Kobe Bryant, Ron Ron, Pau Gasol and Dwight Howard. That's not a bad starting five." (Hard to disagree.)
Why do accounts that post about sports get such high retweet rates? Should we really all just start tweeting about sports, or are there deeper factors at work?
Before diving into that, let me just take a moment to satisfy the budding statisticians in the audience. I'm defining the "retweet rate" of a given post as the number of retweets it got divided by the number of followers that the account has. So, if an account with 10,000 followers posts something clever and gets 100 retweets, that's a retweet rate of 100 / 10,000, or 1%.
The retweet rate for an account, then, is just the average of the retweet rates of all of its posts. And based on the data we've collected, a "typical" account has a retweet rate of .1%. So for every 1,000 followers the account has, a post receives, on average, about one retweet.
Back to the original question: what's with all these sports-related retweets? To get to the bottom of this question, we have to understand why people retweet.

Why do people retweet a post?

Many community managers make the incorrect assumption that people retweet content because they like said content. This is false. People click links that they think will be interesting. They favorite posts that they find particularly notable. But they retweet content they think will resonate with their followers.
A retweet is like retelling someone else’s joke. Sure, you found the joke funny when you heard it the first time. But you're retelling it to someone new because you think they will find it funny.

When someone retweets you, they are telling their followers "Hey! You might like this!" And that begs the question: Who are your followers' followers? And do they care about your content?

Consider Your Followers' Followers

Sometimes there's a natural overlap between your followers and your followers' followers. For instance, if you really love Breaking Bad and you follow @BreakingBad_AMC, it's likely that a healthy number of your followers also watch the show. Therefore, content posted by the community managers running @BreakingBad_AMC have a very receptive group of followers' followers.
Now consider that you're the community manager for a company that makes accounting software. Your customers all have one thing in common--they're all accountants. But who follows accountants? (Yes, you're allowed to chuckle at that.) The answer is actually really simple: all kinds of people follow accountants. Their wives, kids, neighbors, friends, coworkers and golf buddies.
Get where I'm going with this? Most of their followers aren't accountants. So if you're the aforementioned accounting software's community manager, tweeting a torrid stream of accounting-related content simply won't get retweeted. You may be incredibly successful at generating clicks and favorites, but retweets will be few and far between.
Use the tried-and-true cocktail party analogy. If you were at a cocktail party and you met an accountant, the last thing he would want to talk about would be work. He'd be worried that your eyes would glaze over and you'd immediately look for a way out of the conversation. In social media, the unfollow button is incredibly close at hand at all times, so that accountant is much more likely to start a conversation about Breaking Bad, both in real life and on Twitter.
(@BreakingBad_AMC isn't an Argyle customer, so I can't run an easy report on their all-time retweet rate. But after eyeballing some of their most recent posts they're getting a retweet rate five to ten times higher than an "average" account. Hardly surprising.)

So what do I do if I sell B2B accounting software?

Many community managers will be in a similar predicament as the aforementioned accounting software community manager. So what do you do if your followers' followers don't care about your content? Some suggestions:

• Identify commonalities in your followers' followers. Many of Argyle's followers' followers are 25-40 years old, putting them solidly in the group of people who remember the 90s fondly. On a recent Friday, we created a campaign around the hashtag #90sSentence asking people what their favorite 90s-themed sentence was. These posts got a ton of retweets.
• Participate in targeted hashtag conversations. The goal of a retweet is to amplify your message, but it's not the only way to achieve this. If you regularly participate in a targeted community formed around a hashtag, your message will be seen by exactly the people you care about. Amplification achieved.
• Optimize for different metrics. While retweets are a powerful tool for some brands, it's totally valid for you to optimize your efforts for metrics such as mentions, favorites and clicks while discarding retweets as an important KPI. There's nothing wrong with admitting you're not the LA Lakers.

http://socialmediatoday.com/tristanhandy/868616/social-media-virality-why-do-people-retweet  

برنامج "أجرأ الكلام" أحمد أبو بركه وثروت الخرباوى

A Developed Country

CNN: A Stand in the Sinai

This is a CNN Report about the human trafficking from Eastern Africa all the way to Israel passing by Sinai, where smugglers and gangs turn the life of those illegal immigrants into hell. A sad disgusting story, but its not the first to report. Local Newspaper like Al Masry Al Youm & Youm7 had already made extensive reports about these horrific stories

Mais toujours pas de reponse.

Egypt denies deal with Sudan to strike Ethiopian dam

September 24, 2012 (KHARTOUM) –

 An Egyptian official has emphatically denied the veracity of allegations that his country had reached an agreement with neighboring Sudan to use its territories as a launchpad for potential attacks on Ethiopian damming facilities over the dispute of Nile water-sharing.

Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, when completed, will reduce the capacity of the Aswan High Dam, helping to save about six billion cubic metres of water. Image courtesy of Hajor.

Sudan Tribune reported the allegations last month citing a 2010 internal e-mail leaked by the whistle-blowing website Wikileaks, which suggested that Sudan president Omer Al-Bashir had agreed to build an Egyptian airbase in his country’s western region of Darfur to be used for assaults on The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) should diplomatic efforts fail to resolve the dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia over Nile water-sharing.
But Egypt’s state minister for military production, Rida Hafiz, on Monday strongly denied the allegations saying they are “totally bare of truth” According to Egypt’s state-run news agency MENA, Hafiz added that the report is “designed to disturb Egyptian-Ethiopian relations.”
Egypt - and Sudan to a lesser extent - are involved in a drawn-out conflict with the Nile Basin’s upstream countries over Nile Water rights as the latter, mainly Ethiopia, continue to contest and attempt to alter the shares dictated by colonial-era treaties giving Egypt the lion share in Africa’s longest river.
The North African country is concerned that Ethiopia’s GERD, a massive hydroelectric dam on the Blue Nile, about 40 kilometers from the borders with Sudan, will affect its vital flow of fresh water when completed with a capacity to create a reservoir of 65 billion cubic metres.
President Omer Al-Bashir reportedly told his Egyptian counterpart Mohammed Morsi this month that Sudan shares “identical position” with Egypt on the Nile water issue.
(ST)


http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article44005

Progress and fear in post-transition Somalia

   Read Progress and fear in post-transition Somalia in Spotlight

My latest Photoshop shit: Camels on Water

See more in My Art page

US sees Israel, tight Mideast ally, as spy threat

Read US sees Israel, tight Mideast ally, as spy threat in Spotlight

Egypt: IMF, FMF and the MFO

 

