On the 25th of January, the police national day, millions of Egyptians demonstrated in the streets of many Egyptian cities. During the first few days, demonstrators were crying mottos like “People want the fall of the regime” and “Democracy, Liberty and Social Justice”. But it was only a matter of time before they precise their demands in mottos like “We won’t go until he goes” & “Leave and let us live”. The rising of the demands’ ceiling change -from general peaceful ones to precise aggressive and high demands- was due to many reasons. First of all, the unprecedented police brutality. This latter didn’t only use clubs, rubber bullets and water cannons against the demonstrators but also expired tear gas and live gun shots, killing 350 peaceful citizens. Moreover, five hundred have disappeared and have never been found till now. Second, the total disrespect of the government -during the first several days- to the lawful demands of the protestors. The president delivered his first speech on midnight of the fourth day after 4 days of extreme violence, mass killings and interrogations about his presence in Egypt. Moreover, the public media tended either to ignore completely the events or to terrify citizens by describing the protestors as terrorist thugs causing chaos and anarchy.
Apart from this negative violent side, one brilliant aspect of this revolution is the symbolism. It carried out two symbolic transfers. The first was the transfer of the value of commemoration of the police day from the police to the people. As the police proved -during these last few years -not to deserve a national celebration, the people stripped them off their day and marked it in history as a day of the Egyptian revolution. The 25th of January would no longer be the police day but the people’s day. The second strand of symbolism concerns the transfer of power and legitimacy from one place to another. This revolution marked the transfer of legitimacy from the presidential palace to the street and precisely to Tahrir square, where a massive sit-in started. The palace didn’t give up easily but this transfer was an inevitable result of such a popular uprising. This rough process was televised and watched worldwide. But while the eyes of the world were on Tahrir Square, the eyes of the Egyptians were on the army and its ruling military council. This latter declared being the protector of constitutional legitimacy with a promise never to conduct any offensive act against the people, to which it has always been the guardian. As the source of legitimacy shifted from the palace to the square, the army didn’t only keep its word of being non offensive to its own people, but also acted as the defender of the people’s revolution. For sociologists, this could be an original moment to study. Because the society witnessed a moment of perfect equilibrium between its members “specialized in violence” and those “specialized in production”. It is also a unique moment because the armed institution responds to the civil calls of rupturing a contract, in which the army was a dominant part. Consequently, it is paving the way to an integrally civil social contract, in which it will no longer be dominant.
In the logic of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, the social contract is a deal concluded among the members of the society in which elite is designated to serve and take decisions on behalf of the others in exchange for certain compromises (finance and liberty wise) made by the rest of the society. Generally speaking, we can distinguish between several types of contracts, depending on the nature of counterparts. Dealing with social contracts, I believe we can distinguish between two different types of social contracts. On one hand, a civil social contract; as civilians choose one of them to rule them. On the other hand, a civil-military hybrid social contract where one counterpart is the vast civil society and the second is the military junta. This latter genre of contract was the one approved in Egypt throughout the last 6 decades. In 1952, the army led a coup-d’état against the royal family, liberating Egyptians from centuries of a feudal brutal system. Demonstrations spread all over Egypt welcoming the move and cheering the officers. At this point, an informal deal was done between the civil society and the military institution. Since then, only presidents from military background, and who had been supported by the army, led the country.
The terms of this informal deal was an exchange of civil and military interests. This fair deal wasn’t meant to cause any exploitation. On one hand, it seemed like the military institution should achieve the six goals of the revolution (establishing social justice, eradicating the feudal system, liberating the country from the colonizer, etc) and establish a national Arab project as promoted in the 50’s. Moreover, it would perform its regular tasks of defending the nation against the enemy and be ready for war at any time. On the other hand, the army in exchange would be granted enormous resources, whether from foreign aid or from the national budget, without any obligation to declare them or its expenditures. In addition, its personnel would be granted various advantages (the priority of generals as governors, the subsidies for transportation, the obligatory military service, etc.). And last but not least, the mystification and continuous glorifying of the army and its achievements all over the Egyptian history (in school curriculums, media, etc.). This realistic perspective isn’t by any mean a depreciation of the Egyptian army’s great role in Egyptian history as a protector and a liberator. It is just a pragmatic attempt to view things in terms of exchange and benefits.
As mentioned before, since 1952, only presidents from military background led the country. The first was legendary while the second was a liberator and a martyr and finally the third was a developer and a peace keeper. However, he failed to satisfy the needs of the people. For instance, during his last term in office, businessmen took over the government. As the rich minority became richer, the poor became poorer. Throughout the last decade, corruption has been spreading to all sectors till nepotism became the rule and state properties became exploited by the ruling oligarchy. Many catastrophes took place without any decent response from the government. The independence of judges wasn’t respected and constitutional amendments were tailored to make his son a successor to Egypt’s “throne”. Not only did this anger the street, but was also said to have angered many generals. The unlikely fraud of the last legislative elections frustrated people more and more. Many brutal police agents abused their powers, torturing and blackmailing citizens without any action from the government side. The state security department became the attack dog of the regime making Egypt a police state. The former president also kept peace with the hated Israel in a less dignified way than his predecessor who had signed the peace agreement after a huge military victory. Leaked news talked about many army generals being unsatisfied by Mubarak’s policies. As a matter of fact, most Egyptians had the feeling they had lost their dignity both domestically and internationally.
Luckily, the intelligent military council understood the popular desire of cancelling the current social contract, in which they were a part. They choose three delegates to execute their part of the deal. However, there last choice which started as hope for many Egyptians turned out to be an ugly story. Responsibly, they realized it was a huge mistake, and therefore, they accepted the new reality imposed by the street: a fully civil social contract. Despite the ongoing debates and controversies, what Egypt is witnessing now (the constitutional reforms, the technocrat ministry, etc.) is a handing over of power. In exchange, the military institution would probably keep the same privileges it always had. It even renewed its popular credit adding much more to its historic myth in the collective memory.
Other reasons could have been at the origin of this wise military administration of the crisis. On the top of the list: the obligatory military service. The military forces in the streets were mostly composed of the brothers and sons of the demonstrators, who were graduated from universities and schools last year. This made it very hard at any circumstances to open fire. On the contrary, they used extreme violence against escaping prisoners, but not always thugs. A second reason would be the good intentioned moral pressure put on the military shoulders by the civilians’ gestures and shouts. Giving roses to soldiers in front of cameras, cheering for the tanks and crying “The people and the Army are always one hand”, made it hard for soldiers to act brutally. Unlike the state security department, its history has also set criteria under which it can’t act.
One can argue, the main reason for this revolution was the civilizing of the social contract. After decades of disguised military rule, it is time to put on the chairs street men who are chosen directly by the people. But the question remains, would this rupture of the existing hybrid social contract have happened anyway even if Mubarak wasn’t the president? Was Mubarak only a catalyst for a change that would happen sooner or later?
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