 

 

by J. Millard Burr

  |  

23-Aug-12

EGYPT: IMF, FMF AND THE MFO


"President Barack Obama himself, among other personnel from the US administration, promised Egypt $2 billion in the form of debt swaps and credit guarantees in 2011, shortly after Mubarak was unseated. These promises, however, have yet to materialise."  ("US ambassador discuss[es] assistance to Egypt," Ahram Online, Cairo, 17 August 2012.)

IMF TO THE RESCUE

     On 15 August the Egyptian Finance Minister Momtaz El Said met with U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Anne Patterson to discuss previously promised U.S. foreign aid funding.  Also discussed were Egypt government efforts to restore Egypt’s national economy and prospects for an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan.

     Regarding the IMF loan, Patterson agreed that given the political stability it was a "good time" for Egypt to resume negotiations with the IMF. In fact, new negotiations were pending and on 22 August IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde was to visit Cairo to re-open discussions that were initiated shortly after protests erupted across Egypt in January 2011.

     In May 2011 the Egyptian economy was in free-fall.  To halt the decline Egyptian officials had entered talks with the World Bank and it appeared that Egypt was about to receive a major infusion of financial aid.  Ostensibly, Cairo was to recieve some $4.5bn in assistance over the next two years, and World Bank President Robert Zoellick himself stated that it was indeed the Bank's desire to support the "Arab Spring."  According to Zoellick, Bank funds would be made conditional on Egypt's willingness to modernize its economy." (BBC, 24 May 2011 "Egypt and Tunisia to get $6 billion from World Bank.")

     Egypt-IMF talks then stalled in June—at a time when the IMF seemed poised to approve a $3 billion loan.  During a time of great political uncertainty in Egypt an arrangement seemingly had been reached that would achieve an orderly devaluation of the Egyptian pound and attack the problem of a growing budget deficit. But Egypt backed off and no final agreement was reached. In December 2011, talks were resumed but once again stalled.  And as the months passed analysts felt that to have the required effect on the Egyptian economy the IMF would have to fund much more than the $3 billion originally considered.  

     The army's Military Council, which was really in charge of the talks, admitted that it was responsible for postponing an agreement. The military leadership did not want to be condemned for what they thought would be a very unpopular move. Yet, as it lingered, in December 2011 Moody's downgraded Egypt's credit rating. The move occurred shortly after Egypt's leadership (or what passed for it) rejected the IMF's $3 billion credit arrangement first broached in June 2011. As General Mokhtar al-Mullah told reporters in December 2011,"The easiest thing would have been for the military council to accept the loans from abroad, give it to Egyptians to live a better life, and then hand over power and the Egyptian people would have been responsible to repay these debts."

     By 2012 the cost of domestic borrowing had increased, and foreign reserves were reduced by half.  Egyptian exports fell, and the crucial tourist industry continued its downward slide.  When the budget deficit reached 11% of gross domestic product, devaluation of the Egyptian pound had to be considered whether the military liked it or not. Today, Most economists are aware that the Egyptian economy is a mess, and to be effective an IMF package would now need to be somewhere in the range of $10-15 billion.

     In advance of the Patterson-El Said meeting it had been announced by Abdallah Shehata, economic advisor to President Mohammed Morsi, that his government was preparing an entirely new program for the forthcoming IMF negotiations.  It would emphasize "social justice," something that undoubtedly would appeal to Washington, to Secretary of State Clinton and Ambassador Patterson.  El-Said explained that with regard to the "low-income sector" the government intended to "minimise the socio-economic gap between citizens.”  An organization dominated by urbanites and professionals, it is hard to see what the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimun) can do to better the lives of millions of farm families—the poorest of the poor. A land reform law of 1953 limited individual holdings to no more than 200 acres. Second and third agrarian reform laws further limited the area of landholdings.  With no land to play with, it is likely that the Ikhwan will introduce more subsidies, placing more pressure on an already overburdened budget.
 
FOREIGN AID

     At his meeting with Patterson El Said admitted that the issue of greatest immediate importance was the missing funds that had been promised by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and Kuwait.  El Said noted that his government was daily expecting the arrival of a half billion dollars (of two billion that had been promised) from Qatar. In addition, a major tranche of funds promised by Saudi Arabia was said to be in the pipeline. As for the others, who could guess?

     With regard to United States economic assistance, following the meeting Ambassador Patterson informed the press that a U.S. State Department delegation would arrive in Cairo by the end of August.  Discussions would be held on the latest political and economic developments, "and the means of providing Egypt with funds, especially after the appointment of Egypt's new government." (Ahram Online, 17 August 2012)

     Prior to the fall of the Mubarak government, Egypt annually received more United States foreign aid (civilian and military) than any country except for Israel. It has averaged slightly more than $2 billion per annum since the signing of the Camp David Peace Accords.  The amount of American Foreign Military Financing (FMF) has varied very little from year to year, and funds devoted to economic assistance, and generally channeled through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), has slowly declined since 1998.

     FMF that averaged more than $1.3 billion per annum allowed Egypt to receive U.S. military hardware.  Inter alia, it has included jet aircraft, Apache helicopters, aerial surveillance aircraft, and armored personnel carriers.  The Egyptian military could also purchase equipment directly from U.S. defense contractors in excess of the annual FMF payment.  Both the Pentagon and Foggy Bottom have argued that FMF provides the cornerstone to a very cordial relationship, and Egyptian leaders called the FMF "untouchable compensation" for the continuation of peace with Israel.  Just how the Morsi government with its recent change of military leadership stands on the issue of U.S. military aid is presently unclear.

      From news reports following their meeting one could assume that Ambassador Patterson gave assurances that Washington had already reached a decision, and aid to Egypt would continue without conditions.  And given the tenor of Egyptian news reports that followed, one might easily assume that U.S. economic assistance might even be enhanced.
 
MILITARIZING THE SINAI

     As a result of the disorder during Egypt's "Arab Spring", on 28 January 2011 an Egyptian military communiqué ordered the national police to relinquish their posts while the army restored order throughout the nation.  In short order, many police departed the Sinai and that region devolved into chaos. Conditions were so hectic that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, fearing the increase of arms smuggling into Gaza, "agreed to let Egypt deploy 800 additional troops to the Sinai" to fill a power vacuum in the area.  This occurred even though, "the two countries' peace accords stipulate the peninsula should be demilitarized." (Bradley and Mitnick, "Bedouin Arms Smugglers See Opening in Sinai, The Wall Street Journal, 5 February 2011.)

     Six months later, Israeli forces reportedly checkmated what it called a "spectacular" border attack conceived by an Al Qaida affiliate.  Hatched within the Gaza Strip, the plot was to be the fourth in a series of attacks on Sinai gas pipeline that supplies Israel with 35% of its need (and Gaza with all its gas).  On 14 August three Egyptian army brigades of 1,700 men, an equal number of police, and 3,400 security personnel, backed by tanks and personnel carriers, drove across the Sinai and into the Mediterranean towns of El Arish and Sheikh Zuweyid. Once those towns were occupied the convoy continued on to Rafah, an Egyptian town bordering with  Gaza.  An Egyptian military communiqué reported that the occupation force had gained control of a region that had been lost to lawless and terrorist elements.  Unfortunately, despite the occupation the attacks on the gas pipeline continued.  

     Ironically, it was then little noted in the media that the movement of Egyptian forces into the eastern Sinai was yet again a contravention of the Camp David Accords and Article 2, Annex I, which defines the limits of responsibility (the "Security Arrangements") in the various geographic zones.  Whether Israel (and the United States) agreed to what was a violation of the terms of the 33-year-old peace treaty has never been clarified.  Still, It has been reported in the Israeli press that the military appendix to the Accords was modified after the situation in Sinai began to deteriorate; it apparently allowed for the addition of seven additional Egypt military battalions in the Sinai. If true, it is assumed that the United States, which is a guarantor of the agreement, agreed to the increase.  

     In effect, by 2012 the Egyptian army has remilitarized the eastern Sinai—a sector it had been excluded from for more than three decades. The military continued to claim that its move was in response to the presence of 2,000 well-organized and heavily armed Islamist gunmen and a passel of smugglers that threatened the peace. Left unsaid was the reality that the Egyptian military felt that the number of rebels was obviously more than the existing Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) present in the Sinai could handle.

 QUO VADIS MFO

    As an addendum to the 1978 Camp David Accords, in August 1981 the United States, Egypt and Israel signed a Protocol to the Camp David Treaty of Peace establishing the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). The MFO mission was required to implement the security provisions of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace and prevent any violation of its terms. The agreement placed strict limitations on the presence of Egyptian military and police in the Sinai Peninsula.

     The MFO role was initiated in April 1982, the same day that Israel returned sovereignty of the Sinai to Egypt. Under Article 2, Annex I, of the Peace Treaty the Sinai Peacekeeping Zones were delimited.  The Peninsula was divided into three geographically defined zones" In Zone A, located just to the east of the Suez Canal, Egypt was allowed to quarter a mechanized infantry division with a total of 22,000 troops; Zone B, to the east of A and an area comprising the second third of the Sinai, allowed Egypt to emplace four border security battalions and civilian police.  Zone C, which was the most problematic of the three, was located between Line B and the Egypt-Israel border. In Zone C, only the MFO and the Egyptian civilian police were permitted.  In that zone three battalions of MFO were quartered at two bases: MFO headquarters with two infantry battalions (Colombia, Fiji, etc.,) at North Camp was located south of the Mediterranean town of El Arish; an American battalion was quartered at South Camp north of Sharm el Sheikh, now a well known tourist destination.
 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

   In Israel it was reported on 19 August that the government of Israel had asked Egypt to withdraw armored vehicles—including tanks and armored personnel carriers—that had "entered the Sinai in force ten days earlier in contravention of the peace treaty between the two nations." Apparently, their deployment had only been admitted "retroactively." (Gil Ronen, Arutz Sheva)  The Egyptian response to the demand was seen in Israel as an indication of how relations with the Morsi government would proceed.

     Two days later Al Ahram, Egypt's state-run media megaphone, "dismissed the matter as a fabrication of the Israeli news media and said that the move had been fully coordinated with the Israeli military." (Isabel Kershner, AP, 21 August 2012)  Israeli news reports that followed claimed that the Israeli cabinet had authorized the use of Egyptian helicopter gunships, but the movement of a mass of tanks into the Sinai was neither approved nor coordinated with Israel. There next followed an even more disturbing report: Egyptian Anti-Aircraft Missiles were sighted in Sinai. (Gil Ronen, Arutz 7, 20 August 2012)  If true, it was a dangerous provocation because their deployment could only be intended for use against Israeli aircraft.  Meanwhile, in Washington, which is a tripartite member of the Camp David Accords and should be concerned with the deteriorating conditions in the Sinai, nothing of substance has been revealed either in Foggy Bottom or the Pentagon.

CONCLUSION

     From its beginning the MFO has been assiduous in protecting its image as a neutral entity devoted to keeping the peace in the Sinai.  It is not, however, a fighting force.  And under present conditions it is incapable of continuing its peacekeeping role envisioned for it by the 1982 agreement. In the slipstream of the military intrusions that began in early 2011, the MFO raison d'etre has been shattered.  The pier on which Egypt-Israel peace was moored has now been washed away.  To keep the peace today a multinational force would require heavy weapons and armored vehicles.  

     It is presently unclear what the United States, Egypt, or Israel expect of the MFO.  It is likely, however, that Egypt's Morsi will expel it soon unless something like U.S. foreign assistance would change Ikhwan thinking.  For the Muslim Brotherhood a foreign presence on Egyptian soil is no more welcome than the American military presence in Saudi Arabia was welcomed by its Islamist populace.   

     It would only seem logical that before the United States begins to consider any new foreign aid package—and the renewal of the annual billion-dollar stipend that is paid to the Egyptian military—there should be a new tripartite agreement that responds to what has now become the creeping remilitarization of the Egyptian Sinai.  For more than a quarter-century U.S. assistance to Egypt has been predicated on the willingness of Cairo to keep the peace with Israel. Now, however, with a sea-change in the both the government of Egypt and in its armed forces leadership, it is time to discern what Egypt's intentions for the Sinai are.  Certainly, a decision must be reached regarding the MFO.  A decision should be made as soon as possible regarding the role that institution should play in the Sinai, or whether its presence in its current form is necessary. 

http://econwarfare.org/viewarticle.cfm?id=4528&goback=.gmp_944357.gde_944357_member_152152321 

Meles Zenawi: From a Freedom fighter to a Dictator

Just another story of a man who started his life as a freedom fighter and gradually turned into a dictator.
His reign can be summarized in two key numbers: 21 years in office & 99% success rate in elections. He ruled his country with an iron fist, and claimed achieving a sustainable economic development pace for Ethiopia. Not only did he introduce the ethnic federalism model, but he also maintained a relatively stablized country. However, rebel movements never disappeared from the different regions of the country.  

A strong friend of the United States, A frequent stubborn foe of Egypt, he played an influential role in the Horn of Africa Region.
 

Here is a selection of articles that highlight different aspects of both his life & death. 

 A short biography

Meles Zenawi leaves behind richer, less tolerant Ethiopia

 http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_meles-zenawi-leaves-behind-richer-less-tolerant-ethiopia_1730717 
Ethiopian strongman Meles Zenawi led one of Africa's most populous nations for more than two decades, steering it along the path of economic growth while clamping down on dissent.

A towering figure in Africa's political landscape, Prime Minister Meles died late on Monday aged 57 at an overseas hospital where he had been recovering from an undisclosed illness for two months, state-run television said on Tuesday. He was born Legesse Zenawi in 1955 in Adwa, the site of Ethiopia's most celebrated victory against colonial invaders Italy in 1896.

He took the nom-de-guerre Meles as a tribute to Meles Tekle, a young activist killed by the government. But the time Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, the head of the Communist junta that ruled the country from 1974 to 1987, launched his Red Terror purge in 1977, Meles had ditched his medical studies and was fighting in the bush.

He was a rising figure in the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) that he helped found as a 20-year-old, which then aligned with other groups to form the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition. The EPRDF entered Addis Ababa in 1991, much to the amazement of the locals.
Meles led the country first as transitional president and later, after poorly contested elections in 1995, as prime minister of the renamed Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, winning renewed mandates in 2005 and 2010 in polls that rights groups said were rife with violations.

The West welcomed Africa's youngest leader enthusiastically, grateful for his overthrow of a communist regime and impressed with his urbane manner. It also came to value him for the central role his country - home to one of Africa's biggest armies - played in regional and continental security.
Former US President Bill Clinton said Meles was part of a "new generation" of African leaders and he was invited to join then British Prime Minister Tony Blair's crusading Commission for Africa. At home, the EPRDF set about trying to pull Ethiopia out of poverty, pledging to drive growth and improve the lives of peasant farmers.

It introduced a system of ethnic federalism, opening regional parliaments and giving Ethiopia's main ethnic groups the chance to govern the areas in which they dominate. Under Meles' leadership, the Horn of Africa country also embarked on a mass of energy and infrastructure projects, while hospitals and schools throughout the country have surged ten-fold. Officials expect economic growth of 11% for the 2011/2012 fiscal year that ended in June, thanks to rising agricultural output, the seventh consecutive fiscal year of growth. However, inflation remains stubbornly high, hitting 20 percent in July.
Meles forged close business ties with India and Turkey as well as Asian powerhouse China, which footed the $200 million bill for the sprawling, new headquarters of the African Union. The former rebel has made key contributions to regional security, twice sending troops into Somalia to battle Islamist rebels, while Ethiopian peacekeepers have been deployed in several African hotspots such as Sudan's Darfur and Abyei regions.

But Meles' record of solid economic growth, poverty reduction and closer ties to the West has been coloured by a firm crackdown on dissent. Following the disputed polls of 2005, Ethiopia rounded up almost the entire leadership of an opposition group that won an unprecedented number of seats in parliament and jailed them for life for treason. In 2009 followed an anti-terror law, under which more than one hundred opposition figures have been arrested.

The government insists it is tackling rebel groups that have links with al Qaeda and arch-foe Eritrea. More than 10 journalists have also been charged under the law, according to the Committee to Protest Journalists.
The group says Ethiopia is close to replacing Eritrea as the African country with the highest number of journalists behind bars. Two Swedish journalists were jailed for 11 years on charges of entering the country illegally and aiding a rebel group. Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights, has slammed the verdicts, saying journalists, human rights defenders and critics were facing a "climate of intimidation".
Meles responded with trademark defiance, labelling the duo as "messengers boys of terror groups". During the Group of Eight summit in Chicago last May, Meles was interrupted soon after he started to speak: "You are a dictator! You have committed crimes against humanity!" a member of the audience said. The bald, bespectacled strongman, visibly shocked at first, tried to continue talking before staring down, stony-faced.



 Future Impact:

Ethiopian PM Meles Zenawi dies after illness

 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19328356

Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has died aged 57 in a hospital abroad, the government says.

It did not give details but an EU spokesman later told journalists Mr Meles had died in Brussels, Belgium.
Mr Meles had not been seen in public for weeks and speculation about his health mounted when he missed a summit in Addis Ababa last month.
His deputy, Hailemariam Desalegn, becomes prime minister until elections due in 2015, state media reported.
Mr Meles took power as the leader of rebels that ousted communist leader Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991.
He is credited with spearheading economic development in Ethiopia - but, critics charge, at the price of respect for human rights.

He was austere and hardworking, with a discipline forged from years spent in the guerrilla movement - and almost never smiled, says Elizabeth Blunt, the BBC's former correspondent in Addis Ababa.

Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf said Mr Meles was an "intellectual leader for the continent", and UK Prime Minister David Cameron called him "an inspirational spokesman for Africa" who had lifted millions out of poverty.
But a spokesman for al-Shabab Islamist militants in Somalia - where Mr Meles twice sent troops to fight - told Reuters news agency they were "very glad" of his death, saying Ethiopia was "sure to collapse".
Ethiopia's Council of Ministers announced "with great sadness the untimely death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi" in a statement, state TV reported.
The statement said Mr Meles had been receiving medical treatment abroad for the past two months and that his health was improving. But he developed a "sudden infection" on Sunday and despite emergency treatment, died at 23:40 on Monday.
European Commission spokesman Olivier Bailly later told a regular news briefing that Mr Meles "passed away during the night here in Brussels".

Over some eight weeks that Mr Meles had been absent from the public eye, concerns about his health had grown, and in July he was said to have been admitted to hospital.

Reports suggested he was in hospital in the Belgian capital suffering a stomach complaint but these were never confirmed by the Ethiopian authorities.
Three weeks ago, government spokesman Bereket Simon dismissed reports Mr Meles was critically ill, and declined to give any details about Mr Meles's whereabouts.
A period of mourning had been declared until the funeral, for which no date has been announced.
State television said his body would be flown to Addis Ababa later on Tuesday.

Instability concerns
Mr Hailemariam, who is also Ethiopia's foreign minister, will become acting prime minister, government spokesman Bereket Simon told reporters.
He said an election was not necessary as the "constructional procedure" allowed for Mr Hailemariam to "kick off as a full-fledged prime minister".
In an earlier news conference, Mr Bereket said Mr Meles had struggled with illness for a year, but he had continued to work regardless.

Concerns have been expressed - including by Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga - that Mr Meles's death could lead to a power vacuum and dangerous instability in Ethiopia.
But Mr Bereket insisted the country was stable and that "everything will continue as charted" by the late prime minister.
This theme was echoed by state television, which stated that "even if Ethiopia has been badly affected for missing its great leader, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi initiated fundamental policies and strategies which will be further strengthened".
Ethiopia's economy has grown rapidly in recent years, despite the secession of Eritrea and the subsequent war between the two countries.

Under Mr Meles, Ethiopia became a staunch US ally, receiving hundreds of millions of dollars in aid over the years, and hosting the US military drones that patrol East Africa.

He won accolades from the West for sending troops to battle Islamist militants in Somalia, says the BBC's James Copnall.
But concern had been growing about the lack of democracy and human rights in Ethiopia, our correspondent in the region says.
At least 200 people died in the violence that followed the 2005 elections, and many journalists and politicians have been locked up.
One rights critic, Commander Assefa Seifu, called Mr Meles "a devil incarnate".
"He was always talking about democracy, civil rights, adherence to [the] constitution and the like. But it was only a lip service," he told the BBC.

 Analysis

  James Copnall BBC News

Meles Zenawi's death will have repercussions far beyond his country. He was undeniably central to everything in Ethiopia - the good and the bad, the economic growth and development, as well as the repressive climate denounced by opposition politicians and journalists. But he also played a key role in the region.
Since Mr Meles took power in 1991, Ethiopia has seen Eritrea secede, then fought a war with the new country. It also twice sent troops into Somalia to fight militants linked to al-Qaeda.
Ethiopia also has peacekeepers in Abyei, the border region claimed by both Sudan and South Sudan.
Political leaders in all these countries will be carrying out rapid calculations about what Mr Meles' death means for them.
The West has also lost a key ally in the Horn of Africa. Now the attention will switch to whether Mr Meles built a strong enough system to outlast him. He was austere and hardworking, with a discipline forged from years spent in the guerrilla movement - and almost never smiled, says Elizabeth Blunt, the BBC's former correspondent in Addis Ababa. Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf said Mr Meles was an "intellectual leader for the continent", and UK Prime Minister David Cameron called him "an inspirational spokesman for Africa" who had lifted millions out of poverty.
But a spokesman for al-Shabab Islamist militants in Somalia - where Mr Meles twice sent troops to fight - told Reuters news agency they were "very glad" of his death, saying Ethiopia was "sure to collapse".
Ethiopia's Council of Ministers announced "with great sadness the untimely death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi" in a statement, state TV reported.
The statement said Mr Meles had been receiving medical treatment abroad for the past two months and that his health was improving. But he developed a "sudden infection" on Sunday and despite emergency treatment, died at 23:40 on Monday.
European Commission spokesman Olivier Bailly later told a regular news briefing that Mr Meles "passed away during the night here in Brussels".



How Egyptians see him:

Here is an interesting look on how Egyptian press saw his life. The title of the following article is :

Meles Zenawi....US's cop in the African Horn and the enemy of Egypt's historic share in the Nile

ميليس زيناوى.. الشرطي الأمريكي في القرن الإفريقي وحامل لواء العداوة لحصة مصر من مياه النيل

بعد فترة من التعتيم والسرية الشديدة فرضتها السلطات الإثيوبية دامت أكثر من شهرين بشأن حقيقة مرض رئيس الوزراء ميليس زيناوي، أعلن اليوم الثلاثاء رسميًا عن وفاته في بلجيكا عن عمر ناهز 57 عامًا.

ارتبط اسم زيناوي مع الشارع المصري للمرة الأولى عام 1994 بعد محاولة الاغتيال الفاشلة التى تعرض لها الرئيس السابق حسني مبارك على الأراضى الإثيوبية، وزاد هذا الارتباط في السنوات الأخيرة بسبب إصراره على منازعة مصر في حصتها التاريخية بمياه النيل، وعدم اعترافه باتفاقية نهر النيل الموقعة عام 1959 التى تحدد حصص كل دولة من دول حوض النيل في مياه النهر.

اتخذ زيناوى موقفًا معاديًا لمصر خلال السنوات الثلاث الأخيرة، واتهمها بمحاولة زعزعة أمن واستقرار بلاده عبر بتمويل جماعات متمردة مسلحة تسعى للاستيلاء على السلطة، في موقف فُسِرَ وقتها بأنه محاولة للخروج من أزماته الداخلية ومحاصرة المعارضة له ومطالبته باصلاحات سياسية واقتصادية في البلاد.

استطاع زيناوي أن يؤثر على دول حوض النيل، وقام بإقناع بوروندي وأوغندا وكينيا تنزانيا ورواندا، بتوقيع الاتفاقية الإطارية الجديدة لتقاسم مياه النيل عام 2011، الأمر الذي يهدد أمن مصر المائي بشكل كبير.

وفي سعيه لأن يثبت دعائم حكمه في إثيوبيا؛ انفتح زيناوى على القوى الكبرى وخاصة الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، بهدف تحويل بلاده إلى قوى إقليمية في المنطقة مستغلًا في ذلك الحرب على الإرهاب والجماعات الجهادية المسلحة، وسوقَ نفسه باعتباره الشرطي الأمريكي في منطقة القرن الأفريقي، مستغلًا حالة السيولة الشديدة التي تشهدها جارته الصومال، والانفلات الأمني الذي تعيشه بعد أن تحولت إلى قبلة لتنظيم القاعدة، والتنظيمات الجهادية.

قام زيناوي بتحريك جيشه داخل الأراضي الصومالية للمرة الأولى عام 2006 بهدف القضاء على حركة الشباب المتشددة، فيما اعتبر وقتها أكبر خطوة وثقت علاقات إثيوبيا بالغرب منذ الإطاحة بمنجستو هيلا ميريم.

وفي عام 2011 قامت القوات الإثيوبية بدخول الصومال للمرة الثانية بدعم أمريكي أوروبي، وأكد زيناوي أن بلاده تعتزم الإبقاء على قواتها في الصومال إلى حين التصديق على دستور جديد للبلاد، و يصبح جيشها قادرًا على مواجهة خطر المتشددين.

دخل زيناوى في علاقات وثيقة مع إسرائيل، وفتح الباب على مصراعيه للأجهزة الأمنية الإسرائيلية خاصة الموساد، وتحولت أديس أبابا إلى واحدة من أقوى قواعد الموساد في إفريقيا ومعبر تل أبيب القوى للتغلل في غرب ووسط القارة الإفريقية، تحت ستار تصدير تكنولوجيا الري والزراعة التى تتفوق فيها الدولة العبرية إلى القارة السمراء.


وبالرغم من الانتقادات الشديدة التى وجهت إلى زيناوي، يُحسب له القفزة الكبيرة التى شهدها الاقتصاد الإثيوبي خلال سنوات حكمه، وتحقيقه معدلات نمو تخطت الستة فى المائة خلال السنوات الخمس الأخيرة، وكان أكثر المجالات نموًا في البلاد هو الزراعة، التى أولاها اهتماما شديدًا نظرًا للامكانيات الإثيوبية الكبيرة غير المستغله فى الأراضى والمياه.

جدير بالذكر أن زيناوي ولد عام 1954 في إقليم تكراي بشمال إثيوپيا، ودرس الطب في جامعة أديس أبابا وكانت تعرف وقتها باسم جامعة هيلا سلاسي لمدة سنتين، ثم ترك دراسة الطب عام 1975، وانضم إلى جبهة تحرير شعب تكراي، وعندما كان عضوا في الجبهة، أسس الاتحاد الماركسي-اللنيني لتكراي.

تولى زيناوى حكم إثيوبيا عام 1991م، بعد أن أطاح المجلس العسكري الذي كان عضوًا بارزًا فيه بالديكتاتور السابق منجستو هيلا مريم، واستمر في منصبه حتى عام 1995 ، ثم تولى رئاسة الوزراء منذ ذلك الحين بعد أن أجرى اصلاحات سياسية وتعديلات غيرت نظام الحكم في البلاد من رئاسي إلى برلماني، بهدف عدم صناعة ديكتاتور جديد، بيد أن هذا الهدف لم يتحقق بعد أن أحكم زيناوي قبضته على إثيوبيا، واستمر على رأس النظام السياسي أكثر من 20 عامًا، كنتيجه لإصراره على وضع مادة في الدستور تنص على تحصين منصب رئيس الوزراء من الإقالة.

حصل زيناوي على ماجستير في إدارة الأعمال من الجامعة المفتوحة في المملكة المتحدة عام 1995، ثم ماجستير العلوم في الاقتصاد من جامعة إراسموس في هولندا عام 2004.

في عام 1998 تعرض زيناوى إلى أقوى اختبار في حياته السياسية عندما قامت إريتريا بغزو بلاده، مما أدى لاندلاع حرب أسفرت عن مقتل عشرات الآلاف من الشعبين.

أظهر زيناوي خلال الحرب مع إثيوبيا قدرة سياسية وعسكرية بارعة استطاع خلالها أن يوحد الشعب الإثيوبي خلف قواته، وتمكن من دحر القوات الإريترية بل وسيطر على على حوالي ثلثي الأراضي الإرترية، وبالرغم من ذلك قام بتوقيع معاهدة سلام مثيرة للجدل مع إريتريا تضمن لها امتيازات عديدة.

أثار هذا القرار غضب الكثير من الإثيوپيين وأدى إلى حالة انقسام داخل الحزب الحاكم، بسبب قناعة كثيرين أن زيناوي يرغب في الحفاظ على الرئيس الإريتري أسياسي أفورقي.

وفي عام 2011 تغير موقف زيناوي من أفورقي وأعلنت إثيوبيا صراحة دعمها لجماعات إريترية متمردة تسعى للإطاحة بالرئيس أفورقي. وفي مارس الماضي أقرت إثيوبيا للمرة الأولى أن قواتها قامت بهجمات على المتمردين داخل إريتريا، وكانت هذه أول مرة تعترف فيها أديس أبابا بوقوع مثل تلك الهجمات منذ انتهاء الحرب الحدودية بين البلدين

http://gate.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/13/71/242647/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85/%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B7%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%A7.aspx .

Ya Nhar Alwan

See Ya Nhar Alwan and other 7amousha digital art in My Art page

Targeting Tribal Leaders: A New Militant Tactic in Sinai

By Ashley Lindsey

Militants killed Egyptian tribal leader Khalaf al-Menahy and his son Aug. 13 as the two were returning from a conference in east Sinai organized and attended by tribal leaders to denounce militancy, according to Sinai security forces. The senior al-Menahy was a prominent proponent of bolstering the Sinai Peninsula's representation in Egypt's parliament and of improving security in the region. He also was a prominent sheikh in the Sawarka tribe, said to be the largest in Sinai. Following his burial Aug. 13, the tribe vowed to seek vengeance.
This is the first reported case of militants attacking tribal leaders in Sinai. It comes soon after an attack on Egyptian security forces Aug. 5 and an attack on military checkpoints in northern Sinai on Aug. 8.
Although the militant tactic of targeting tribal leaders is new to Sinai, the tactic has been common in conflict zones in the Middle East and South Asia, such as in Yemen, Iraq and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. Though it can offer many benefits to these militants -- including weakening the targeted tribe and possibly leading to its co-option -- these kinds of attacks tend to only succeed in zones with little government control and against tribes that cannot effectively retaliate. Examining similar instances of this tactic thus provides a helpful tool for assessing the consequences of attacks against tribal elements in the Sinai Peninsula.

A Widespread Militant Tactic

Yemen

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has operated openly in Yemen's tribal-dominated southern and eastern provinces for years. It has sought to expand its presence and operations by winning over local tribes using tactics such as strategic marriages.
Lately, it appears to have begun a shift from wooing tribal leaders to intimidating them. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula recently failed in an attempt to assassinate tribal leader Majed al-Dhahab in the city of Radda in Bayda province. An important tribal leader, al-Dhahab participated in the offensive to drive al Qaeda -- and his own cousin, a local al Qaeda leader -- from the region after the militant group seized control of Radda in January. Al-Dhahab's son received a package that unbeknownst to him contained a bomb, which he was instructed to give to his father. However, the package exploded in his arms Aug. 4 before he could deliver it. Immediately after his son's death, al-Dhahab received a call warning him that the group would kill anyone who opposed it.
The group followed up with another attack on tribal elements Aug. 5. A suicide bomber detonated an explosive device at a wake in Jaar, killing 45 people. The dead included several tribal fighters who had participated in the June Yemeni government offensive against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and the wounded included a tribal leader.
The region's tribes have not publicly vowed to retaliate against the militant group. If they are capable of doing so, they probably will respond to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's attacks. But the tribes could be too weak to mount an effective response, especially in the wake of attacks on their leadership structure. This could cause some tribesmen to abandon the fight, allowing militants to try to resume activity in the region's towns should they wish.

Iraq and the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border

Although new to Yemen, militants frequently used the tactic of attacking tribal leaders during the U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The tactic is still frequently used, especially in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. In one significant instance, in 2007 al Qaeda in Iraq assassinated high-profile Sunni tribal Sheikh Abdul-Sattar Abu Risha, who led the Anbar Awakening Council. A U.S. ally, Abu Risha had formed the council, uniting dozens of Sunni tribes in the province against al Qaeda in Iraq. His killing backfired on the militant group, generating a massive outpouring of sympathy for Abu Risha and prompting the tribes in the province to join in vowing to fight al Qaeda in Iraq to the death.
In southern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban are deeply embedded into the tribal system. They have effectively used the tactic of assassinating tribal leaders to eliminate obstacles to their operations and evolution. To this end, they regularly employ suicide operations, armed assaults and roadside bombs against anti-Taliban militias known as lashkars and against tribal leaders in northwestern Pakistan.
One area particularly affected by such attacks is Bajaur, a Pakistani agency that borders Afghanistan's Kunar province. After numerous attacks on tribal leaders and members of peace committees in Bajaur, the Mamond tribe announced July 25 that the tribal leaders had formed a lashkar to prevent cross-border attacks. Hundreds of elders, leaders and religious figures of various subtribes and peace committees pledged their support for this militia. As with the killing of Abu Risha, the Afghan Taliban attacks on tribesmen and leadership in the region spurred a fiercely united response across numerous tribes, with the new militia even expressing a willingness to enter Afghanistan to attack Taliban leaders.

 

Upsides and Downsides of a Militant Tactic

Militant groups attack tribal leaders to increase their influence and area of operations. From the militants' perspective, removing a tribal leader ideally will weaken the targeted tribe. This could end the tribes' resistance and even lead to the its being co-opted by the militant group due to a leadership vacuum following the militant attack. The weakening of the tribe could leave the group no choice but to allow the militant group to operate unchallenged in its territory. Even though assassinated tribal leaders are replaced and the leadership structure remains intact, tribal leaders in the area could be persuaded to adopt a more accommodating stance on the presence of militants.
Success for a militant group in the long term happens under two conditions. First, the militants must be acting in an area with a tribal patronage network and limited government oversight. Without such a network, attacks on tribal leaders in efforts to co-opt and intimidate that tribe would not provide any significant gain. In Yemen, for example, the patronage and tribal network are very strong and in most cases enjoy greater legitimacy and power than the government. Attacks against tribal chiefs there are accordingly tantamount to attacks on the local government. On the one hand, that means tribal networks can band together and shun foreign militant elements as one community. On the other hand, if al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is able to coerce a tribe into aligning with it, the militant group will then enjoy access to that tribes' resources, will gain the ability to plan and launch attacks in that area, and could even gain better relations with neighboring tribes.
Second, the group must be militarily capable of overwhelming the targeted tribe and its allies or at least of gaining the upper hand. As can be seen from the Iraq example, killing Abu Risha backfired because his tribe was large, committed and militarily strong, and it had the support of several allied Sunni tribes that belonged to his Anbar Awakening Council.
The tactic of targeting a tribal leader thus comes with certain risks. When the aforementioned two conditions are not met, a militant group exposes itself to great danger when it targets tribal leaders.

 

Consequences of the Sinai Assassination

The Sinai Peninsula meets the requirement of limited government control and strong tribal networks. The question then becomes whether the Sinai tribes can muster a strong defense against the militants. In the coming weeks, it will be important to look for signs of the retaliation pledged by al-Menahy's Sawarka tribe and others allied with it. This retaliation could come in the form of attacks against the militants passing through Sawarka and its allied tribes' territory.
Tribal retaliation could also come in the less aggressive, yet still effective, form of supplying increased logistical support and intelligence to the Egyptian government. Increased weapons seizures and the arrest of key leaders suggest that tribal sources on the ground are providing intelligence to Cairo. A targeted campaign against the militants already has begun, with Egyptian planes bombing the mountains of El Arish on Aug. 15. The intelligence for these attacks likely came from local tribes.
The success of tribal and Egyptian security efforts against the militants will determine whether the militants miscalculated their position in Sinai when they attacked a key tribal leader. The resilience of militants in Sinai also will help determine whether they can continue to stage attacks against Egypt and Israel.

Read more: Targeting Tribal Leaders: A New Militant Tactic in Sinai | Stratfor

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Sinai: Closed Until Further Notice سيناء: مُغلقة حتى اشعارا آخر

Military operations, guns, insurgents, special forces, helicopters, attacks on check points,.... Northern and Mid Sinai is becoming a mini war zone. And its all because of the last tragic killings.
I studied various conflicts in the world and as I came across different examples in Africa and Latin America, an image of Egypt was forged in my head: this big crazy nation that luckily succeeded to keep itself safe from high rates of criminality, civil wars, insurgency, separatist movements,...etc.
But as time passes, this image seems to fall and the country seems to join another category. Criminality is not as high as in Brazil but we are on the road. Drug trafficking isn't as flagrant as in Mexico, but hey in less than one month we caught over 240 million narcotic pills in different ports,........ imagine how many have already passed. We have no rebel movements like in Colombia or Uganda, but dam it an attack by insurgents killed 16 army soldiers,.... not to mention the number of police officers killed during the last year and a half. Violence is no longer a phenomenon but a norm, the society is getting more brutalized and massacres are becoming less and less shocking.   
 
No one remembers hearing of such a massacre for long time, probably since the early 90's known as the terror war era, when again radicals regularly attacked and killed soldiers with cold blood in South Egypt.

However, this time is still different. When? Why? &  How? They attacked soldiers during iftar, a thing that we don't even remember Israelis have done during the war.  They stole two armored vehicles and crossed the borders for a reason they only know. And How? that is a big question......how the fuck could they manage to plan, gather, attack a military checkpoint without any dam clue by the mighty EGIS or all the other national security bodies (even if they did inform the president as they claim)? 

Anyway, I am too depressed to narrate the story, to analyze the facts (in case there were any), to speak of  the whole incident. Its just too sad to know that fellow soldiers, whom I or my brother could have been in their place, were killed that way, and by so called egyptians. Its even sadder to know that there exist Egyptians ( whatever was all the conspiracy plots raised about who planned it) who are ready to execute such an operation against their army, which protect their borders, in that way, knowing that this army is constituted of faithful soldiers and recruits who are just spending a military service.

But I am also very annoyed hearing all the arguments given by the MB partisans and Morsi supporters, to defend and justify his decisions of releasing ex-terrorists and to maintain fully non controlled open borders & tunnels with Gaza. With no concern what so ever for Egyptian national security, they cant stop defending this pan-Islamist ideology on the expense of the nation's interests. There will be no Islamic, Arabic, African ...... what ever Umma, before having a powerful strong well-conserved Egypt, who knows well its ancient history, who believes in & protects its mixed identity and who seeks to be a leader not a periphery follower.  May our beloved president and his hungry obedient gang gets it well.